C
hurchill also emphasised England’s extreme geo-
graphical vulnerability to air attack. While Ber-
lin was some 600 miles away, London was just
100 miles from potential enemy bases. As he said in the
House, in words that would come to haunt him in 1940:
“With our enormous Metropolis here, the greatest target
in the world,...a valuable fat cow tied up to attract the
beasts of prey...we are in a position...in which no other
country in the world is at the present time.”^1(^) The Chancellor, Sir John Simon, had myopically as-
serted that a strong economy was “the fourth arm of de-
fence,” leaving Britain unprepared for war in 1938. While
the Munich accord did at least give Britain breathing space
for rearmament, Chamberlain’s message of “peace in our
time” was seen as a message of weakness, not strength.
Amongst the most successful pre-war rearmament
measures, however, was the “shadow factory” scheme.
Several leading motor manufacturers provided redundant
capacity for aeroengine/airframe production with the
ability to switch production on demand. By April 1940,
Britain was already producing more fighters per month
than Germany.
The Dowding System
A
lmost alone amongst senior RAF staff, Air Mar-
shal Sir Hugh “Stuffy” Dowding, one of the war’s
largely unsung heroes, disagreed with Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin and the widely held belief that
“the bomber will always get through.” This thinking led to
the conclusion that the only sure means of defence was
being able to threaten more of the enemy’s women andchildren than they could of yours, and that fighters were
therefore of marginal utility. Churchill was one of the few
political figures supporting Dowding.
Quietly, and under Dowding’s close direction, Britain
had been developing an integrated air defence system that
was superior to anything in the rest of the world. Certain-
ly, Germany had point-defence radar, but nothing that
brought it all together; indeed, the Luftwaffe considered
that radar would give only enough warning for fighters to
scramble just before an attack, thereby anchoring them to
the point defence of their airfield.
Comprising a series of (unsophisticated) high and
low-level coastal radars, with Observer Corps reporting
posts overland, radars and observers fed information
on air movements to a Filter Room where reports were
judged, coordinated, and deconflicted, before being pre-
sented to commanders as a minute-by-minute air situa-
tion. This, combined with the introduction of modern
monoplane fighters, such as the Hurricane and then the
Spitfire, allowed Britain to have an effective air shield,
which neither the Poles, the French, nor even the Ger-
mans, had. As Churchill said: “All the ascendancy of the
Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but for
this system...and all was now fused together into a most
elaborate instrument of war, the like of which existed no-
where in the world.”^2(^) Not only did this “Dowding System” offer the Com-
mander-in-Chief a recognised air picture, it was dissemi-
nated down to operational commanders at Group Head-
quarters, and still further to Sectors from where fighters
could be offered tactical direction by radio (“Vector one-
I
n July 1934, just a year after Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power, Winston
Churchill declared that Germany had created a rudimentary air force,
contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler already possessed some 400
military aircraft, with an aircraft industry capable of producing 100 more each
month. Churchill argued that the German air force was already approximately
two-thirds the strength of the RAF’s Home Defence Force.
Churchill, Hitler, and the
Battle of Britain
By A. P. N. Lambert
C
hurchillalsoemphasisedEngland’sextremegeo-
graphical vulnerability to airattack. While Ber-
lin wassome 600 milesaway,Londonwas just
100 milesfrompotentialenemybases.Ashesaidinthe
House,inwordsthatwouldcometohaunthimin1940:
“WithourenormousMetropolishere,thegreatesttarget
intheworld,...avaluablefatcowtieduptoattractthe
beastsofprey...weareina position...inwhichnoother
countryintheworldisatthepresenttime.”^1
TheChancellor,SirJohnSimon,hadmyopicallyas-
sertedthata strongeconomywas“thefourtharmofde-
fence,” leavingBritainunpreparedforwarin1938.While
theMunichaccorddidatleastgiveBritainbreathingspace
forrearmament,Chamberlain’smessageof“peaceinour
time”wasseenasa messageofweakness,notstrength.
Amongst the most successful pre-war rearmament
measures, however, was the “shadow factory” scheme.
Several leading motor manufacturers provided redundant
capacity for aeroengine/airframe production with the
ability to switch production on demand. By April 1940,
Britain was already producing more fighters per month
than Germany.The Dowding SystemA
lmost alone amongst senior RAF staff, Air Mar-
shal Sir Hugh “Stuffy” Dowding, one of the war’s
largely unsung heroes, disagreed with Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin and the widely held belief that
“the bomber will always get through.” This thinking led to
the conclusion that the only sure means of defence was
being able to threaten more of the enemy’s women andchildren than they could of yours, and that fighters were
therefore of marginal utility. Churchill was one of the few
politicalfiguressupportingDowding.
Quietly, and under Dowding’s close direction, Britain
had been developing an integrated air defence system that
was superior to anything in the rest of the world. Certain-
ly, Germany had point-defence radar, but nothing that
brought it all together; indeed, the Luftwaffe considered
that radar would give only enough warning for fighters to
scramble just before an attack, thereby anchoring them to
thepointdefenceoftheirairfield.
Comprising a series of (unsophisticated) high and
low-level coastal radars, with Observer Corps reporting
posts overland, radars and observers fed information
on air movements to a Filter Room where reports were
judged, coordinated, and deconflicted, before being pre-
sented to commanders as a minute-by-minute air situa-
tion. This, combined with the introduction of modern
monoplane fighters, such as the Hurricane and then the
Spitfire, allowed Britain to have an effective air shield,
which neither the Poles, the French, nor even the Ger-
mans, had. As Churchill said: “All the ascendancy of the
Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but for
this system...and all was now fused together into a most
elaborate instrument of war, the like of which existed no-
whereintheworld.”^2
Not only did this “Dowding System” offer the Com-
mander-in-Chief a recognised air picture, it was dissemi-
nated down to operational commanders at Group Head-
quarters, and still further to Sectors from where fighters
could be offered tactical direction by radio (“Vector one-I
n July 1934, just a year after Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power, Winston
Churchill declared that Germany had created a rudimentary air force,
contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler already possessed some 400
military aircraft, with an aircraft industry capable of producing 100 more each
month. Churchill argued that the German air force was already approximately
two-thirds the strength of the RAF’s Home Defence Force.
Churchill, Hitler, and the
Battle of Britain
By A. P. N. Lambert