Finest Hour – July 2019

BOMBER COMMAND

The Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, asked Harris

for an immediate rebuttal, persuaded Churchill to with-

draw his erroneous signal, and demanded Ismay destroy

his copy. Churchill did and Ismay promised to, but did

not. The reply Harris sent that day said in part: “We have

never gone in for terror bombing and the attacks which

we have made in accordance with my Directive have in

fact produced the strategic consequences for which they

were designed and from which the Armies now profit....

Attacks on cities, like any other act of war, are intolerable

unless they are strategically justified. But they are strategi-

cally justified in so far as they tend to shorten the war and

so preserve the lives of Allied soldiers.”8‘

(^) Churchill should have harnessed his extraordinary
oratorial skills to articulate the supreme importance of
Bomber Command in the spring of 1945. Instead, he
sank into silence. In spite of this, Churchill and Harris re-
mained friends and respectful of one another’s consider-
able talents. At Churchill’s funeral, Harris was accorded
the singular honour of serving as an honorary pallbearer.
Bomber Command’s Accomplishments

T

his brings us to the supreme question:

what did Bomber Command accom-

plish? According to the Canadian gov-

ernment’s website:

The efforts of the approximately

50,000 Canadians who served with the

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and

the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Bomber

Command operations over occupied

Europe were one of our country’s most

significant contributions during the Sec-

ond World War....

The men who served in Bomber Com-

mand faced some of the most difficult

odds of anyone fighting in the war. For

much of the conflict, the regular dura-

tion for a tour of duty was 30 combat

sorties. The risks were so high, howev-

er, that almost half of all aircrew never

made it to the end of their tour. Despite

the heavy losses, Bomber Command

was able to maintain a steady stream of

aircraft flying over U-boat bases, docks,

railways and industrial cities in Germa-

ny, as well as enemy targets in occupied

Europe.^9

Although the Canadian historical view is clear,

only the Germans who experienced the attacks at the time

really knew what was being accomplished. And what did

the Germans say? Field Marshal Erwin Rommel told his

superiors: “If you can’t stop the bombing, we can’t win the

war.” Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, Field Marshal

of the Luftwaffe Albert Kessselring, General Karl Koller,

Field Marshal Erhard Milch, General Sepp Dietrich, and

Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt all attributed Ger-

many’s defeat to Allied air superiority and the Strategic

Bombing Offensive.^10 Reich Munitions Minister Dr. Al-

bert Speer said Germany’s failure to defeat Bomber Com-

mand was Germany’s greatest lost battle of the whole war.

He believed the Strategic Bombing Offensive did more

damage to the German war effort than losing every battle

in Russia, including the surrender of Stalingrad, because

bombing continuously damaged with ever increasing fe-

rocity, and then ultimately destroyed, Germany’s ability

to produce the means necessary to make war.

Opposite left

Prime Minister Churchill watches a Short Stirling of

RAF 7 Squadron taking off on 6 June 1941

at Oakington, Cambridgeshire

Above

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris

BOMBERCOMMAND

TheChiefofAirStaff,SirCharlesPortal,askedHarris
foranimmediaterebuttal,persuadedChurchilltowith-
drawhiserroneoussignal,anddemandedIsmaydestroy
hiscopy.ChurchilldidandIsmaypromisedto,butdid
not.ThereplyHarrissentthatdaysaidinpart:“Wehave
nevergoneinforterrorbombingandtheattackswhich
wehavemadeinaccordancewithmyDirectivehavein
factproducedthestrategicconsequencesforwhichthey
weredesignedandfromwhichtheArmiesnowprofit....
Attacksoncities,likeanyotheractofwar,areintolerable
unlesstheyarestrategicallyjustified.Buttheyarestrategi-
callyjustifiedinsofarastheytendtoshortenthewarand
sopreservethelivesofAlliedsoldiers.”8‘
Churchill should have harnessed his extraordinary
oratorial skills to articulate the supreme importance of
Bomber Command in the spring of 1945. Instead, he
sank into silence. In spite of this, Churchill and Harris re-
mained friends and respectful of one another’s consider-
able talents. At Churchill’s funeral, Harris was accorded
the singular honour of serving as an honorary pallbearer.

Bomber Command’s Accomplishments

T

his brings us to the supreme question:

what did Bomber Command accom-

plish? According to the Canadian gov-

ernment’s website:

The efforts of the approximately

50,000 Canadians who served with the

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and

the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Bomber

Command operations over occupied

Europe were one of our country’s most

significant contributions during the Sec-

ond World War....

The men who served in Bomber Com-

mand faced some of the most difficult

odds of anyone fighting in the war. For

much of the conflict, the regular dura-

tion for a tour of duty was 30 combat

sorties. The risks were so high, howev-

er, that almost half of all aircrew never

made it to the end of their tour. Despite

the heavy losses, Bomber Command

was able to maintain a steady stream of

aircraft flying over U-boat bases, docks,

railways and industrial cities in Germa-

ny, as well as enemy targets in occupied

Europe.^9

Although the Canadian historical view is clear,

only the Germans who experienced the attacks at the time

really knew what was being accomplished. And what did

the Germans say? Field Marshal Erwin Rommel told his

superiors: “If you can’t stop the bombing, we can’t win the

war.” Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, Field Marshal

of the Luftwaffe Albert Kessselring, General Karl Koller,

Field Marshal Erhard Milch, General Sepp Dietrich, and

Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt all attributed Ger-

many’s defeat to Allied air superiority and the Strategic

Bombing Offensive.^10 Reich Munitions Minister Dr. Al-

bert Speer said Germany’s failure to defeat Bomber Com-

mand was Germany’s greatest lost battle of the whole war.

He believed the Strategic Bombing Offensive did more

damage to the German war effort than losing every battle

in Russia, including the surrender of Stalingrad, because

bombing continuously damaged with ever increasing fe-

rocity, and then ultimately destroyed, Germany’s ability

to produce the means necessary to make war.

Opposite left

Prime Minister Churchill watches a Short Stirling of

RAF 7 Squadron taking off on 6 June 1941

at Oakington, Cambridgeshire

Above

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris