54 F1 RACING AUGUST 2019
PICTURES:SHUTTERSTOCK;RENAULTSISYPHUS WASTHE
king of Corinthcondemned bythe gods to an
eternity of pushing ahuge boulder up a hill, only
for it to topple back androll tothe botto m as
he nearedthe su mmit.Howthis scenario must
resonate withthe senior managementof
Renault F1 – andthe corporation signing
the cheques –as th e team repeatedly falls
well short of Formula1’s peak, seemingly
regardless of theeffort and money expended.
When Renault reacquiredthe mo ribund
‘Team Enstone’ latein 2015 it set itself an
ambitious but historically realistic target:
to be in contention for racewins and world
championshipsinfi ve years.After all,
when it boughtthe Enstone factory in2000,
after four seasonsof progressFernandoAlonso
deliveredsilverwarein20 05 and2006. Renault’s
diffi culties infollowing a similar trajectory this
time around demonstrate that F1 isnow a very
diff erent sport. The ground rules have changed
beyondrecognition.
On theface of it, they haven’t. In2000 F1 was
dominated by asingle team thatbuil t its engine
and chassis under one roof – Ferrari. While
the Mercedes team of todayhas geographically
separate chassis and enginefacilities, the two
factoriesare not so far removed and powertrain
engineersare d eeply involved in the car designprocess.This le vel of inte grationisessential.
Commercially and politically, though, theF1
landscape has shiftedinwa ys that militateagainst
Renault recapturing pastglories.HISTORY
REPEATINGThe Benetton team Renaultacquir ed in
March 2000 came with championship-winning
pedigree, though it had recently entered a spiral
of decline. Benetton’s Enstone factory and
Renault’s engine facility at Viry-Châtillon were
not strangers toeach other, having collaborated
to title-winning effect in 1995, and Benetton
had been running Mecachrome-built engines- in effect the same Viry-designed V10 – since
Renault stepped back from F1 atthe end of 1997.
In an explicit signal of intent to return to the
glory years, Renault even reinstalled former
team principal Flavio Briatore at the helm.
It wasn’t a painless transition. While fresh
investment and new hires at Enstone – including
an innovative parallel designteam arrangement- yielded an uptick in chassis performance,
Viry’s contribution was more problematic.
Unusually wide, with the cylinder banks
aligned at 110 degrees rather thanthe
more conventional 90, the 2001 engine
was overweight, underpowered and
unreliable. Believing the aerodynamic
gains and lower centre ofgravity to be
worth the initialgrowing pains, Renault
persistedfor three seasons before going
the oppositeway, building a 72-degree
V10 for 2004.
It would beeasy to view this period asone
in which the team’s performance improved in
a broadly linear fashion until itfi nally toppled
Ferrari from its perch in 2005. But nothing is
ever that simple, and many ofthe issues that
bedevil Renault to this day are rooted in this era.
Firstly, questions remain about how
competitivethe basic product was. While the
cars looked aerodynamically sophisticated, and
Renault innovated in chassistechn ologies such
as the controversial mass damper, the enforced
switch to Bridgestone rubber after Michelin’s
withdrawal at the end of 2006 revealed major
shortcomings. By necessity – because of the
GREEK MYTHOLOGY
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