22 new york | august 5–18, 2019
our years after Donald Trump
emerged as the most nakedly au-
thoritarian candidate in American
history, it’s tempting to view the threat he once seemed to pose as overblown. Upon his
election, some panicked that he would be a proto-dictator, trampling every democratic
institution in the fascist manner imported from Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.
Others saw merely a malign, illiberal incompetent who would probably amount to nothing
too threatening—or believed that America’s democratic institutions and strong Constitu-
tion would surely survive Trump’s strongman posturing, however menacing it appeared in
the abstract. Many contended that his manifest criminality meant he would be dispatched
in short order, with impeachment simply a matter of time.
It was all, unavoidably, unknown and unknowable—and so
we cast around for historical analogies to guide us. Was this the
1930s, along the lines of Sinclair Lewis’s It Can’t Happen Here?
Or the 19th century in Latin America, with Trump an old-school
caudillo? Was he another demagogue like George Wallace or
Huey Long—but in the White House?
Well, we now have a solid record of what Trump has said and
done. And it fits few modern templates exactly. He is no Pinochet
nor Hitler, no Nixon nor Clinton. His emergence as a cultish
strongman in a constitutional democracy who believes he has
Article 2 sanction to do “whatever I want”—as he boasted, just casu-
ally, last month—seems to have few precedents.
But zoom out a little more and one obvious and arguably apposite
parallel exists: the Roman Republic, whose fate the Founding
Fathers were extremely conscious of when they designed the U.S.
Constitution. That tremendously successful republic began, like
ours, by throwing off monarchy, and went on to last for the better
part of 500 years. It practiced slavery as an integral and fast-growing
part of its economy. It became embroiled in bitter and bloody civil
wars, even as its territory kept expanding and its population took off.
It won its own hot-and-cold war with its original nemesis, Carthage,
bringing it into unexpected dominance over the entire Mediterra-
nean as well as the whole Italian peninsula and Spain.
And the unprecedented wealth it acquired by essentially looting
or taxing every city and territory it won and occupied soon created
not just the first superpower but a superwealthy micro-elite—a one
percent of its day—that used its money to control the political pro-
cess and, over time, more to advance its own interests than the
public good. As the republic grew and grew in size and population
and wealth, these elites generated intense and increasing resent-
ment and hatred from the lower orders, and two deeply hostile
factions eventually emerged, largely on class lines, to be exploited
by canny and charismatic opportunists. Well, you get the point.
Of course, in so many ways, ancient Rome is profoundly different
from the modern U.S. It had no written constitution; it barely had
a functioning state or a unified professional military insulated from
politics. Many leaders were absent from Rome for long stretches of
time as they waged military campaigns abroad. There was no estab-
lished international order, no advanced technology, and only the
barest of welfare safety nets.But there is a reason the Founding Fathers thought it was worth
deep study. They saw the destabilizing consequences of a slavehold-
ing republic expanding its territory and becoming a vast, regional
hegemon. And they were acutely aware of how, in its final century
and a half, an astonishing republican success story unraveled into
a profoundly polarized polity, increasingly beset by violence, shed-
ding one established republican norm after another, its elites fight-
ing among themselves in a zero-sum struggle for power. And they
saw how the weakening of those norms and the inability to com-
promise and mounting inequalities slowly corroded republican
institutions. And saw, too, with the benefit of hindsight, where that
ultimately led: to strongman rule, a dictatorship.
So when, one wonders, will our Caesars finally arrive? Or has one
already?Drawing parallels between Rome’s fate and
America’s is not new, of course—from Gore Vidal’s
trenchant critique of American imperialism in the Cold
War, to Patrick Buchanan’s A Republic, Not an Empire
in the late ’90s, to Cullen Murphy’s Are We Rome? in the aughts. But
the emergence of Trump adds a darker twist to the tale of imperial
overreach and republican decline: that the process is accelerating,
and we may be nearing a point of no return.
The story of Rome is as unlikely as America’s. Its republic emerged
from a period of rule of consecutive kings, elected for life, beginning
around 750 BCE, or so later Roman historians claimed. That period
lasted a couple of centuries before the last king, a despised figure
called Tarquinius Superbus, was overthrown. From then on, from
509 BCE to 49 BCE, the rule of one man was anathema and the title
rex a political kiss of death. A Senate and other assemblies replaced
the monarch, and power was more widely distributed.
The new offices of state, including the most powerful, the con-
suls, were all held by at least two people, with strict term limits of
one year—and with each officeholder given a mutual veto, to guard
against any monarchical pretensions. The power awarded to the
consuls and the Senate—representing the landed elite and, increas-
ingly, the business class—was balanced against that of the tribunes
(there were, at first, two), representing the masses, who had their
own assembly with real clout. A new office of “dictator” was cre-
ated—a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency assignment to one manF
PHOTOGRAPH: PREVIOUS SPREAD, ANGELO MERENDINO/GETTY IMAGES (HAIR)TRANSMITTED________ COPY ___ DD ___ AD ___ PD ___ EICTRANSMITTED1619FEA_AndrewSullivan_lay [Print]_35565047.indd 22 8/2/19 7:36 PM22 newyork| august5–18, 2019
years after Donald Trump
ergedas the most nakedly au-
thoritariancandidateinAmericanhistory, it’s temptingtoviewthethreat heonceseemedtoposeasoverblown.Upon his
election,somepanickedthat hewouldbea proto-dictator,tramplingevery democratic
institutionin thefascist mannerimportedfromMussolini’sItaly andHitler’sGermany.
Otherssawmerelya malign,illiberal incompetentwhowouldprobablyamounttonothing
toothreatening—orbelievedthat America’s democraticinstitutionsandstrongConstitu-
tionwouldsurelysurviveTrump’sstrongmanposturing,howevermenacingit appearedin
theabstract.Manycontendedthat hismanifest criminality meanthewouldbedispatched
inshortorder, withimpeachmentsimplya matteroftime.
Itwasall,unavoidably,unknownandunknowable—andso
wecastaroundforhistoricalanalogiestoguideus.Wasthisthe
1930s,alongthelinesofSinclairLewis’sItCan’t HappenHere?
Orthe19thcenturyinLatinAmerica,withTrumpanold-school
caudillo?Washeanotherdemagoguelike GeorgeWallaceor
Huey Long—butintheWhiteHouse?
Well,wenowhavea solidrecordofwhat Trumphassaidand
done.Andit fitsfew moderntemplatesexactly.He is noPinochet
norHitler, noNixonnorClinton.Hisemergenceasa cultish
strongmanina constitutionaldemocracywhobelieveshehas
Article2 sanctiontodo“whateverI want”—asheboasted,just casu-
ally, last month—seemstohavefew precedents.
Butzoomouta littlemoreandoneobviousandarguablyapposite
parallelexists:theRomanRepublic,whosefatetheFounding
Fatherswereextremelyconsciousofwhenthey designedtheU.S.
Constitution.Thattremendouslysuccessfulrepublicbegan,like
ours,bythrowingoffmonarchy, andwentontolast forthebetter
partof 500years.It practicedslaveryasanintegral andfast-growing
partofitseconomy. It becameembroiledinbitterandbloodycivil
wars,evenasitsterritory keptexpandinganditspopulationtookoff.
It wonitsownhot-and-coldwarwithitsoriginalnemesis,Carthage,
bringingit intounexpecteddominanceovertheentireMediterra-
neanaswellasthewholeItalianpeninsulaandSpain.
Andtheunprecedentedwealthit acquiredbyessentiallylooting
ortaxingevery city andterritory it wonandoccupiedsooncreated
notjustthefirstsuperpowerbuta superwealthymicro-elite—aone
percentofitsday—that useditsmoney tocontrolthepoliticalpro-
cessand,overtime,moretoadvanceitsownintereststhanthe
publicgood.As therepublicgrew andgrew insizeandpopulation
andwealth,theseelitesgeneratedintenseandincreasingresent-
mentandhatredfromthelowerorders,andtwodeeplyhostile
factionseventuallyemerged,largelyonclasslines,tobeexploited
bycannyandcharismaticopportunists.Well,yougetthepoint.
Ofcourse,insomanyways,ancientRomeis profoundlydifferent
fromthemodernU.S.It hadnowrittenconstitution;it barelyhad
a functioningstateora unifiedprofessionalmilitary insulatedfrom
politics.Many leaderswereabsentfromRomeforlongstretchesof
timeastheywagedmilitary campaignsabroad.Therewasnoestab-
lishedinternationalorder, noadvancedtechnology, andonlythe
barestofwelfaresafety nets.
Butthereis a reasontheFoundingFathersthoughtit wasworth
deepstudy. Theysaw thedestabilizingconsequencesof a slavehold-
ingrepublicexpandingitsterritory andbecominga vast,regional
hegemon.Andthey wereacutelyawareofhow, initsfinalcentury
anda half,anastonishingrepublicansuccessstoryunraveledinto
a profoundlypolarizedpolity, increasinglybeset byviolence,shed-
dingoneestablishedrepublicannormafteranother, itselitesfight-
ingamongthemselvesina zero-sumstruggleforpower. Andthey
sawhowtheweakeningofthosenormsandtheinability tocom-
promiseandmountinginequalitiesslowlycorrodedrepublican
institutions.Andsaw,too,withthebenefitofhindsight,wherethat
ultimatelyled:tostrongmanrule,a dictatorship.
Sowhen,onewonders,willourCaesarsfinallyarrive? Orhasone
already?DrawingparallelsbetweenRome’s fateand
America’sis notnew,ofcourse—fromGoreVidal’s
trenchantcritiqueofAmericanimperialismintheCold
War, toPatrickBuchanan’sA Republic,NotanEmpire
inthelate’90s,toCullenMurphy’sAre We Rome?intheaughts.But
theemergenceofTrumpaddsa darkertwisttothetaleofimperial
overreachandrepublicandecline:thattheprocessis accelerating,
andwemaybenearinga pointofnoreturn.
Thestoryof Romeis asunlikelyasAmerica’s. Its republicemerged
froma periodof ruleof consecutivekings,electedforlife,beginning
around 750 BCE,orsolaterRomanhistoriansclaimed.Thatperiod
lasteda coupleofcenturiesbeforethelast king,a despisedfigure
calledTarquiniusSuperbus,wasoverthrown.Fromthenon,from
509 BCEto 49 BCE,theruleof onemanwasanathemaandthetitle
rexa politicalkissofdeath.A Senate andotherassembliesreplaced
themonarch,andpowerwasmorewidelydistributed.
Thenewofficesofstate,includingthemost powerful,thecon-
suls,wereallheldbyatleast twopeople,withstricttermlimitsof
oneyear—andwitheachofficeholdergivena mutualveto,toguard
againstany monarchicalpretensions.Thepowerawardedtothe
consulsandtheSenate—representingthelandedeliteand,increas-
ingly, thebusinessclass—wasbalancedagainst that ofthetribunes
(therewere,atfirst,two),representingthemasses,whohadtheir
ownassemblywithrealclout.A newofficeof“dictator”wascre-
ated—abreak-glass-in-case-of-emergencyassignmenttooneman PHOTOGRAPH: PREVIOUS SPREAD, ANGELO MERENDINO/GETTY IMAGES (HAIR)