FlightCom Magazine 20a luxury hotel in the sky. The closest any
carrier got to that were the famous showers
on Emirates Airline’s A380s and the Etihad
Airways’ first-class apartment. Virgin
Atlantic never took a single A380.
Long before the 2019 decision to
terminate the programme in 2021, it
was clear the A380 would never make a
profit. Airbus sunk more than €20 billion
($22.3 billion) into the project, but the
aircraft, which entered service in 2007
with Singapore Airlines, was too big. It
was superseded by more efficient twins
like the 787, the A350 and the upcoming
777X. Yet, for all its challenges, the A380
was a technological success, and knowledge
gained through the programme flowed into
the A350.
CRISIS YEARS
In 2005, a discovery that some A380
wiring harnesses were too short highlighted
shortcomings in Airbus’ industrial system.
The crisis led to a series of structural
reforms that ultimately led to Airbus’ parent
company merging with the commercial unit
a decade later.
The A380 was not the company’s only
headache. Having seriously underestimated
the 777 in the 1990s, Airbus now grappled
with how to respond to Boeing’s new 787. Its
initial response—re-engining the A330—
triggered an outcry among customers.
Steven Udvar-Hazy, then CEO of aircraft
leasing powerhouse International Lease
Finance Corp. (ILFC), made sure Airbus
understood it needed a better design. As
described in one of Guy Leitch’s columns in
2007, Udvar-Hazy virtually single handedly
forced Airbus to redesign the A350 with a
larger fuselage – the Extra Wide Body
(X W B).
So in 2006, Airbus made the crucial
decision to launch the A350. The aircraft
helped make up for the A340 mistake, and
its relatively smooth development, testing
and industrial ramp-up indicated that
Airbus had learned many of the painful
lessons of the A380 programme.
In 2007, Enders took centre stage in
Airbus’ commercial aircraft business. He
had risen mainly on the defence side of the
company, serving as co-CEO of the parent
company with Louis Gallois. When the
board agreed that EADS should be run by
a single CEO, Enders proposed that he head
up the commercial aircraft business. He
became sole CEO of the parent company
five years later.
Enders once said it was less important
to launch new aircraft programmes than
to make money on those that are built. He
nonetheless reluctantly agreed to the launch
of the A350. As Bombardier was starting to
make inroads into the narrowbody market
with its new C Series, and airlines were
demanding more fuel-efficient aircraft,
Airbus launched the A320neo in late 2010.
It had new engines, but as few other changes
as possible from the first-generation aircraft.
Boeing initially tried to ignore the Neo,
pushing ahead to develop a clean-sheet
successor to its 737. But in a huge coup by
John Leahy, Airbus won a big A320Neo
order from American Airlines. “There was
a big fight, and Boeing threatened to sue
[American] because it happened before the
end of the 20-year exclusivity agreement,”
Leahy recalled to AWS&T. “But American
said if Boeing wanted a share of the order,they would have to [produce] a 737neo as
well. So they did it and did not even know
what the aircraft was going to be like
because they were so focused on the all-new
single-aisle.”
Airlines have since ordered 6,504
A320neo-family aircraft, more than of any
other aircraft in the space of nine years.
The A321neo now controls the upper end
of the single-aisle market and provides
the basis for the A321LR, Airbus’ venture
into narrowbody long-haul flying. It is also
Airbus’ strategic weapon against Boeing’s
proposed new midmarket airplane (NMA).
In another stroke, Airbus agreed in
2017 to assume a controlling stake in
Bombardier’s C Series programme at
no cost. Some called it the “deal of thecentury.” The cutting-edge aircraft now fills
out the lower end of the Airbus portfolio
and has forced Boeing to react by buying a
controlling stake in Embraer’s commercial
aircraft business.
In contrast to the commercial successes,
Enders did not do as well in his bid to balance
out Airbus by bulking up the company’s
defence business. His 2012 effort to merge
with UK-based military powerhouse BAE
Systems was scuttled by the German
government. But in the end, there was a
silver lining: The French government was
so concerned about future interference in
Airbus from the Germans that it agreed to
governance changes that would severely
limit state interference in the company.
Enders was now free to make Airbus
even more international, opening an A320
final assembly line in Mobile, Alabama, to
complement a similar line in Tianjin, China.
When he retired earlier this year,
handing over his responsibilities toGuillaume Faury, Enders looked back at
his company’s history. “Launching Airbus
today would be impossible,” he said with
a view on the rise of nationalism and
protectionism that also infiltrates European
politics and business decisions. Given this
assessment, it is even more remarkable that
it was possible for Europeans to join forces
50 years ago, only a little over 20 years after
the defeat of Nazi Germany.
In the early days, Felix Kracht put it this
way: “In Toulouse, British bolts are torqued
into German nuts using French wrenches.”
That it is still happening may be one of
Airbus’ biggest successes.THE DECISION
TO PURSUE
THE A380 WAS
N O T P U R E LY
RATIONAL.