FlightCom – August 2019

7 FlightCom Magazine

• Adheres to standard radiotelephone
  phraseology and procedures


• Accurately reads and interprets
  required company and flight
  documentation


• Accurately reads, interprets,
  constructs and responds to datalink
  messages in English


• Completes accurate reports as
  required by operating procedures


• Correctly interprets non-verbal
  communication


• Uses eye contact, body movement
  and gestures that are consistent
  with and support verbal messages.
  This could well save many marriages
  out there, if both parties adhered to
  these guidelines...
  The other eight competency descriptors
  are just as comprehensive and thorough,
  and give excellent definition and specific
  indicators as to what should and should not
  be displayed by the crew.
  Let’s consider that accident that became
  the birthplace of CRM (Cockpit Resource
  Management, as it was first called), the
  Tenerife accident of 1977, when KLM and
  Pan Am collided on the runway at Los
  Rodeos Airport in thick fog.
  This accident encapsulates everything
  that could go wrong with communication, as
  well as just about every other competency,
  but poor communication essentially caused
  the accident.
  An excerpt from the accident report
  reads as follows:
  Immediately after lining up, the KLM
  captain advanced the throttles and the
  aircraft started to move forward. First officer
  Meurs advised him that ATC clearance had
  not yet been given, and Captain Veldhuyzen
  van Zanten responded: “No, I know that. Go
  ahead, ask.”
  Meurs then radioed the tower that they
  were “ready for takeoff” and “waiting for
  our ATC clearance”. The KLM crew then
  received instructions that specified the
  route that the aircraft was to follow after
  takeoff. The instructions used the word
  “takeoff,” but did not include an explicit
  statement that they were cleared for takeoff.
  Meurs read the flight clearance back to the
  controller, completing the readback with the
  statement: “We are now at takeoff.” Captain
  Veldhuyzen van Zanten interrupted the co-
  pilot’s read-back with the comment, “We’re
  going.”
  The controller, who could not see

the runway due to the fog, initially

responded with “OK” (terminology that is

nonstandard), which reinforced the KLM

Captain’s misinterpretation that they had

takeoff clearance.

The controller’s response of “OK” to the

co-pilot’s nonstandard statement that they

were “now at takeoff” was likely due to his

misinterpretation that they were in takeoff

position and ready to begin the roll when

takeoff clearance was received, but not in

the process of taking off.

The controller then immediately added

“stand by for takeoff, I will call you”,

indicating that he had not intended the

clearance to be interpreted as a takeoff

clearance.

A simultaneous radio call from the Pan

Am crew caused mutual interference on

the radio frequency, which was audible in

the KLM cockpit as a 3-second-long shrill

sound, (or heterodyne). This caused the

KLM crew to miss the crucial latter portion

of the tower’s response.

The Pan Am crew’s transmission was

“We’re still taxiing down the runway,

Clipper 1736!” This message was also

blocked by the interference and inaudible to

the KLM crew.

End of excerpt.

I would say, looking at those indicators,

that ALL individuals concerned could be

considered Not Competent if this was an

assessment. The Pan Am crew, despite their

efforts and being clear and concise, were

blocked and this should have immediately

been rectified by the tower.

Of course, the actions of the KLM

Captain, who was head of training for the

airline at the time, were the trigger here, but

clear, effective communication would have

definitely saved the day.

Notice the description of the

competency states ‘in normal and non-

normal’ situations. Thus, if the heat is on,

so to speak, communication has to remain

effective. For many years after this accident,

the before take-off checklist was amended

to include “Take-off Clearance – Obtained”,

responded to by all three cockpit occupants.

That put a band-aid on the problem, but

since I left Boeing 747s as a second officer

twenty years ago, I have not seen it on a

checklist again.

The concept of EBT is that evidence is

obtained during the training and checking

that the crew members have developed the

Knowledge, Skills and Attitude (KSA) to

be able to perform in any adverse situation

that may be encountered on the line. Is EBT

going to create ‘real’ pilots? I certainly

feel it has become a lot more relevant in

developing the soft skills that are absolutely

critical to support the stick and rudder stuff.

Let’s see how it is approached by our

regulator, who is being brought up to speed

in this regard by local airlines. Well done,

Comai r.

IATA EBT implementing partners.