JULY/AUGUST AIRFORCEMAG.COMthreats, fth-generation ghters have freedom of maneuver
because they are both stealthy and they know where threats
are located. “I see radars. I see airplanes. I see surface-to-
air missiles, and the jet knows where those things are and
tells me,” an F-22 pilot said of his experience flying combat
sorties over Syria in Operation Inherent Resolve. “So, I have
a picture of the battlespace.”
With that high degree of battlespace awareness, a
fifth-generation pilot can turn stealth into an offensive
attribute for attack.
Stealth, therefore, is not just a defensive survival attri-
bute; it’s a prerequisite to successful offensive operations,
combining the advantage of surprise with increased
lethality.
UNDERSTANDING THE COST AND VALUE OF
STEALTH
Unfortunately, multiple oversight agencies, including
the respected Congressional Budget Office (CBO), continue
to treat fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft as if they are
interchangeable. This leads to questionable analytical
outcomes given outdated assessment models. One recently
released CBO report presented startling options to offset a
hypothetical cancellation of the F-35: Fill the gap by pur-
chasing legacy fighters like the F-16 and F/A-18. The same
report also floated the idea of divesting the entire F-22 fleet
without suggesting how to deliver comparable capability.
These are poorly reasoned options and false choices.
Treating all fighter aircraft as similar commodities, regard-
less of capabilities, reveals a dangerous disconnect between
the threats America faces and the Air Force America needs.
Additionally, most—if not all—of DOD’s focus on unit
and sustainment costs per aircraft type ignore the actual
costs necessary to accomplish desired objectives against
the priority threats of the National Defense Strategy. For
example, fifth-generation aircraft do not require the large
mission package of additional specialized support aircraft
to jam radars, defeat enemy fighters, and negate surface-
to-air-missile systems that fourth-generation aircraft do.
This mission support package is not part of DOD’s cost
analysis, but it should be considered to make any cost
assessment relevant. Meeting actual mission objectives is
what matters, and cost-per-effect is a more relevant metric
than cost per aircraft or cost per flying hour.
Including support asset requirements in an “ap-
ples-to-apples” cost-effectiveness assessment shows that
fifth-generation aircraft are significantly more cost-effective
than fourth-generation aircraft. Additional force-protec-
tion packaging for fourth-generation fighters also drive up
requirements for additional pilots and support personnel,
along with additional mission support aircraft such as air-
to-air refueling tankers. Against peer threats, the cost of
achieving a desired effect with fourth-generation aircraft
is dramatically higher than the same effect delivered from
fifth-generation aircraft. In a simple cost analysis, the return
on investment is substantially greater with fifth-generation
aircraft.FIXING THE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY GAP
In testimony last year to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen David L. Goldfein
and then-Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson addressed the
health of the Air Force. Service advantage and readiness
shrank, they said, “due to the longest continuous stretch
of combat in our nation’s history, coupled with years of
inconsistent and insufficient funding.” All the while, China
and Russia have closed gaps in both capacity and capability.
The result, they added, has been “an overstretched and
under-resourced United States Air Force.”
For three decades, the Air Force has divested capabilities
to help meet budget requirements, fueling today’s recap-
italization crisis. The service is now too small and risks
getting smaller as aircraft age out of service. To stabilize
the force and meet the objectives of the National DefenseLt. Gen. Mark
Kelly, 12th
Air Force
Commander, in
an F-35 leads
a formation of
F-15Es over the
Utah Test and
Training Range
in July 2018.
The US should
increase F-35
procurement
rates to make
up for USAF’s
undersized F-22
fleet.Photo: A1C Codie Trimble