JULY/AUGUST AIRFORCEMAG.COM An F-15C on
a training
exercise out
of Kadena AB,
Japan. F-15Cs
will wear out
their basic
structural
integrity by the
early- to mid-
2020s.Photo: A1C Matthew SeefeldtStrategy, the Air Force must acquire at least 72 ghters per
year. Failure to sustain that rate risks a force that does not
have the necessary capacity to meet our national security
needs.
However, the issue is not simply about quantity of air-
craft, but also about the capability of those aircraft. As the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta , Marine Gen. Joseph
Dunford, said on May 29, “Where you have to make a choice
between capacity and capability, I would go with capability.”
Air Force written testimony to Congress makes that point
plainly, stating “to meet emerging worldwide threats across
the spectrum of con ict ... the cornerstone of the Air Force
[must be a] shift from 4th/5th-generation to a 5th/6th-gen-
eration eet.” Increasing the procurement rate of fth-gen-
eration aircraft and accelerating NGAD development are the
paths necessary to ensure this goal is met.
While some defense observers suggest that the F-15EX
program will come from additive funds, history suggests
otherwise over the long haul. Budget plus-ups of this sort
disappear when defense budgets decline, but the mandate
to pay the bill remains. Given today’s ballooning federal
de cits, economic uncertainty, and mounting pressure from
mandatory federal spending accounts, it is unlikely that
current spending levels can be sustained. Further looming
over the budget is a sharply divided and gridlocked Congress,
with the growing possibility of a return to sequester-level
spending. Either path could lead to a competition between
the F-35 and F-15EX for funding, with severe rami cations
for the F-35.
If the F-15EX becomes a program of record and funds are
appropriated for production, it is likely that any future bud-
get trade-o s could come out of planned F-35 purchases. is
would reduce F-35 production rates, pushing up the cost per
plane. If that happens, new doubts will emerge about F-35
program sustainability and a ordability, yielding further
cuts and further price hikes. is is what Washington calls
a “death spiral,” a self-reinforcing dynamic that leads to an
inevitable early end to expensive programs.
Recently departed Secretary of the Air Force Heather
Wilson pushed back against the trade-o of F-35 for F-15EX,
prudently explaining: “If the budget gets crunched in the
out years, you can’t start trading o and saying we’re going
to keep open an F-15 line. ... We’re not going to trade o
fth-generation for fourth-generation.” In reality, however,
once the F-15EX becomes a line item in the budget, that
decision will not be in the hands of the Air Force. Congress
will make that call, with local politics, not prudent planning,
the foremost driver in the debate.
It is ironic that it is because the F-22—itself a victim of the
death spiral—was prematurely canceled that an F-15EX is
even being considered. e only di erence this time is that
dramatic reductions to the Air Force F-35 program would
also impact the US Navy, the US Marine Corps, and a host
of allied militaries also buying the F-35.
While each military service will need new capabilities and
capacities to ful ll their obligations, none of those invest-
ments will matter if the Air Force is unable to provide the
airpower foundation upon which joint combat operations
depend. America must now have the resolve to rebuild its Air
Force to be able to defeat advanced adversaries as outlined
in the National Defense Strategy. e following actions are
prudent means to accomplish this objective:■ (^) Ensure fth-generation aircraft and NGAD receive top
priority for nite budget resources. Procuring F-15EXs cannot
come at the cost of these essential modernization programs
■ (^) Increase the F-35A production rate to 80 aircraft per
year beginning in scal year 2021
■ (^) Reduce the ratio of fourth- to fth-generation ghters
from 82/18 to 50/50 as rapidly as possible
■ (^) Encourage allies to buy fth-generation aircraft
■ (^) Eliminate “aircraft unit cost” as a decision metric on
programs and replace it with a “cost-per-e ect” model
■ (^) Replace the simplistic cost-per- ying-hour metric with
the more holistic metric of total annual cost per aircraft.
America’s sons and daughters will y into harm’s way in
whatever combat aircraft their nation procures. We must
do everything in our power to ensure those aircraft can
get the job done in the face of an increasingly challenging
threat, while also ensuring the airmen inside will return
home safely from their missions. at requires investing in
modern, capable, and relevant advanced aircraft designs
and technology. J