Air Force Magazine – July-August 2019

52 JULY/AUGUST 2019 AIRFORCEMAG.COM JULY/AUGUST 2019 AIRFORCEMAG.COM 53

T

he notion of a "Revolution in Military Af-

fairs" started with the Russians in the late

1970s. Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, chief of

the Soviet general staff, was among those

who declared that a “military-technical

revolution,” later called an RMA, was un-

derway.

As the Russians saw it, advanced technologies—es-

pecially “informatics”—and precision strike weapons

employed at long ranges were beginning to revolu-

tionize the nature of warfare.

However, the RMA concept was initially based on

theory, not combat experience. The first opportunity

to make a judgment from the evidence of a significant

conflict was the Gulf War of 1991.

Senior military officials in Washington expected the

Gulf War to unfold in traditional fashion. In December

1990, they forecast a violent overland struggle, pos-

sibly involving the greatest tank battle in the history

of warfare. Ground forces were anticipated to be

decisive. Airpower would be a supporting element.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

predicted 15,000 US casualties. Some estimates ran

much higher.

The reality of Operation Desert Storm was far differ-

ent. Airpower opened the attack at 3 a.m. on Jan. 17,

1991. By dawn, Iraq’s command and control network
      had been destroyed. A 38-day air campaign left the
      Iraqi forces reeling, unable to conduct coherent oper-
      ations. They were finished off in a 100-hour, four-day
      ground action. Casualties for the allied coalition were
      247 dead and 901 wounded, with US losses accounting
      for about half of the total.
      Precision strikes and information superiority set
      a new standard for effectiveness, making it possible
      for coalition airpower to hit 150 individual targets
      the first day. By contrast, Eighth Air Force in World
      War II struck only about 50 target sets in all of 1943.

The Counter-Revolution

in Military Affairs

By John T. Correll

Two USAF F-15Cs, an
F-15E, and two F-16s
over burning oil fields in
Kuwait during Operation
Desert Storm. US airpower
destroyed Iraq's command
and control operations in
less than 24 hours.

Photo: USAF

For the ground forces, the problem with the RMA

was airpower, not technology.

The RMA

was a threat

to budgets

and roles

and mis-

sions for the

ground forc-

es, and the

Army struck

back.