The New York Times International - 30.07.2019

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T HE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL EDITION TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2019 | 7

Business


Jamie Gamble spent most of his career
as a partner at the law firm Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett, which counts
virtually every major company in the
United States — including Facebook,
General Motors, Google and JPMorgan
Chase — among its clients.
A longtime lawyer for the insurance
giant American International Group,
Mr. Gamble worked alongside Richard
Beattie, Simpson Thacher’s chairman
at the time, to advise A.I.G. during the
financial crisis of 2008 and in the years
of litigation that followed.
Mr. Gamble has had an epiphany
since retiring nearly a decade ago that
is so damning of his former life that it
is likely to give his ex-partners a case
of agita.
He has concluded that corporate
executives — the people who hired him
and that his firm sought to protect —
“are legally obligated to act like socio-
paths.”
He made that determination about
five years ago when he started to work
on a novel that recently inspired him to
compose a provocative essay elucidat-
ing what he calls, based on his first-
hand experience, a “complex network
of horribles” in corporate America. He
recently shared a draft with a small
number of colleagues, seeking their
comments.
“The corporate entity is obligated to
care only about itself and to define
what is good as what makes it more
money,” he writes in the essay. “Pretty
close to a textbook case of antisocial
personality disorder. And corporate
persons are the most
powerful people in
our world.”
Mr. Gamble’s
change of heart will
not exactly come as
a revelation to the
increasingly vocal
group of investors,
politicians and even
chief executives who
are pushing compa-
nies to be more
responsible and to
focus on metrics like environmental
sustainability and corporate govern-
ance, rather than on simply maximiz-
ing profits.
But in the world of corporate law-
yers — and the board governance
experts among whom it is quietly
getting attention — Mr. Gamble’s essay
may be a watershed.
He doesn’t blame his former clients,
exactly. He blames the law.
Perhaps most significantly, he has
devised a provocative new governance
rule that he believes will fix what ails
corporate America, although he ac-
knowledges in his essay that his idea
“is likely to seem insane to senior
corporate executives and boards of
directors.”
Still, he says, “To everyone else it’s
likely to seem far too small a change to
make a big difference.”
Mr. Gamble’s proposal is this: that
every company devise a set of ethical
rules to be part of their bylaws, a move
that could open them up to shareholder
lawsuits, should they fail to stick to
those rules.
Companies, he suggests, should
“adopt a binding set of ethical rules,
approved by stockholders and address-
ing the key ethical dimensions of cor-
porate life” including:

THEIR“relationships with employees.”
THEIR“relationships with the communi-
ties in which they produce and sell.”
THEIR“relationships with customers.”
THEIR“effects on the environment.”
AND THEIR“effects on future genera-
tions.”

Once the rules are in place, he
writes, “any shareholder could sue the
board of directors for violating the
ethical rules — just as any shareholder
can today sue the board of directors for
violating the maximize rule.”
There is something rather elegant
about Mr. Gamble’s concept.
Today, corporate directors’ decisions
are measured — at least from a legal
perspective — on whether they maxi-
mize shareholder value. When they
stray from doing that in the short term,
they are protected by the “business
judgment rule” if they can show that
whatever decisions they have made
are geared toward maximizing value in
the long term. It may be an oversimpli-
fication, but if they veer from seeking
profits in the name of other stakehold-
ers, shareholders may have a legal
case against them.
Nowhere in their responsibilities are
they expected to consider any stake-

Reining in


boardroom


‘sociopaths’


Andrew Ross Sorkin


D EALBOOK

S ORKIN,PAG E 8

Aformer
corporate
lawyer
wants all
companies to
devise ethical
rules to be
part of their
bylaws.

In early 2017, a memo circulated inside
Amazon that imagined an ambitious
new grocery chain. The document was
written like a news release, a common
practice for ideas being weighed inside
the company, with the title “Grocery
Shopping for Everyone.”
The new stores, the document envi-
sioned, would have robust produce,
fresh food and prepared meals sections.
Nonperishable products, like paper tow-
els or canned beans, would be stored on
a separate floor, away from customers.
Shoppers could order those items with
an app, and while they shopped for fresh
food, the other products would be
brought down in time for checkout.
There would also be an area to pick up
groceries ordered online and to manage
packages for delivery drivers.
The faux news release, which has not
previously been reported, cited a fic-
tional grocery expert named Hal
Apenyo, as in the chili pepper, declaring
success in just six months. “The conver-
sion from offline grocery shopping to
mixed format shopping has been mas-
sive,” the character was quoted as say-
ing.
A few months later, in June 2017, Ama-
zon barged into the grocery business in
a different way, by announcing a block-
buster deal to buy Whole Foods for $13.
billion. The purchase catapulted Ama-
zon near the top of the $700 billion gro-
cery industry and sank stocks of tradi-
tional grocers on fears that they would
be outmaneuvered into oblivion. The
memo and other big grocery proposals
stopped circulating inside Amazon, as
Whole Foods demanded everyone’s at-
tention.
But two years later, Whole Foods
seems not to have been the answer to
Amazon’s grocery ambitions; it seems
to have only whetted executives’ appe-
tite.
The acquisition has made clear the
difficulties of selling fresh food inexpen-
sively, either in a physical store or
through delivery. Bananas are not the
same as books.
But the combination has also shown
glimmers of success, particularly in de-
livery. And that has provided some fuel
to Amazon executives’ efforts to add an-
other food-selling option — one built
from the ground up.
The company is now quietly exploring
an ambitious new chain, probably sepa-
rate from Whole Foods, that is not far re-
moved from the one outlined in the old
memo. It would be built for in-store
shopping, as well as pickup and delivery.
As the discussions heated up this year,
employees passed around a slightly up-
dated version of the memo.
The details of Amazon’s challenges
and ambitions in the grocery business
are based on interviews with more than
15 people who have worked at or with
the company. Most spoke on the condi-
tion of anonymity because they have
nondisclosure agreements or were not
authorized to speak publicly.
“People really need to understand —
Whole Foods is the beginning, it’s not
the end,” said Brittain Ladd, who
worked on Amazon’s grocery operations
until 2017. “It’s not everything.”
An Amazon spokeswoman, Rachel
Hass, said the company “doesn’t com-
ment on rumors or speculation.”
Before it bought Whole Foods, Ama-
zon was an afterthought as a grocer, well
behind chains like Publix and ShopRite.
The food it sold was limited to mostly

canned and dry goods, and its decade-
long effort to sell perishables through a
pickup and delivery program called Am-
azonFresh never caught on.
Whole Foods had struggles of its own.
The company was fending off activist in-
vestors and had stopped expanding.
While its base remained loyal, grocers
like Krogers and Walmart had started
selling many of the products that once
set Whole Foods apart, like organic kale
and kombucha.
“Whole Foods was broken — we
shouldn’t forget that, which is why they
could buy it,” said Phil Lempert, a food
marketing analyst.
It was clear from the start that the two
companies differed culturally. John
Mackey, Whole Foods’ co-founder and
longtime chief executive, had written a
best seller about how companies should
have a social conscience and consider
all stakeholders in their decisions. Ama-
zon corporate principles say good lead-
ers “do not compromise for the sake of
social cohesion.” But Amazon pushed
changes in things that were once points
of pride for the grocer.
In an effort to shed Whole Foods’
“whole paycheck” reputation, Amazon
bought more from national food distrib-
utors and cut back on the local farms.
United Natural Foods, a leading organic
distributor, has increased its sales to
Whole Foods by 38 percent over the past
two years. And inside stores, employees
stopped making signs on chalkboards
by hand. Now, Whole Foods prints signs
in a font that resembles handwriting but
requires less labor.
Other price-cutting efforts failed. The
former head of a major produce com-
pany said Amazon had told him it
wanted to sell marquee fresh items at
low prices every day. The executive said
he had to explain that certain products,
like berries or lettuce, may be available
all year, thanks to global supply chains,

but that they cost more in the off-season.
Forcing flat, low prices would put too
much risk on growers.
Amazon executives, the person said,
were caught off guard by the response.
It didn’t seem as if they had fully appre-
ciated how seasonality made predict-
able pricing far harder than pricing of
cereal or paper towels.
The mixed results are reflected in
prices at Whole Foods today. A standard
basket of goods has fallen about 2.5 per-
cent since the acquisition, according to
Gordon Haskett Research Advisors.
Amazon has said its Prime members,
who get charged $119 for an annual sub-
scription, have saved hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in discounts at Whole
Foods. But over all, Whole Foods is still
more expensive than other major gro-
cers, particularly for items like meat.
Amazon has also run into some trou-
ble integrating Whole Foods into its de-
livery machine.
Amazon never saw delivering cold

milk and fragile fruit to doorsteps as
something for the masses, according to
former employees. Instead, executives
thought of it as an option for people who
wanted high-quality foods and could af-
ford a premium price to have fragile and
fresh items arrive at their doorstep.
In theory, that was a good fit for Whole
Foods and its affluent shoppers. Within
six months, Amazon began making two-
hour deliveries from Whole Foods in
four cities for Prime members. Six
months later, that had expanded to more
than two dozen cities. It’s now available
in 90.
But Whole Foods stores are not like
Amazon’s delivery warehouses. Be-
cause Whole Foods sells so many fresh
items, its stores have smaller back-of-
house areas than a standard supermar-
ket. That means employees who pick
products for online orders must gather
more items from the same shelves as
shoppers. They roam aisles with scan-
ners in hand, asking associates on the

floor when they can’t find something.
In addition, items in grocery stores
are grouped together. Walk into a Whole
Foods, and a picker for an online order
might be standing there trying to see if
the identical tubs of Parmesan she’s
grabbed are grated or shaved. In a ware-
house, similar items are kept far apart to
avoid confusion.
Still, deliveries have shown big poten-
tial, making up almost all of Whole
Foods’ growth.
The promise of serving customers,
but doing so more efficiently, has Ama-
zon thinking again about aggressive in-
vestment in groceries.
Rather than drastically expand
Whole Foods, several former employees
said, Amazon is considering designing
stores specifically with pickup and de-
livery in mind and with a smaller area
dedicated to fresh shopping — as the old
memo imagined.
While it is unclear what hybrid design
Amazon has in the works, a recent job
posting for a store designer on “an excit-
ing new team” was looking for someone
interested in “creating multiple
customer experiences under one roof.”
And Amazon has been looking for
spaces close to Whole Foods locations,
indicating a hub-and-spoke approach in
which one store serves as the ware-
house and commissary for others. Ex-
perts say it could take more than a dec-
ade to build a new chain.
To be a major grocery player, Amazon
would need a little more than 2,
stores, the old memo estimated. That’s
far fewer than the 5,000 run by Walmart,
the country’s top grocery seller, but
more than the roughly 1,200 operated by
Publix. Whole Foods got Amazon about
a quarter of the way there.
A store designed with different shop-
ping options, “Mr. Apenyo” predicted in
the old memo, would be “highly scal-
able.”

Amazon’s insatiable grocery appetite


SEATTLE

Buying Whole Foods seems
to have encouraged the tech
giant to pursue other ideas

BY KAREN WEISE

Above, a Whole Foods supermarket in New York. Below, in Austin, Tex., Whole Foods groceries being prepared for a delivery by Amazon, which bought the chain in 2017.

DOLLY FAIBYSHEV FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

DREW ANTHONY SMITH FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

A report last week on second-quarter
gross domestic product showed that the
United States economy had slowed last
spring.
The latest report came exactly 10
years after the Great Recession ended,
making this officially the longest expan-
sion in American history. So perhaps it’s
no surprise that forecasters, investors
and ordinary people are increasingly
asking when the next downturn will ar-
rive.
Economists often say that “expan-
sions don’t die of old age.” That is, reces-
sions are like coin flips: Just because
you get heads five times in a row doesn’t
mean your next flip is more likely to
come up tails.
Still, another recession will come
eventually. Fortunately, economic ex-
pansions, unlike coin-flip streaks, usu-
ally provide some hints about when they
are nearing their end — if you know
where to look.
Below is a guide to some of the indica-
tors that have historically done the best
job of sounding the alarm.
One caveat: Economists are notori-
ously terrible at forecasting recessions,
especially more than a few months in
advance.

In fact, it’s possible (though unlikely)
that a recession has already begun, and
we just don’t know it yet.
“Historically, the best that forecasters
have been able to do consistently is rec-
ognize that we’re in a recession once
we’re in one,” said Tara Sinclair, an econ-
omist at George Washington University.

“The dream of an early warning system
is still a dream that we’re working on.”

INDICATOR 1: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

WHAT TO WATCH FOR:Rapid increases, even
from a low level.
WHAT IT’S SAYING:All clear.

DISCUSSION: The unemployment rate is
near a 50-year low, but that isn’t what
matters for recession forecasting. What
matters is the change: When the unem-
ployment rate rises quickly, a recession
is almost certainly on its way or has al-
ready arrived.
Even small increases are significant.
Claudia Sahm, an economist at the Fed-
eral Reserve, recently developed a rule
of thumb that compares the current un-
employment rate with its low point over
the previous 12 months. (Both are meas-
ured using a three-month average, to
smooth out short-term blips.) When that
gap hits 0.3 percentage point, the risks
of a recession are elevated. At half a per-
centage point, the downturn has proba-
bly already begun.
Unemployment is considered a “lag-
ging” indicator, and it is unlikely to be
the first place to pick up on signs of trou-
ble.
But what it lacks in timeliness, it
makes up for in reliability: The unem-
ployment rate pretty much always
spikes in a recession, and it rarely rises
much without one.
Which is why right now the unem-
ployment rate should be a source of
comfort: Not only is it low, it’s trending
down. When that has been the case his-
torically, there has been less than a one

in 10 chance of a recession within a year,
according to a Brookings Institution
analysis that worked off Ms. Sahm’s
measure.
RELATED INDICATORS: Initial claims for un-
employment insurance; payroll job
growth.

INDICATOR 2: THE YIELD CURVE

WHAT TO WATCH FOR:Interest rates on 10-
year Treasury bonds falling below those
on three-month bonds. (It has already
happened.)
WHAT IT’S SAYING:Storm warning.

DISCUSSION: The yield curve is less intu-
itive than the unemployment rate, but it
has historically been among the best
predictors of recessions.
The fundamentals are straightfor-
ward: The curve essentially shows the
difference between the interest rate on
short-term and long-term government
bonds. When long-term interest rates
fall below short-term ones, the yield
curve is said to have “inverted.”
Think of the yield curve as a measure
of how confident investors are in the
economy. In normal times, they demand
higher interest rates in return for tying
up their money for longer periods. When

Some signs a recession will come. Sometime.


BY BEN CASSELMAN

SOURCE: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS VIA BROOKINGS INSTITUTION THE NEW YORK TIMES RECESSION, PAGE 8

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