indiaintheinternationalkaleidoscope22 News the Newsbehind JULY 08, 2019own nuclear submarine programme.
Th us, Mr Modi’s meetings with Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Chinese
President Xi Jinping in Osaka take on
an added importance. President Xi is
expected in Varanasi for what is being
termed Wuhan-II......”
But “crucial will be India’s ability to
allay the Trump Administration’s trade
phobias. Th e Indian trade defi cit with
US, taking into account goods and
services, dropped from US $27 billion
in 2017 to US $21 billion in 2018. Th e
US also ignores that India’s cumulative
weapons purchases from it total US $18
billion, compared to the US $15 billion
with Russia in recent times. Nearly
2,00,000 Indian students in the US
also suck almost US $10 billion dollars
annually out of the Indian reserves.
US Representative Eliot L. Engel,
chairman of the House Committee on
Foreign Aff airs, wrote to Mr Trump
that the US policy towards India needs
coherence and predictability. Perhaps
the best India can hope for is to avert
crises till Mr Trump’s fate is decided
next year......”
AMID TENSIONS,
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE TO
MOVE FORWARD
Taking a positive, but cautious
view is Michael Kugelman (Deputy
Director and Senior Associate for
South Asia with the Asia Program at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre
for Scholars, Washington, DC). He
believes “the positive messaging from
both sides signals the commitment
of both countries to work through
their disputes — a commitment
rooted in the realisation that there is a
strategic imperative to move forward.
Washington and New Delhi appear
to genuinely believe that their shared
vision for Asia — a free, open, rules-
based system meant to push back against
Chinese power — ensures a continued
strong partnership. To be sure, such
future comity is far from guaranteed.As pointed out in a recent essay by
the Brookings Institution, converging
U.S.-India views on China following
the 1962 India-China war did not lead
to deeper cooperation. Still, the positive
rhetoric telegraphs the belief on both
sides that the relationship, warts and
all, remains on a positive trajectory, at
least for now.”
But Kugelman also warns “the
relationship could eventually turn sour
and even plunge into a full-blown crisis.
Imagine if the U.S. were to investigate
India’s trading practices, or if it penalises
New Delhi for completing its S-400
deal with Russia. Such moves would
ratchet up tensions to the point where
any effusive rhetoric would sound
disingenuous more than reassuring. But
that’s not where we are today.”
INDIAN POLICY OF MULTI-
ALIGNMENT OR STRATEGIC
AUTONOMY IS HARDLY
SUSTAINABLE
Christophe Jeff relot (senior research
fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS,
Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and
Sociology at King’s India Institute,
London) takes a practical and a
strategic view. To him “the Indian
policy of multi-alignment or strategic
autonomy......is hardly sustainable
when the world scene gets so polarised
that memories of the Cold War come
to mind. India thought it could be a
strategic partner of the US and still buy
S-400 from Russia. It went ahead with
the deal at a cost of Rs 40,000 crore
(without any tender) in spite of US
warnings — and now it has to negotiate
in order to get a sanctions waiver.
“Similarly, to be a friend of Iran
and the US at the same time is getting
more and more diffi cult.” India will
need to take a call if “Trump returns
to the Bush motto ‘with us or against
us’? After all, India needs Iran because
of Chabahar and Afghanistan — where
the American withdrawal is another
bone of contention.”Jeff relot says Washington is also
considering if the US can rely on India
to contain China. In the last Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation meeting at
Bishkek, Modi did not rule out India
joining hands with Russia and China
in the emerging trade war with the US.
Th e decision India will make regarding
5G will send a signifi cant signal: Will
it boycott Huawei, like the US, or will
it say ‘no’ to the US and deal with
Huawei?”
DIFFICULT CHOICES MODI
BEFORE INDIA
Shyam Saran (former foreign
secretary and senior fellow, Centre for
Policy Research) raises similar issues.
He says “India’s ties with Iran and its
decision to go ahead with the purchase
of the Russian S-400 air defence system
may introduce new strains and could
well strengthen growing perceptions
in Washington that the value of the
Indo-US strategic partnership has been
overplayed. India’s current approach
of ‘multi-alignment’ as means of
maintaining its strategic autonomy was
clearly visible in Modi’s participation
in two back-to-back trilaterals — one
with Trump and Shinzo Abe and the
other with Xi and Putin. Th is is a repeat
of similar meetings at the previous
summit. For good measure, there
was also a BRICS Summit bringing
together the leaders of Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa. At the
India-US-Japan trilateral, the focus was
on security in the Indo-Pacifi c while in
the India-Russia-China trilateral, there
was clearly a convergence of interest on
maintaining an open and multilateral
global trade regime, opposing
protectionism and unilateralism and
supporting more sovereign control
over the digital economy. What India
is looking for are issue-based coalitions
and interest-based partnerships, but
this will become more complicated
as geopolitics becomes increasingly. polarised.
.
.