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24 News the Newsbehind JULY 08, 2019Council to examine the pros and cons
before walking out. It was a decision
taken arbitrarily and was opposed by
his Defence Secretary, General Jim
Mattis, who later resigned over policy
diff erences. Iran showed patience and
reaffi rmed its compliance with the deal
but wanted European powers to devise
a mechanism to continue trade and
economic relations with them.
Th e EU and the EU3 (Germany,
France, and the UK) urged Trump
not to walk out, but in vain. Th ey
responded positively to Iran’s demand
for continued trade and economic
relations, but have not delivered
so far, primarily because they do
not want to defy Washington. Th e
Single Payment Mechanism, called
INSTEX (Instrument in Support of
Trade Exchanges) has not met Iran’s
expectations as it cannot deal in oil.
Iran’s oil export has fallen sharply.
Russia and China have expressed
disapproval of Trump’s action. China
has said that it would continue im-
porting oil from Iran even though the
waivers issued by Washington have
not been renewed. However, the non-
US signatories have not formally got
together to take a common position
against Washington or to come out in
support of Iran.
The two-day G-20 meeting in
Osaka did not discuss the crisis in
the Gulf and apparently none of his
interlocutors urged Trump to resort to
diplomacy.
It will be naïve to hold that because
both Iran and Trump have said neither
wants a war, there will not be a
war. Wars are often the unintended
consequences of actions.
Iran has exceeded the 300 kg
limit on the uranium it can hold and
has made it clear that unless EU3
makes it possible for Iran to sell oil,
Iran will start enriching uranium
beyond the permitted limit 3.67%.
Iran’s assumption that the EU3 can
be pressured into defying the US is
possibly mistaken. Th e danger is that
Iran might proceed further and throw
out the IAEA inspectors and then EU3
will abandon Iran and join with the US
in re-imposing sanctions.
If the US resorts to bombing Iran,
it will be naïve to assume that Iran,
the weaker party, will surrender with
alacrity. Iran will retaliate through its
regional proxies (the Hamas in Gaza,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shia
militants in Iraq). Iran might also close
the Straits of Hormuz, through which
traverse 17 million barrels of crude a
day, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
UAE and Iran. Oil prices will shoot
up and Trump’s popular ratings will
plummet.
Iran is unlikely to sit down with
the US at a negotiating table unless
Ayatollah Khamenei, their Supreme
Leader, permits the government. Iran’s
assessment that Trump wants nothing
short of surrender is not wrong. Iran’s
economy will shrink, and its people will
suff er immensely.
China has stated that it would
continue importing oil from Iran.
When China gets closer to signing a
deal to end the trade war with US it
might yield to Washington on import
of oil from Iran. There is also the
possibility that the US will fail to get
any resolution passed in the Security
Council penalizing Iran, as China and
Russia will not agree.
So far, Iran has not asked India
to leave Chabahar port, an essential
link for India with Afghanistan and
Central Asia. Th e work in Chabahar
has slowed down. If the hardliners take
over in Iran, there is a risk that India,
having stopped import of oil from Iran,
might be asked to wind up its project in
Chabahar. If hostilities break out, and
the region gets destabilized, India might
have to embark on the impossible task
of evacuating the eight million Indians
in the Persian Gulf region.Out-of-the box thinking is required.
What is required is not bringing the
two sides to the negotiating table, but
making it possible for Iran to sell oil.
Th e principal importers of oil from
Iran are China, India, South Korea,
Turkey, Italy, Japan, Spain and France.
Leaving out Italy, which is keen to be
the closest ally of the US in Europe,
suppose the other seven get together?
Let us conduct a thought experiment
in classical diplomacy: One of the seven
appoints a sherpa (special envoy) who
visits the other six capitals, who also
appoint sherpas. Th e seven sherpas
work together and agree on a collective
statement to be issued simultaneously
from the capitals, telling Washington
that they intend to buy oil from Iran.
The US will not be able to apply
sanctions against seven countries. Th e
unipolarity in international fi nance and
trade will be eliminated.
Th e question is who will appoint the
fi rst sherpa. Why not India?
(Th e author, a former diplomat, was
Counsellor in Teheran 1976-1979)
In arrangement with South Asia
MonitorINDO- PACIFIC: ASEAN AND
INDIA SHARE A COMMON
OUTLOOK
At the 34th ASEAN summit in
Bangkok, the leaders of the 10-nation
grouping fi nally came out with their
positions on the Indo-Pacifi c region in
a document titled ‘ASEAN Outlook
on the Indo-Pacifi c’. Acknowledging
that this is a very important part of
the globe from both a geo-political
as well as geo-economic perspective,
the group clearly wants developments
here to be ASEAN-centric and even
ASEAN-led.
Th is approach of ASEAN, writes
Gautam Bambewale (former Indian