2019-08-03_Outlook

5 august 2019 OutlOOk 29

The spur to Trump’s claim was, of
course, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran
Khan’s maiden visit to Washington,
which generated hope that a positive
outcome of the Trump­Khan meeting
might result in an early resumption of
India­Pakistan dialogue.
“If I can help, I would love to be a med­
iator,” Trump told Imran in the White
House. “If I can do anything to help, let
me know,” he added. Then came the
bombshell, as Trump went on to say, ”I
was with Prime Minister Nar e ndra Modi
two weeks ago (on the G20 sidelines in
Osaka) and we talked about this subject
and he actually said, “ Would you like to
be a mediator or arbitrator,” I said,
“Where,’ he said ‘Kashmir’.”
The Pakistani PM’s response was
on expected lines: “The prayers of
over a billion people will be with you
if you can mediate and resolve the
situation.” Trump, by now puffed up
in self­importance, went on to say
that since both Indian and Pakistani
leaders wanted him to mediate it
was time he spoke to Modi to see
how it can be taken forward.
But India moved in swiftly to
scotch all possible rumours. “I
would like to categorically assure
the House that no such request has
been made by the prime minister to
the US president,” Jaishankar told
Parliament. “It has been India’s
consistent position that all out­
standing issues with Pakistan are
discussed  only bilaterally.”

H

e also emphasised that any

engagement with Pakistan

would require an end to

cross­border terrorism, adding

that “the Shimla Agreement and the

Lahore Declaration provides the basis

to resolve all issues between India and

Pakistan bilaterally”.

However, some commentators point

out that both India and Pakistan had

agreed on a number of occasions on

third­party mediation, like the Indus

Water Treaty ( brokered by the World

Bank in 1960), the Rann of Kutch

Accord (mediated by British premier

Harold Wilson in 1965) and the

Tashkent Agreement to restore peace at

the end of the 1965 war (initiated by

Russian statesman Alexei Kosygin and

others), all of which worked well for the

two neighbours. Some even stood the

test of war and other hostilities.

However, as Sibal points out, India

faced a string of disappointments from

the time it went to the UN on the Kashmir

issue. This continued with UN­appointed

mediators on Kashmir;  the Indus Water

Treaty, the Duncan­Sandys mission and

the Tashkent Agreement. None of these

initiatives ended with gains for India,

says Sibal. “At Tashkent, we had to return

the Haji Pir pass. With the IWT, we lost 80

per cent of the Indus river basin and ac­

cepted mediation on upstream projects.”

The Duncan Sandy mission, in the wake

of the Chinese aggression in 1962, led the

UK and the US to supply arms to India but

with the provision that they were not to

be used against Pakistan. It further stipu­

lated that New Delhi should take the ini­

tiative of resolving the Kashmir dispute

so that the two neighbours could jointly

deal with the threat of Communist China.

Similarly, the Wilson mediation over the

Rann of Kutch dispute ended up awarding

areas to Pakistan that were part of India’s

sovereign claim.

However, going by the backtracking in

the US administration to distance itself

from Trump’s comments on mediation,

Indian leaders may not receive more

such worrisome offers from Washington.

But the import of the Trump­Khan

meeting and what it means for both

US­Pakistan relations and also for

India­US ties are being closely studied.

Not just a PM’s maiden visit to Wash­

ington, the significance of Khan’s visit

comes in the backdrop of a long spell of

strained ties with the US and eagerness

shown in both capitals to mend the

rupture. The fact that, in an unprece­

dented gesture, Khan also had Pakistan

army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa and ISI

director­general Faiz Haneed with him

indicate that the three key members of

the Pakistani establishment would be

on the same page on agreements that

are reached in Washington.

A lot of emphasis, as past week’s devel­

opments have indicated, would be rel­

ated to Afghanistan, a country from

where Trump is in a rush to pull his

troops out after fighting the US’s

longest war, marked, in the end, by

a resurgent Taliban. Pakistan’s

imp ortance has grown for its ability

to deliver the Taliban to the talks

table and also with the promise

that it can make the Taliban agree

to an US­initiated plan to restore

peace in Afghanistan after the

Americans leave.

In return, much of the  financial

and military aid from the US to

Pakistan that had been frozen for

several years were now likely to

resume. New Delhi’s goal would be

to keep up the pressure on Pakistan

for its use of terrorism as the pre­

ferred tool against India.

The first test for this is this

October, when the Financial Action

Task Force plenary session meets

in Paris to decide whether Pakistan

should remain on the grey list,

whether it should be brought under

the ‘black list’ for its lack of action

against terrorist groups or if it should

go off the list altogether.

The Imran Khan government would

certainly try its best to use the ‘Afghan

card’ to enlist support from not only the

US, but also from China and Russia—the

other global players in the Afghan talks.

In this advantageous scenario for

Pakistan, to force it to take ‘visible, veri­

fiable and irreversible’ steps against ter­

rorist outfits operating from its soil

would be a diplomatic challenge for India.

The outcome at the FATF may help

India determine where it stands not

only vis­a­vis Pakistan, but also with

the US, Russia and China, those ‘third­

party’ arbiters of Pakistan’s stand

towards India. O

In return for bringing the

Taliban to the table, Pakistan

would expect the US to

resume aid. India, too, must

keep up pressure on Pakistan.

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