hink back to the beginning of the year
and the first rush ofexcitement as the latest
crop of cars hit the track for pre-season testing
in Barcelona. Interest naturally spikes during
launch season, more so in yearssuch asthis
in which the rules have changed. Large-scale
technical shake-ups often mix up the on-track
order so the stakes were high... andMercedes
was nowhere on the timesheets in the first week.
Ferrari, with its markedly different solution to
the new front-wing rules, seemed to be flying.
“You always know that you want toupdate
the car as late as possible,” says Mercedeschief
designer John Owen. “One of the things that
affects you a bit if youupda te it late is that if
you’re busy pushing a car out for the first test,
the second test is only a week later. So, the
problem you get into is that from a production
point of view you’re trying to make two cars
at the sametime.
“Wha t we would normally do in those
circumstances is focus entirely on what we’re
taking to the second test in aerodynamic terms,
and then take just any old snapshot of where
the car was in the development phase, much
earlier than normal, just so we can have a set of
bodywork so wecan runthe car at the first test.”
Negative feedback from the drivers of the
W10 in those early days added weight to the
suggestion that Mercedes was in trouble.
When the second test began a handful of days
later, thesilver cars lookedvery different – and
ultimately proved tobe much faster. Some
speculatedthat an accelerated development
programme had been put into place to transform
the W10 overnight.
But evenwith Mercedes’ prodigious resources
this was an absurd suggestion. More plausible
was the theory circulating within the paddock
that Mercedes had been pursuing parallel designT
62 F1 RACING JANUARY 2020
programmes, much as it hadduring its previous
incarnation as Honda in 2008, when itthre w
everything it had at the car that would become
the championship-winning Brawn BGP001.
The truth is a little more prosaic. As Owen
says, it’s standard F1 practiceto a pproach the
first test of the season with a very basic car
build, based on an early spec. For 2019, the new
front wing regulations had been published in an
immature and loophole-riddled state, and then
finessed via a series of FIA clarifications over the
following six months. That presented the teams
with development challenges, which manifested
themselves during ‘launch week’ before the first
test: Renault, for instance, ‘launched’ what it
admitted was a 2018 car with different front and
rear wings, while Williams didn’t have its car
ready until mid-way through the first test
(and even then it was declared illegal).
With hindsight, Mercedes’ tactic of rolling
out thatearly ‘snapshot’ of the W10 to maximise
track time and prove out the mechanical
fundamentals was correct. It enjoyed peerless(if not perfect) reliability throughout the season
and a relatively straight trajectory of aero
development. After being fast out of the box in
testing, Ferrari found its very different front-end
philosophy carried inherent limitations that took
until Singapore to debug. Red Bull was struggling
until an Austrian GP update transformed the
RB15. Renault pinned its hopes on a French GP
upgrade package which didn’t work, resulting in
yet another technical restructure at Enstone.
“The car that went to the first test was never,
ever intended to race, from the moment it went
to manufacture,” adds Owen. “Anything that
looks like we were on the back foot, or reacting,
is absolutely not true.
“We never had any plansto race it and we
were a bit surprised that some of the other
teams – one in particular – got themselves
quite buoyed by the idea we weren’t any good.
It surprised me because it seemed a bit naïve in
the sensethat this wasn’t going to be the car
we were bringing [to the races].
“That first test is all about understanding, and