TheEconomistFebruary 1st 2020 171T
he titansof Brexit have a tendency to
gush over Britain’s bond with America.
Before the referendum in 2016, Boris John-
son—now prime minister, then mayor of
London—predicted that, outside the Euro-
pean Union, the thriving British would be
“even better and more valuable allies of the
United States”. Britain’s relationship with
America had long been “special”, enthused
Liam Fox as trade secretary in 2018. But
Brexit provided a “once-in-a-generation
opportunity to raise it to a new level”.
Yet in the week that Britain actually
leaves the euit finds itself at loggerheads
with America on tax, trade and technology.
If the British government persists with
plans for a digital-services tax that would
hit tech giants, America has said it will re-
taliate with punitive tariffs on British car
exports. And despite heavy American lob-
bying and suggestions that the countries’
intelligence-sharing could be at risk, Mr
Johnson decided on January 28th to allow
Britain to buy 5gtelecoms kit from Huawei
of China. Mike Pompeo, America’s secre-
tary of state, had warned against letting
China “control the internet of the future”.
The decision on Huawei came two days
before Mr Pompeo was due to join his Brit-
ish counterpart, Dominic Raab, in London
for a public conversation on “the future of
the special relationship”. At first glance,
and despite the croonings of Brexiteers,
that relationship appears to be in poor
shape. Thomas Wright of the Brookings In-
stitution, a Washington think-tank, de-
scribes it as “in its worst state since the
Suez crisis” in 1956.
Mr Wright has catalogued many ways in
which President Donald Trump “torment-
ed” the previous government, under The-
resa May. Although Mr Trump has a better
rapport with Mr Johnson than he had with
Mrs May, tensions have not disappeared.
Meanwhile, competition for America’s at-
tention has been growing. Under the ener-
getic Emmanuel Macron, France empha-
sises that it is the “oldest ally” of the United
States. China’s rise is also tugging America
away from Europe.
All this adds to a sense of uncertainty,
post-Brexit, about Britain’s status and rolein the world. The so-called special relation-
ship has always been lopsided: Helmut
Schmidt, a German chancellor, once
quipped that it was so special only one side
knew it existed. But for nearly half a cen-
tury, membership of the European club al-
lowed the British to stop fretting too much
about their influence in the world. They
were “the bridge between the usand Eu-
rope”, as Tony Blair, one of the most enthu-
siastic proponents of the special relation-
ship (and an ardent Remainer), put it as
prime minister in 1997. Britain could wield
influence on both sides of the Atlantic.
Now that the bridge is breaking, questions
about Britain’s power are back.Things have come to a pretty pass
After the second world war Britain strug-
gled to find its place in America’s shadow.
Winston Churchill envisaged Britain as
part of three great circles among the de-
mocracies: the Commonwealth, the Eng-
lish-speaking sphere and a united Europe.
In 1946, in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, he
had proposed a “special relationship” with
the United States, a “fraternal association”
of English-speaking peoples involving not
only kindred societies but military col-
laboration. Another prime minister, Har-
old Macmillan, patronisingly positioned
Britain as playing Athens to America’s
Rome, teaching a “vulgar, bustling” people
how to run a rising empire.
None of this proved convincing. In 1962
Dean Acheson, a former American secre-No longer such a smooth ride
LONDON AND WASHINGTON, DC
A weakened Britain hopes to draw strength from its alliance with the United
States. Good luck with that
Briefing The special relationship