40 Middle East & Africa The EconomistFebruary 1st 2020
21never happen,” says the defence minister,
Naftali Bennett. But legal concerns may
slow the process: the cabinet plans to ask
the attorney-general if an interim govern-
ment can approve such a drastic step. (Mr
Kushner hopes Israel waits until after the
election.) The cabinet cannot vote on im-
plementing the full Trump plan, because
that calls for relinquishing territory, which
under Israeli law requires a referendum.
Regardless of the delays, mere talk of
annexation could benefit Mr Netanyahu
politically. His main challenger, Benny
Gantz, ran on a vaguely centrist platform in
the past two elections, absorbing parts of
Israel’s “peace camp”. That won him a plu-
rality of seats in September, but he too
failed to form a coalition. In recent weeks
he has moved sharply to the right, hoping
to attract disgruntled Likud voters. Mr
Gantz says he too would implement the
Trump plan. Some members of his Blue
and White party are more cautious. If they
balk at annexation, Mr Netanyahu will
paint them as weak and unpatriotic, liable
to miss a “historic opportunity” that he lik-
ens to David Ben-Gurion’s decision in 1948
to declare Israel’s independence.
The Palestinians see all this not as an
opportunity but a disappointment, one
both historic and predictable. For a time
they were guardedly optimistic about Mr
Trump. Despite his pro-Israel campaign
rhetoric, some Palestinian officials hoped
an unconventional president might take
an unconventional approach to diplomacy.
His special envoy at the time, Jason Green-
blatt, held a well-received listening tour of
the West Bank in 2017, meeting Palestinianleaders and ordinary citizens.
But the relationship suffered a lasting
rupture in December 2017, when Mr Trump
broke decades of precedent and an-
nounced that he was moving America’s
embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The
Palestinians claim part of Jerusalem as
their future capital; most countries keep
their embassies in Tel Aviv, arguing that to
do otherwise would prejudge the status of
the city. The following year Mr Trump
closed the Palestinian diplomatic mission
in Washington. He has also cut all Ameri-
can aid to the Palestinians. Relations have
not been this bad since 1987, when America
labelled the Palestine Liberation Organisa-
tion a terrorist group.
Mr Kushner and his aides did not seem
to mind; they came to view the Palestinians
more as a nuisance than a negotiating
partner. Their plan would impose immedi-
ate costs on the Palestinians, with the
benefits (such as a proposed $28bn in aid,
none of which has yet been pledged) com-
ing years, perhaps decades, in the future.
Instead they proposed an “outside-in”
approach: encourage other Arab states to
embrace the plan, then hope they would
press the Palestinian leadership to accept
it. This was always a far-fetched idea. Jor-
dan has rejected the plan. The Gulf states,
which have worked hard to court Mr
Trump, will not want to anger him by pub-
licly criticising it. Ambassadors from Bah-
rain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates
attended its release (Saudi Arabia was nota-
bly absent). But they are unlikely to do
much to promote a proposal that the Pales-
tinians have so firmly rejected.On the eve of his inauguration, Mr
Trump expressed almost preternatural
confidence in his son-in-law, a property
developer with no diplomatic experience.
“If you can’t produce peace in the Middle
East, nobody can,” he told Mr Kushner. Per-
haps no one can. Mr Kushner is unlikely to
bring peace, but his plan may still bring
lasting change. If Israel annexes large parts
of the West Bank, it will be all but impossi-
ble for the Palestinians to establish a viable
state. The two-state solution, on which de-
cades of American peacemaking had been
built, has long been a fading dream; it
would finally be buried. Mr Trump may yet
go down in history, not for making a deal,
but for making one impossible. 7TelAvivJerusalem
Municipal
boundary EastJerusalemWESTBANKISRAELD e a dS e aEGYPTDead
SeaPre-1967border
“Greenline”GAZA
STRIPMediterranean
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boundaryTunnelISRAELTelAviv
WEST BANKEGYPT JORDANDead
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ySource:PeaceNow Source:WhiteHouseIsraeli(AreaC)Joint(AreaB)Palestinian(AreaA)AreasofcontrolPalestineIsraelimunicipalareasIsraelisettlementsBuilt PlannedSeparationbarrierCurrent situation
January 2020Donald Trump’s plan
Announced January 28th 202025 km 25 kmT
he henchmen of Muqtada al-Sadr,
Iraq’s most capricious—and perhaps
most powerful—cleric, not only participat-
ed in the anti-government protests that
have rocked Baghdad and other cities for
months, they defended them. Others who
joined the demonstrations stood a good
chance of being frisked by Mr Sadr’s men,
who looked out for troublemakers. Togeth-
er with the mainly Shia crowds they de-
manded a new political system, one not
dominated by a small elite, and a fairer dis-
tribution of the country’s oil wealth.
But on January 25th Mr Sadr ordered his
followers to withdraw, blaming the hostile
behaviour of the protesters towards his
men. A crackdown on the protesters who
remained appeared imminent. Over 600
people have been killed since the unrest
began in October. As expected, the police
cleared the streets in some cities. The pro-
testers, though, have not gone home. There
are more now.
With Mr Sadr throwing his weight be-
hind the establishment, Iraq’s battle lines
are clearly defined. The politicians and
clerics who champion Shia political Islam,
and who are backed by Iran, face protesters
calling for a secular, non-sectarian govern-
ment free of Iranian influence. The result is
stalemate and stagnation. Adel Abdul-
Mahdi, the prime minister, resigned last
year, but he carries on as a caretaker (un-
constitutionally, say some). The ruling par-
ties have mulled many possible succes-
sors. Each name elicits guffaws from the
crowds in the street.
Mr Sadr hopes to fill the post with a loy-
alist. Ever since America toppled the dicta-The country’s most turbulent cleric
stakes his claim to powerIraqi politicsSadder and Sadr