The Economist - USA (2020-02-01)

(Antfer) #1

54 Business The EconomistFebruary 1st 2020


2

W


orkscouncilsandworkerrepre-
sentativesonboardsarea German
invention.ButMitbestimmunghas
spreadthroughoutEurope.Nineteenof
theeu’s 27post-Brexitmembers—allbar
Belgium,Bulgaria,Cyprus,Estonia,Italy,
Latvia,LithuaniaandRomania—have
some“co-determination”intheprivate
sector,atstate-runfirmsorboth.Sodoes
Norway,whichisnotintheeu.
Rulesdiffer.InSwedenworkershave
therighttoberepresentedonboardsof
firmswithmorethan 25 employees.In
Luxembourgthethresholdis1,000.Seats
reservedforworkersrangefromonein
CroatiatohalftheboardinSlovenia.In
NorwayandSwedenworkers’repre-
sentativessitonfirms’solemanagement
board.TheirAustrianandSlovakian
counterpartsaremembersofthesuper-
visoryboard,theuppertierintwo-layer
boardstructureslikeGermany’s.
OutsideEuropethepracticehasnot
takenhold(SouthKoreaisa rareexcep-
tion).Inmanycountriesunionsplaythe
roleofworkscouncils.America’sWagner
actof 1935 prohibitstheformationofany
formofemployer-employeecommittee
thathasthepowertodecideonworking
conditionsandlabour-management
relations,observesSteffenMülleratthe
HalleInstituteforEconomicResearch.
SomeAmericanunionsopposeco-deter-
minationforfearofbeingusurped.
America’sprivate-sectorunionshave

seenmembershipcollapseinrecent
decades,leadingtorenewedinterestin
co-determination.Theidea facesresis-
tance—andnotonlyfromemployers.In
2014 workersata Volkswagenplantin
Tennesseevotedagainstbeingrepre-
sentedbytheUnitedAutoWorkers,one
ofAmerica’sbiggestlabourunions,
whichhadplannedtointroducea Ger-
man-styleworkscouncilattheplant.
LocalRepublicanleadersconvinced
enoughworkersthatthiswouldhurtjobs
bydeteringotherbusinessesfromin-
vestinginTennessee.

What’sAmericanforMitbestimmung?


Labourinmanagement

BERLIN
Mostoftheworldhasyettoembraceco-determination

People to the power

dustrial relations during downturns. In the
dark days of the global financial crisis of
2007-09, when demand for German manu-
facturers’ products dried up, the system
made it easier for the two sides to engineer
a compromise: employees kept their jobs
in exchange for agreeing to fewer hours
(and so less pay) and thriftier holiday bene-
fits. Productivity improved. When the re-
cession ended in 2010 firms were immedi-
ately able to ramp up production.
A study published in October by the
Hans Böckler Foundation, the trade un-
ions’ think-tank, concluded that compa-
nies with labour representatives on super-
visory boards did considerably better
during the financial crisis and its after-
math than those without. They sacked few-
er workers and reinvested more. Their
cumulative total returns between 2006 and
2011 were also 28 percentage points higher.
Co-determination, the reports’ authors
conclude, “prevented short-sighted deci-
sions by management”.

Armed with such numbers, and jolted
by fears of what globalisation and digitisa-
tion might mean for German workers, un-
ions are demanding more of it. Rainald
Thannisch of the dgb, an umbrella group
for German organised labour, wants equal
representation for workers on supervisory
boards at any firm employing more than
1,000 people (and one-third of the seats at
firms with 250 employees). Legal loopholes
that allow companies to avoid co-determi-
nation, such as being owned by a founda-
tion, must be closed, Mr Thannisch says,
and penalties for employers who prevent
workers from forming a works council en-
forced more stringently.
Although they mostly accept co-deter-
mination’s peacemaker role in industrial
relations, German bosses bridle at such
proposals. Two-thirds of those who run
firms with equal worker representation on
the supervisory board see even the current
version of co-determination as a handicap
to doing business, according to the bda, an

employers’ association. Talk to chief exec-
utives and many gripe how works councils
and bloated supervisory boards slow deci-
sion-making and add costs (since works-
council members are paid for every hour
they deliberate among themselves and
with management). This, they add, dis-
courages bold leadership and puts off for-
eign investors. It may tempt managers to
buy labour’s support, as some of Volks-
wagen’s did in 2005 by creating a slush
fund for the carmaker’s powerful works
council to secure favourable votes in deci-
sions on the firm’s restructuring (the exec-
utives responsible were prosecuted). Nor is
it necessarily fair to all employees. One
boss of a company in the dax 30 index of
Germany’s biggest listed firms notes wryly
that co-determination ignores German
multinationals’ foreign workers, whose in-
terests may differ from domestic ones.
All this explains why companies that
can avoid co-determination try to do so.
Many in the Mittelstand, as Germany’s me-
dium-sized export powerhouses are collec-
tively known, convert into a Societas Euro-
paea (se), a public company registered
under European Union corporate law that
is exempt from co-determination rules, be-
fore reaching the 500-employee threshold
for worker board membership. (Converters
must keep co-determination if they had
more than 500 workers before the conver-
sion.) Some flee abroad, for example trans-
forming themselves into a British plc.
Günzburger Steigtechnik, a maker of
ladders in Bavaria, has more than 350 staff
but no works council. Employees are in-
volved in big decisions, insists Ferdinand
Munk, the boss, whose family has owned
and run it for four generations. The com-
pany pays attention to workers’ special
needs—such as organising an employee’s
shift around the care of his ailing wife—
without badgering by a works council. A
formal structure, Mr Munk thinks, would
only slow things down. He says that co-de-
termination is “actually counterproduc-
tive” in an age where speed and nimble-
ness are of the essence. Mario Ohoven,
head of the Mittelstand association, calls it
“out of date”.
Most employers concede that co-deter-
mination played a constructive role in the
decades after the war. But times have
changed. The world is overtaking German
corporate giants. Only one, sap, a software-
maker, is among the world’s 100 biggest
companies. Apple’s $1.4trn market value is
roughly that of the entire dax 30. Co-deter-
mination may not be the sole reason. Euro-
pean countries which do not embrace it
hardly do better. But as cars go electric and
manufacturing goes digital, German in-
dustry faces drastic restructuring—includ-
ing of its biggest companies’ vast work-
forces. Bosses who agree with Mr Ohoven
will be ever less timid to say so. 7
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