TheEconomistFebruary 15th 2020 71
1
G
arettjones, aneconomicsprofessor
at George Mason University in Virginia,
knew he was on to a good thing when he got
a call from the campus police. A student
journalist had written a report on a lecture
that he had given suggesting that rich
countries would be better off if they were
less, rather than more, democratic. The
hostile reaction, which spread beyond the
university, included a call threatening
enough to trouble the university’s private
security force. Mr Jones concluded that he
had an idea powerful and contentious
enough to make into a book. The result is
“10% Less Democracy”.
This is a fertile time for critiques of de-
mocracy. In light of the use of state appara-
tus by elected leaders to undermine an op-
ponent in America, murder people in the
Philippines, render a religious minority
statelessinIndia,threatenjudicialinde-
pendenceinPoland,and rob thepublic
purseinSouthAfrica,thesystemwhich
haslongprovidedtherichworldwitha sat-
isfyingmixofmoralsuperiorityandstable
governmentislookinga bitropy.Areport
lastmonthfromtheCentrefortheFuture
of Democracy at Cambridge University
found that support for democracy had de-
clined sharply in most of the world since
the 1990s, including in America and west-
ern and southern Europe. The world’s big-
gest autocracy, meanwhile, is bringing
prosperity to its own population and ex-
tending its influence round the world.
But as Mr Jones discovered, criticising
democracy in the West is still a bit like
launching a broadside against the pope in
15th-century Europe—or against a modern-
day authoritarian president. You can sug-
gest that all is not going to plan, but you
will get a friendlier reception if you pin the
blame on dodgy advisers or foreign inter-
ference, rather than on the concept itself.
David Runciman’s recent “How Democ-
racy Ends” attributed democracy’s woes to
decadence.Thesystemwashealthier, he
argued,whenchangeorconflict—the ex-
pansionofthefranchiseinthefirst half of
the20thcentury,thesecondworld war—
hadgivenita shotinthearm.Pankaj Mis-
hra,in“AgeofAnger”,maintained that the
problemliesinthegrowinggapbetween a
politicalsystemthatpromisesequality and
aneconomiconethatleadstoinequality.
Bycontrast,MrJonesplantsresponsi-
bilitysquarelyontheshouldersof the vot-
ers.Asaneconomist,heapproaches de-
mocracyas a productionsystem whose
outputisgovernance,andexamines how it
canbetweakedtoimprove theproduct.
Thecoreof“10%LessDemocracy” is thus
researchonwhethermoreorlessdemocra-
cy produces better or worse outcomes for
countries and citizens.
Early and less often
As the title suggests, Mr Jones’s critique op-
erates within a narrow band. He concedes
that massacres and famines are less likely
to happen in democracies than in autocra-
cies, and that there is a clear correlation be-
tween democracy and prosperity. But he
takes issue with Daron Acemoglu’s claim,
in the title of a paper published last year,
that “Democracy Does Cause Growth”. The
paper found that when undemocratic
countries became democratic, they grew
faster, raising gdpper head by an average of
20% in the long run.
But democracy, Mr Jones points out, is
not like virginity: countries can be a bit
Powerfromthepeople
Toomuchofa goodthing
Aneconomistarguesthatanexcessofdemocracycanleadtopoordecisions
10% Less Democracy: Why You Should
Trust Elites A Little More and the Masses
A Little Less.By Garett Jones.Stanford
University Press; 248 pages; $28 and £22.99
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