38 | Rolling Stone | February 2020
A
NTHONY FERRANTE had just
arrived for work at the Eisen-
hower Executive Office Build-
ing, next door to the White
House, when the first attack
hit. Around 7 a.m., internet
service went out across the United States and
parts of Europe. Reddit, Netflix, and The New
York Times website wouldn’t load. Ferrante
couldn’t check Twitter for updates because that
was down too. “No one knew what it was,” he
says. “It was definitely chaotic.”
It was Friday, October 21st, 2016. In two
weeks, Americans would pick a new president.
When Ferrante, a director in the White House’s
cybersecurity team, realized the internet had
gone dark across the country, he feared the
worst. Ferrante thought he was witnessing a
dry run for an attack on the election.
A native of Portland, Maine, with pale Nordic
features and a sharp widow’s peak, Ferrante
hacked his first computer when he was 10 and
studied computer science at Fordham. He was
destined for a cushy career as a cyber expert in
the private sector when the September 11th at-
tacks happened. He quit corporate America,
joined the FBI, and specialized in tracking ter-
rorists on the internet; in his first case at the
bureau, he helped foil the terrorist plot to blow
up the PATH train tunnel between New York
and New Jersey. Over the next decade, he rose
to become one of the FBI’s top cyber security
agents and helped write President Obama’s di-
rective that created the first chain of command
in the event of a major cyberattack on U.S. soil.
In late 2015, Ferrante moved to the White
House to run the National Security Council’s
Cyber Incident Response Desk, a small team
whose job was to lead the government’s re-
sponse to a major cyberattack. But by the sum-
mer of 2016, his focus had narrowed to a single
but growing threat: Russian interference in the
election. He and his colleagues had received in-
telligence reports about strange activity target-
ing state election websites. At first, the details
were sketchy and there wasn’t enough data to
draw any connections. Then, in July, the head
of elections for Illinois noticed a huge amount
of data flowing out of his voter registration sys-
tem. The FBI discovered that Illinois had been
hacked; the culprits accessed databases with in-
formation on hundreds of thousands of voters
and stole an unknown quantity of data.
The FBI sent an urgent alert to state election
chiefs, encouraging them to search their sys-
tems for any digital breadcrumbs that matched
data from the Illinois breach. Ferrante came
to work each morning to find that several new
states had been targeted with the same sorts of
tools and techniques that Illinois had experi-
enced. With the FBI’s help, his team concluded
that Russian-based hackers had penetrated
two state voter databases (Illinois was one, the
other was not publicly named) and scanned
election websites in every state. “We knew at
that point we were dealing with a large-scale
coordinated campaign,” Ferrante says.
President Obama wanted a national cyber-
security preparedness plan for the upcoming
election, and Ferrante was put in charge of
creating it. He and his team spent months re-
searching every detail of American elections
and running different scenarios. What if a mil-
lion people showed up to vote in Florida only
to be told there was no record of them as a
voter? What if a cyberattack took down the
division of the Associated Press that supplies
election-night reporting data to major news
organizations like CNN? What if the internet
crashed on Election Day?
That last scenario felt a lot less hypotheti-
cal on October 21st as Ferrante scrambled to
figure out why the huge swaths of the inter-
net were dark. He called his counterparts at
the FBI, CIA, Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, and National Security Agency; they were
just as confused as he was. By midday the out-
age was international news, spreading from
the East Coast to the West. It was only after
the third wave of attacks, Ferrante says, that
the FBI made contact with an internet-domain
company in New Hampshire called Dyn. The
company eventually shored up its servers that
day, and the internet was restored.
Ferrante and his team had by that point con-
ducted perhaps the most exhaustive study of
the potential threats to our convoluted vot-
ing system. There were the cyberthreats they
had envisioned and prepared for: hacked voter
registration databases, disruptions to the flow
of information on election night, faulty voter
equipment. By Election Day, these threats
weren’t all speculative: Two teams of Rus-
sian hackers, known as Fancy Bear and Cozy
Bear, had broken into the Democratic National
Committee and stolen reams of data. The Dyn
attack, resulting from a massive botnet that ex-
ploited flaws in internet- connected gadgets and
appliances such as home security cameras and
WiFi routers, showed it was possible to wreak
havoc on the internet itself. (To this day, the
culprit of that attack remains unknown. The
FBI hasn’t announced any arrests and won’t
comment on its investigation.)
For Election Day, Ferrante created the
first-ever cybercommand post in the White
House Situation Room. From six in the morning
until the election was called for Donald Trump,
he and his colleagues monitored the vote, but
the day passed without incident. The sense of
accomplishment he felt was outweighed by a
sinking feeling over what he knew Russia had
already done. By hacking the Democratic Party,
spreading disinformation on social media, and
compromising confidential voter data, it had
proved to the rest of the world it was possible
to successfully interfere in a U.S. election and
come away largely unscathed.
Obama hit Russia with new sanctions and ex-
pelled 35 of its diplomats in his final days in of-
fice, but it would be up to his successor to pro-
tect against future election attacks. Soon after
Trump took office, a team of cyber experts who
worked in the Obama White House met with a
group of Trump aides including Joshua Stein- FR
OM
LE
FT
:^ N
AI
RA
D
AV
LA
SH
YA
N/
AP
IM
AG
ES
/S
HU
TT
ER
ST
OC
K;^
SA
ND
RO
M
AD
DA
LE
NA
/
SH
UT
TE
RS
TO
CK
;^ F
OT
OG
RIN
/S
HU
TT
ER
ST
OC
K;^
MI
CH
AE
L^ N
EL
SO
N/
EP
A/
SH
UT
TE
RS
TO
CK
;^ F
AC
EB
OO
K;^
CR
OW
DS
TR
IKE
;^ M
.^ S
PE
NC
ER
G
RE
EN
/A
P^ I
MA
GE
S/S
HU
TT
ER
ST
OC
K
Do you
think we’ll
be able to
cut green-
house gas
emissions
in half
by 2030
to avoid
climate
catastro-
phe?
13%
Ye s
87%
No
Go to Rolling
Stone.com
for next
issue’s poll.
READERS’
POLL
SEEKING TROLLS
The newly formed
Internet Research
Agency — bank-
rolled by Russian
oligarch Yevgeniy
Viktorovich Prigo-
zhin — posts an ad
seeking “internet
operators,” or trolls.
TENSIONS RISE
Russia invades Ukraine and annexes
Crimea, dramatically escalating tensions
with the United States. Six years later, the
conflict still rages.
LICENSE TO
CONSPIRE
The nascent troll
farm launches
Project Lakhta,
which a DOJ indict-
ment will later call
a “conspiracy to
interfere in the U.S.
political system.”
USA FIELD TRIP
Two IRA employees
visit nine states
including the elec-
toral battlegrounds
of Michigan,
Colorado, and
Nevada to “gather
intelligence” on
American politics.
TARGET: CLINTON
The IRA seeks “any
opportunity to
criticize Hillary.”
Posing as Christian
activists, anti-
immigration zealots,
and civil-rights
radicals, their posts
reach 126 million.
DNC HACK
Fancy Bear, a
hacker group
associated with
the GRU, Russian
military intelligence,
spear-phish John
Podesta’s account
and steal 50,000
emails.
DATA BREACH
GRU hackers break
into the Illinois
State Board of
Elections, gaining
access to 200,000
voters’ registration
data — the first of
a series of attacks
across all 50 states.
THE LONG VIEW: RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE
TIMELINE
AUG. 20 13 FEB. 20 14 APRIL JUNE FEB. 20 16 MARCH JUNE