The Economist - USA (2020-02-08)

42 Europe The EconomistFebruary 8th 2020

2 by three (see chart). There are a head-spin-

ning 13 coalition combinations in the 16

states (see map). Eastern Germany is par-

ticularly afflicted, thanks to the strength

there of the untouchable afd. Saxony, Sax-

ony-Anhalt and Brandenburg are all run by

“Kenya” cdu-spd-Green coalitions (the

parties’ colours match the Kenyan flag),

fragile and unloved contraptions erected

solely to keep the afdout of office.

Federalism has its uses. States can serve

as laboratories for unusual coalitions. To-

day’s tie-ups between the Greens and cdu

in Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, for in-

stance, are dry runs for a potential national

government. But ideologically disparate

coalitions often struggle to govern effec-

tively, voters cannot predict how they will

rule and they can gum up works in the

Bundesrat, Germany’s upper house, which

is made up of state government represen-

tatives. Moreover, uniting to stop the afd

has served merely to confirm its anti-elite

argument, says Thomas Poguntke of the In-

stitute of German and International Party

Law and Party Research in Düsseldorf.

There is another difficulty in a system

where politics in one state inevitably reso-

nates in another. It is cdupolicy never to

work with Die Linke or the afd in govern-

ment. Yet some party grandees thought the

cduin Thuringia should grit its teeth and

prop up Mr Ramelow, an avuncular, charis-

matic type who has run the state compe-

tently since 2014. Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer

feared that approving such a deal would

embolden conservative cdumembers in

states like Saxony or Saxony-Anhalt to ask

why they should not be allowed to cosy up

to the afd. But avoiding that headache

merelycreatedanotherone:nowshemust

mopupthemesscreatedbyherThuringian

colleagues,whohaveexposedthecduto

chargesofcollaborationwithextremists.

Asstatepoliticsfragmentsandpolarises

further,tensionsbetweenpartiesatfederal

andstatelevelseemboundtoworsen.

AfterliftingMrKemmerichtovictoryin

Thuringia,theafdwasquicktocrowthatit

hadmadeitselfindispensabletobuilding

conservative majorities. This argument

findsreceptiveearsinthecdu, especially

intheeast.Thereareseveralinstancesof

thepartiesquietlyco-operatingatmunici-

pallevel.Manyanalystshavelongassumed

thecdu’santi-afdcordonsanitairewould

eventuallybuckleinonestateoranother.

Thuringiadoesnotquitereachthatlevel,

butitshowsmoreclearlythaneverthe

dangersofGermany’spoliticalfragmenta-

tion—andallthankstothose 74 votes. 7

*Governmentformation

pending †CSU

Source:

Forschungsgruppe Wahlen

Joint ventures

Germany, governing coalitions by state

January2020,statecolouredbyleadparty

(Numberofgovernmentseachpartysitsin)

Mecklenburg-

West Pomerania

Saxony-Anhalt Brandenburg

Thuringia*

Saxony

Schleswig-

Holstein

North Rhine-

Westphalia

Hesse

Saarland

Baden-

Württemberg

Rhineland-

Palatinate

Bavaria

Lower Saxony

Bremen Hamburg

Berlin

†

CDU/CSU(11) SPD(10) Green(10)

FDP (3) Left (2) Free voters (1)

T

en yearsago it was just a big, sleepy vil-

lage, says Mohammed Duveydar, a doc-

tor from neighbouring Syria, as he looks

out onto Reyhanli’s busy main street.

When he visited before the war locals

would turn in early and wake up before

dawn. But habits changed after the refu-

gees came. Reyhanli, a short walk from the

border, now sealed off by a concrete wall,

remains a poor and conservative town, but

seems to have a bounce in its step. Since the

start of the war next door, its population

has nearly tripled, to about 250,000. Syri-

ans, most of them natives of devastated

Idlib, now outnumber Turks. The main

streets are thick with shops. Young people,

Syrian and Turkish alike, stay up late into

the night, inhaling cups of coffee or nargh-

ile smoke at newly opened cafés. Some

Turkish girls have started wearing the Is-

lamic headscarf the Syrian way, says a teen-

ager. Some Syrian women have started

wearing it like the Turks.

Refugees from Syria’s war were greeted

with open arms when they began arriving

in Turkey nine years ago. No longer. Polls

show that over 80% of Turks want the 3.6m

refugees their country hosts to go home.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s govern-

ment has drafted plans to resettle up to half

of them in areas wrested by its troops from

Kurdish insurgents in an offensive last

year. (That no longer seems feasible: Tur-

key nabbed only a third of the area it want-

ed.) But despite hardening attitudes, the

refugees are putting down roots, especially

in border towns like Reyhanli, picking up

Turkish habits and spreading their own.

Most have no intention of going home,

whatever the situation in Syria. Over

110,000 Syrians, including Mr Duveydar,

have received Turkish citizenship.

Syrians do not have it easy in Turkey.

With some exceptions, they have no right

to own property or to work. Most work ille-

gally, while the authorities turn a blind eye.

Thousands have been deported. But quiet-

ly, so as to avoid a nativist backlash, the

government is helping Syrians make them-

selves at home. Access to education has im-

proved. The government has been phasing

out special refugee learning centres, where

most courses are taught in Arabic, placing

the pupils in Turkish schools.

Tensions in Reyhanli peaked in 2013,

when car bombs killed 52 people in the

town centre. Some locals responded by

attacking Syrian shops, forcing hundreds

of people to flee. Security has since im-

proved, as have relations between locals

and newcomers. But a fresh crisis is knock-

ing at the town’s gates. In neighbouring

Idlib, regime and Russian forces have un-

leashed a bloody offensive against Turk-

ish-backed Syrian rebels and foreign jiha-

dists. Hundreds of thousands of people

displaced by the fighting have massed near

the border.

Desperate to avoid another wave of refu-

gees, Mr Erdogan’s government has

pledged to stop the regime advancing. On

February 2nd, after shelling killed eight

Turkish soldiers deployed to Idlib under an

agreement with Russia, Turkey responded

with air and artillery strikes against Syrian

positions. Three days later, Mr Erdogan

warned that “Turkey would have to take

matters into its own hands” unless regime

forces pulled back by the end of February.

The stand-off has already strained Tur-

key’s relations with Russia, which backs

the regime, but which Mr Erdogan has

courted as a strategic partner. During a visit

to Ukraine on February 3rd, Mr Erdoganac-

cused the Russians of negligence. He said

REYHANLI

Syrians are putting down roots in

Turkey. But trouble looms

Tu r ke y

The new Turks

Aleppo

Manbij

Idlib

Reyhanli

Idlib

SYRIA

TURKEY

Government

Kurds

Jihadists

Rebels

(Turkish-

backed)

Turkish troops

Areas of control

February 3rd 2020

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor

50 km

1