Amandla! magazine | Issue 84

(Luxxy Media) #1

and grassroots churches, and its strong
influence in leftist social organisations. In
spite of this, it continued to be, in a way,
a “Left” party with a presence among
progressive sectors of the middle classes,
but still without access to the popular and
poor masses of Brazil.
This was especially the case in regions
dominated by conservative regional
strongmen, the traditional conservative
middle classes and sectors of the economic
and social elites. During the
1990s, the most difficult task
was to persuade the economic
elites and convince the middle
classes that the PT could make
a government that could lead
the country out of economic
instability and transform the
Brazilian state into a tool for
the mitigation of poverty,
unemployment and hunger.
The end of hunger was
specifically its main focus.
This implied an engagement in
dialogue with the political centre



  • this engagement was called
    discursive “deradicalisation”.
    It was not without its problems
    within the traditional alliances
    of the Brazilian Left. The most
    iconic act of this transition was
    the “Letter to the Brazilian
    people” in which, in 2002, Lula
    informed the establishment
    that he would not do away with
    “legal security” in Brazil – he
    would honour contracts signed
    by his predecessor, and wouldn’t
    change the economic rules
    adopted by him.
    That year, Lula was elected
    president in his third run for the highest
    office. The lesson is that, unlike what
    may appear to be the case, if you want to
    participate in the democratic game, it is
    possible to dialogue with broader sectors
    without losing your identity. You can still
    retain the values that can and will guide
    the government’s actions, as the PT in
    government demonstrated, particularly in
    Lula’s first two terms in office.
    Dilma’s government, which
    attempted deeper changes in the
    economic structures, failed to take note
    of the growing discontent of the middle
    classes caused by a relative loss of class
    privileges. This pushed the elites and the
    whole society to the institutional coup
    of Dilma’s impeachment. This led to the
    demonisation of the PT, the “antipetism”
    and the victory of Bolsonaro, a radical -
    and marginal - right-wing deputy of a tiny
    party, that allowed the elites to block the
    PT’s return to power in 2018.


The PT cycle
Separating Brazil from the rest of the
world, it can be said that the June 2013
revolts expressed what we call the “PT
cycle” - from its creation, to its arrival
in government and then to more than
ten years managing the Brazilian state.
Then, despite the relative bonanzas for
them, the elites and the middle classes
began to abandon the PT. They had been

forced to “put up with” it. Now they
created a breeding ground for the rhetoric
of hatred and “cultural war”. They built
“antipetism” and pushed society towards
radical right-wing options. Until then,
these had not had expression in Brazilian
society.
The corruption scandals and the
judicial persecution of the main figures of
the PT, including Lula, fed and were fed
by this climate. This led the PT to a major
setback in its electoral representation and
its worst opinion poll rating. It reached a
historical low of 20% of popular support.
For a large part of the population, the PT
became synonymous with “corruption” - a
“petista” was a thief.

PT reborn
The period between 2015 (impeachment
of Dilma) and 2019 was the worst period
in the history of the PT. It was a period
of “divorce” from society that seemed

irreparable. However, despite all the
attacks, Lula’s party has a reasonably good
chance of winning the elections on Sunday,
October 2 (or in a second round, on October
30). How did this happen? How was the
relationship rebuilt between Lula – and
perhaps the PT as a whole - and, to date,
47% of the Brazilian population?
The first factor is that Lula could
demonstrate that he was subjected to
political and legal persecution and was

arbitrarily imprisoned and tried without
evidence. The Brazilian Supreme Court
(STF) annulled the sentences against him
because they were made by a judge who
was not impartial. and was politicallly
motivated. In this way, Lula demonstrated
to society that he was unjustly imprisoned
and prevented from competing in the
2018 elections, which made Bolsonaro’s
victory possible. By redeeming himself,
he also demonstrated that he was right
when he denounced arbitrariness. Along
with his own reputation, he recovered the
reputation of the party itself, which was
once again embraced by broad sectors
of society - but strongly by the popular
sectors and the youth.
The second factor is that the large
social movements never abandoned Lula.
His link with the PT, MST, CUT, MAB
(Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens),
MTST (Movimento de Trabalhadores sem
Teto) and youth movements associated

In the same period, the new unionism also created the trade union federation, Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT)
in 1983. This gathered together the power of the workers in the labour sphere of the struggle.

Perspectives for the left

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