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ire. The Taliban had all that irepower inside the city,
and Afghan and U.S. forces had to deal with it.
But in addition to armor, advanced weaponry and
superior training, the U.S. had another major advan-
tage: air dominance. The military said it dropped
73 bombs and missiles in the Ghazni operation. By
Aug. 15, a third Special Forces team and additional
units had arrived in Ghazni. Thanks to the airstrikes,
the Taliban began falling back. The U.S. military said
226 Taliban were killed during the operations.
Typically, both sides declared victory. Even
as the ighting drove them from the city, the
Taliban bragged that it had sent a clear message to
President Donald Trump that “the conquest of this
city signiies the failure of yet the latest American
strategy,” according to a released statement. “The
experience of Ghazni has proven that no defensive
belts of cities can withstand the ofensive prowess
of the Mujahideen.” In truth, the strategic value of
the Ghazni attack seems to have been the tweets,
headlines and video footage that rippled across
social-media feeds, showing armed Taliban brazenly
roaming free inside the city center. The message was
clear: the Taliban remains a ierce enemy who can
strike whenever they choose, regardless of peace
talks and hopes of reconciliation.
From the U.S. and Afghan militaries’ view, the
battle was a success. Afghan soldiers, though heav-
ily reliant on American Special Forces and airpower
to turn the tide, stood, fought and routed the enemy
within ive days. The Afghan commandos garnered
respect for their performance. “They stepped up, no
doubt,” says Noah Olson, a 20-year-old Army Spe-
cialist. “They want to get this over with as much as
we do.” U.S. military brass declared the onslaught a
misire from a fading enemy. “Tactically, operation-
ally and strategically, the Taliban achieved nothing
with this failed attack except another eye-catching,
but inconsequential headline,” said U.S. Army Lieut.
Colonel Martin O’Donnell, spokesman for the U.S.-
led international military coalition in Kabul.
Like most narratives emanating from Afghani-
stan, the truth lies somewhere in between. Looking
at the damage inside Ghazni, it was hard for any-
one to declare a true victory. Carcasses of burnt-out
buildings smoldered in the sun. Stores that bristled
with goods for the upcoming holiday became husks
of blackened, twisted metal. “At a time like this, your
neighbors are like brothers,” says Said Mohammed,
63, whose restaurant managed to emerge unscathed.
“We grieve for them.”
The bloodshed was also apparent. At Ghazni Pro-
vincial Hospital, rooms were illed with patients of
all ages who had sufered wounds in the onslaught.
Dr. Abdul Basir Ramaki, the hospital’s medical di-
rector, said that the dead tallied 150, with 265 more
injured, as of Aug. 16. “Many were women and chil-
dren,” he says. “All Afghan people are tired of this vio-

lence.” (A U.N. report quoted “unveriiable numbers”

that put the civilian death toll at more than 150.)

Guma Khan, an elderly man with a long white

beard, lay on his back in a hospital bed, recovering

from a bullet wound to his left leg. “I was just walk-

ing down the street,” he says. “How am I supposed

to go on living here?”

Brigadier General Dadan Lawang, the com-

mander of the Afghan National Army’s 203rd Corps,

told TIME that 112 Afghan military and police were

killed, and 56 were wounded. He said his team was

reviewing its security posture to guard against fu-

ture attacks. “We need to ensure this never happens

again,” he says.

BUT THE AFTERMATHof the battle shows why that

vow is unlikely to hold. On Aug. 17, Afghan President

Ashraf Ghani arrived at the joint military headquar-

ters in Ghazni Provincial Center. He blamed Paki-

stan for the Taliban attack, saying that many of the

ighters were streaming back across Pakistan’s bor-

ders. Islamabad has long been blamed for giving the

Afghan Taliban safe harbor, and Ghazni lies near

tribal regions in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

and Balochistan provinces.

Ghani claimed Pakistan’s military chief, General

Qamar Javed Bajwa, had assured him over the phone

that cross-border insurgent activity would not be al-

lowed after the July 25 elections in Pakistan. “I need

answers now,” Ghani said. “From where did they

come from and why are they receiving treatment in

your hospitals?” (Pakistan denied any involvement.)

The initial success of the Taliban assault was

aided by the apparent lack of coordination between

Afghan security forces. The local police were run-

ning low on supplies and ammunition and had dii-

culty communicating, according to Afghan oicers.

In addition, two American soldiers told TIME that

they heard that the Afghan National Army had acci-

dentally ired on their own units, as well as Ameri-

can convoys. When asked about the eyewitness ac-

counts, the U.S. military command in Afghanistan

said those reports remained unconirmed. If true,

the lack of readiness suggests Afghan forces may

need “assists” from the U.S. Special Forces for some

time to come.

When the ighting inally died down, the U.S. sol-

diers were looking forward to returning to their bases

in the region, where they had running water, toilets

and food that wasn’t prepared in a box. More than

a week’s worth of combat made the prospect of re-

turning to the amenities of a long-established head-

quarters particularly appealing. Almost all the men

had endured close calls and considered themselves

fortunate to have made it out alive. “Our luck’s run-

ning out,” one soldier said, half-jokingly. “I still have

ive months here. My number’s going to be called

eventually.” □

World

THE TALIBAN

HAD ALL THAT

FIREPOWER

INSIDE THE

CITY, AND

AFGHAN AND

U.S. FORCES

HAD TO DEAL

WITH IT