be guilty of this, though for good reasons Tilley focuses on how
the theodicist is at fault. I want to take an example of this men-
tioned by Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion. Regarding an
encounter with the Christian philosopher Professor Richard
Swinburne, Dawkins writes: “I was on a television panel with
Swinburne, and also with our Oxford colleague Professor Peter
Atkins. Swinburne at one point attempted to justify the Holo-
caust on the grounds that it gave the Jews a wonderful oppor-
tunity to be courageous and noble. Peter Atkins splendidly
growled: ‘May you rot in hell’.” (The God Delusion p.64)
Like Atkins, I recoil from the comments made by Swinburne.
As I reflect on my own reaction to Swinburne’s remarks the prob-
lem is not so much that the idea is illogical (which it is). Rather I
morally object to a profound misapprehension, a deafening
detachment from the human situation, a rush to defend a spe-
cific concept of God while leaving humanity desolate. Swinburne
might even be accused, from within his own faith, of idolatry, of
turning concepts into something to worship and of making an
altar piled high with human suffering for that purpose. But let’s
suppose for a moment that Swinburne’s desperate apologetics
made some sort of logical sense. This question would still remain:
does the logic of the argument align with answers to the broader
question of how to live one’s life? The philosopher cannot in
some priestly fashion hand down answers to those on the front
line of life. To think they can is once again to disregard the phe-
nomenological and moral gap between Auschwitz and the semi-
nar room. Part of Tilley’s point about the kind of apologetics we
see demonstrated by Swinburne is that they exhibit values that
need to be called into question. Prioritising defence of a concept
of God over empathetic engagement with victims of suffering is
a morally dubious option when seeking to defend the good.
I want to take this direction of Tilley’s thinking but apply it
to the anti-theodicist as well. Anti-theodicists argue that it is
irrational to believe in a benevolent, omnipotent God given the
existence of evil. They sometimes offer this as a reason for dis-
regarding the strength that prayer or meditation, ritual, fast or
festival may offer. For many anti-theodicists, such a collection
of delusions, however comforting, will not shift the argumentone iota. They say that following the arguments closely will
involve us seeing, in the cold light of dawn, a universe without
a God; a heartless world, a spiritless world in which we must be
self-reliant and in which we will be all the better for that. This
view assumes that the non-believer is correct in their arguments- something with which I have a great deal of sympathy. But it
also assumes that because they are correct, the logical argu-
ments have more weight in personal encounters with evil and
suffering than all the positive experiences that a religious
believer may have from their religious engagement. They
should, in other words, relinquish that religious engagement
and their life commitments thus far, for the sake of an argu-
ment. It is this second view with which I take issue. For many
religious believers the task of alleviating suffering, of forging
communal resistance against hopelessness and despair, is inte-
gral to their faith. It is not something that can be distilled from
a set of beliefs, but rather an entire life system whose motiva-
tional force is its integrity. My point is that the logic of a spe-
cific argument about problems of evil should be seen from a
first person perspective as part of a broader set of considerations
about how to live life. Such considerations include the various
ways of engaging with suffering that we find most effective.
Making Logic Moral
I do not wish to claim that philosophy of religion seminars are
redundant, but I do want to make some remarks about their
limitations.
At its best, the debate between the theodicists and anti-theod-
icists is both a logical and moral enterprise. Whether or not
belief in an all-good, omnipotent God is compatible with the
existence of evil is a question of great importance in the lives of
many people, and the debate is an attempt to pursue that vital
question. To do so honestly, to seek what is most reasonable to
believe whatever one’s personal background or inclinations and
however much one’s findings may clash with existing beliefs, is
a moral pursuit. So I do not advocate a halt to this debate. Quite
the contrary. It should remain part of an ongoing exploration
both within and beyond academia. Clearly the debate can leadAugust/September 2019 ●Philosophy Now 29Evil
Theodicy: hiding in the monastery whilst evil flourishes outside?‘UG
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