August/September 2019 ●Philosophy Now 31Evil
The third feature is the observer’s inability to identify with
the perpetrator’s perspective. The observer might find psycho-
logical motives which explain the aggressor’s behavior. How-
ever, his or her sense of bafflement remains, since explanation
and understanding are not the same thing. Indeed, there is much
debate within philosophy and psychology regarding their dif-
ferences. Often in cases of the perpetration of evil, the motives
remain external to the observer in the sense that even when they
are known, they do not resolve the mystery surrounding the
transgressor’s actions. We are unable to perceive a connection
between how we think and act, and this particular terrible deed.
Fourth, what might intensify the observer’s horror is an insu-
perable difference between the observer’s and perpetrator’s judg-
ment following the incident, as indicated by the perpetrator’s
lack of remorse. If anything can alter the observer’s moral judg-
ment of the case (which is not at all certain) it can only happen
through the aggressor coming to perceive the situation in much
the same way as the observer does – with the same degree of
horror, and the same level of incredulity in the face of the viola-
tion of normal human expectations. When the perpetrator lacks
remorse and regret after the act, or refuses to accept responsi-
bility for it, the observer finds himself emotionally shaken by the
way the aggressor does not perceive his own moral failure.
For some, these four features may be present in every attri-
bution of evil within a perpetrator/victim relationship, from rape,
murder, pedophilia or genocide, to merely taking pleasure in the
victim’s suffering after humiliating them in public. (A person
who takes pleasure in the suffering of others will be judged evil
even if he was not responsible for the victim’s suffering.)
To illustrate these features working together, let’s take an
example. Gabriel, a sports teacher in a school, takes pleasure in
repeatedly instructing Raphael, a six-year-old overweight kid, to
jump over a bar, merely in order to see Raphael failing to do so
over and over again – to the great amusement of himself and of
other pupils. All the salient features of the prototype of evil are
present here: an extreme asymmetry in power between victim and
perpetrator; an observer might naturally think that Raphael’s vul-
nerability triggers the teacher’s cruelty; it is almost impossible for
the observer to take Gabriel’s perspective on the situation; and if
Gabriel were for instance to blame Raphael after being confronted
with his own moral failure, the observer will experience a second
shock, and his rage toward Gabriel will intensify.Problems With These Aspects
If this analysis is correct, it means that moral evil is not funda-
mentally in the act itself, nor in the gravity of the damage done,
but is to be found in the nature of the relationship of the aggres-
sor to the victim in their vulnerability and weakness, or towards
those who are needy and dependent in general. These are the
acts that we see as evil. But are we right to do so? I suggest instead
that each attribution is false, or at least not necessary for an act
to be evil, and that the attribution relies on cognitive bias.W
hy do we still use the term ‘evil’? Why don’t we merely
say ‘very, very bad’, or ‘a severe moral failure’? I think
‘evil’ describes a category of moral failures of a certain
kind better than any other word. The question I want
to look at now is how we determine those kinds of moral failure.
For thousands of years, the concept of evil was closely linked
to a religious view of life. In Judaism and Christianity, evil in
human conduct (which is known specifically as ‘moral evil’) is
viewed as extreme defiance of God’s commandments. An act
of evil radically violates that holy code. However, despite the
evident religious connotations attached to the concept,
widespread use of the term has survived in today’s secular soci-
ety. People in the West still employ the term in a variety of
contexts. ‘Evil’ is used to describe war crimes, horrific acts of
murder, cruelty, violence, sexual abuse, and attempts to cause
suffering simply to gain pleasure from a victim’s distress.
One must assume that the concept has survived because people
still find it useful. And yet, although the term is quite common,
psychologists (and I am one) have usually refrained from dealing
with the subject of evil. In the professional discourse, evil has
been consistently viewed as at best an elusive topic, and at worst
a dangerous one. The handful of academic studies that relate to
evil are interested in exploring the psychology of evildoers, but
the properties that guide us in recognizing evil and distinguish-
ing it from ordinary wrongdoing remain a puzzle.
My main thesis is that moral evil is unique because it implies a
unique way of thinking on the part of the perpetrator of evil toward
his victim. Based on examples from the common use of the word
and from my research on the topic, I have found four co-occur-
ring features to be the most salient aspects of the prototype of evil.
I want to briefly consider these features, and then explain why per-
ceiving an act as evil is based on an attribution error. Still, we need
not fix this error, because making it is important for our survival.
Four Perceived Features of Moral Evil
First, in acts that are perceived as evil there is an extreme asym-
metry between victim and perpetrator. Think of the following
pairs: rapist/victim; child molester/child; Nazi soldier/Jewish
civilian. One feature common to most evil crimes is an extreme
gap in power relations between victim and perpetrator. When
an observer identifies evil, the victim is perceived as compara-
tively weak, helpless, defenseless, needy, and, at times, innocent.
Second, there’s a perceived lack of emotional connection
between the perpetrator and the victim’s vulnerability. The
observer’s impression is that the perpetrator clearly recognizes
a weak and helpless person or group, and that the aggressor acts
in full awareness of the victim’s vulnerability. But while in the
observer this vulnerability and weakness usually arouse empa-
thy and a desire to come to the victim’s defense, the aggressor’s
perceived feelings are assumed to be very different. From the
observer’s perspective, the victim’s vulnerability either fails to
arouse the aggressor’s concern, or even motivates the attack.
Is Attributing Evil a Cognitive Bias?
Aner Govrin argues that a common perception of evil is mistaken.