Vanity Fair UK – September 2019

(Kiana) #1

A WIDENING WEB


I


n many instances, the surveillance of Saudi dissidents began
online. But the internet was at first a lifeline for millions of
people in the region. During the Arab Spring of 2010–12, social
media helped topple autocrats in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
Monarchs in a number of the Persian Gulf States began to fear
the dissenters in their own countries, many of whom had aired
their grievances or organized their protests online.
In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, the ruler at the time—King
Abdullah—saw real value in social media, believing the web
might actually serve to narrow the gap between the ruling fam-
ily and its subjects. “In the beginning, the kingdom’s obsession
with tracking social media was not to monitor dissidents or
opponents, but rather to identify societal problems early on,”
said a Western expat who lives in Saudi Arabia and advises
the ruling elite and various ministries on matters of national
security. “It was to give the kingdom a chance at identifying
economic vulnerabilities and blind spots so it could intervene
before that frustration exploded.”
During the early 2010s, the head of Abdullah’s royal court
was Khaled al-Tuwaijry. According to various press accounts,
he, in turn, relied on a young, ambitious law-school graduate
named Saud al-Qahtani, who was tasked with assembling a
team that would monitor all forms of media, with a special
focus on cybersecurity. Like Assiri, al-Qahtani had been a
member of the Saudi Air Force.
Over the years, Assiri and other government critics would
learn that one of the popular chat rooms on the nascent web
was actually a foil. Saudi cyber-operatives had allegedly set it
up to entice others to join in and comment freely, only to be
tricked into revealing details that would disclose their identi-
ties. One such forum, several activists told me, was believed to
have been created by al-Qahtani, who, early on, had instructed
the monarchy to treat the internet as a secret, potent monitor-
ing tool. (Al-Qahtani did not respond to requests for comment.)
Since then, al-Qahtani is believed to have shaped the country’s
broader cybersecurity efforts. His online network—according


to human rights monitors and computer-threat experts—has
included Saudi computer sleuths and hackers poised to go after
government critics at home and abroad. As first reported by
Vice’s Motherboard, al-Qahtani worked closely with Hack-
ing Team, an Italian surveillance company that sells intrusion
resources and “offensive security” capabilities around the
globe. Others have traced Saudi government ties to the Israeli
surveillance company NSO, whose signature spyware, Pega-
sus, has played a role in the attempted entrapment of at least
three dissidents interviewed for this report.
This aggressive posture first appeared around the time that
M.B.S. became a senior adviser to the royal court, then ramped
up in 2017, when he was appointed crown prince. At the time,
his country faced plunging oil prices, a costly war in Yemen that
was launched by M.B.S., a rising threat from Iran, the linger-
ing effects of the Arab Spring, and internal social unrest. As the
chairman of the country’s two most powerful governing bod-
ies, the Council of Political and Security Affairs and the Coun-
cil of Economic and Development Affairs, “the crown prince
centralized power upwards to him,” in the words of an insider
who apprises the Saudi government on security and policy.
Soon, M.B.S. would have direct command over the country’s
domestic and foreign intelligence services, its armed forces,
the national guard, and other relevant security agencies. The
prince was free to assemble his own teams in the official intel-
ligence agencies—and in their more ad hoc offshoots, which
is where al-Qahtani thrived as the head of both the Center for
Studies and Media Affairs and the Saudi Federation for Cyber
Security, Programming and Drones.

A ROGUE OPERATION?

J


ust days after Khashoggi’s murder, the kingdom rushed
to contain the diplomatic fallout by calling the crime a
“rogue operation.” But it was hardly an anomaly. It soon came
to light that the regime had been sending squads across sover-
eign borders to physically repatriate Saudi dissidents. Indeed,
shortly after the grisly hit job in Istanbul, a journalist from
Reuters, who was briefed in Riyadh by an unnamed govern-
ment official, was presented with what the reporter described
in an article as “internal intelligence documents which
appeared to show the initiative to bring back such dissidents
as well as the specific one involving Khashoggi. There is a
standing order to negotiate the return of dissidents peaceful-
ly; which gives them the authority to act without going back to
the leadership.” These attempts to kidnap and return alleged
offenders, according to the spokesperson quoted by Reuters,
were part of the nation’s “campaign to prevent Saudi dissi-
dents from being recruited by the country’s enemies.” (Two
U.S.-based Saudis I spoke with told me that federal agents had
recently approached them, handed over their business cards,
and warned them that, based on up-to-date intelligence, they
should heighten their personal security. The F.B.I. told Vanity
Fa i r that the bureau “regularly interacts with members of the
communities we serve to build mutual trust around protecting
the American public.”) Representative Adam Schiff, chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee, has said he plans on
examining “what threat is posed to [Saudi] individuals resid-
ing in the United States, but as well, what are the practices of
[the Saudi government].”

The jet took off
at 7:30 p.m. for

Cairo. The cabin lights

and in-f light
monitors were suddenly

turned off. The
plane was redirected

to Riyadh.

90 VANITY FAIR SEPTEMBER 2019

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