and urban local bodies
(whichcameto be held
from 2001 onwards)sawa
risein Muslim representa-
tion.In 2001,the share of
Muslimmukhiyas(elec-
ted headmen, panchayat
chiefs)was over 16 per
cent.Thisis almostpro-
portionate to theMuslim
populationin the State.
From 2006 onwards,re-
servationforlowerback-
wards(AtiPichhrhas)in
theselocalbodiesled to the
riseof subalterngroups.A
majority of Muslims listed
as EBCs(Extremely Back-
ward Castes) or MBCs
(Most Backward Castes)
understandablyadded to
their representation. All
thesecauseddiscomfiture
among Hindus, initially
theuppercastesandlater
the subalternHindus.
In manycases,the pan-
chayat representatives
are/were local toughs/
hoodlums/lumpens. Al-
though they were not
Muslim-specific, they
strangelycameto be seen
as representing “Muslim
resurgence”. In some
cases, these representat-
iveshappenedto be related
to peopleworkingin West
Asia. All these factors
beganto providecredence
to the stereotyping of
Muslimminorities by the
majority community.This
“resurgence”cameto be
propagatedas a “Muslim
menace” to Hindus.
Neo-richMuslimsas-
serted their identity by
constructing mosques
withtallspiresandhuge
domesandby public dis-
play of religious rituals
suchas Julus-e-Muham-
madiandMiladcelebra-
tions. These displays of
identity, mostoftenan en-
actment of competitivein-
tra-Muslim maslaki
(sub-sectarian) identities
betweentheBarelvisand
the Deobandis,cameto be
seenby sections of Hindus
as Muslimminorityasser-
tionagainstHindus.The
cumulative effect of all
thesewasa buildupof an
anti-Muslim feeling and
Hinduconsolidation.ANTI-MUSLIM
FEELING
A comprehensivestudyof
thisphenomenonexplain-
ing thecommunalisation
of Bihar’s social space
must be undertaken by
professionally competent
andresource-rich organ-
isationssuchas the CSDS.
One is not sure if the
CSDS-Lokniti survey
questionnaire factors in
thegrowinganti-Muslim
feeling. A keen Bihar-
watcherandhighlyprofes-
sionalacademiclikeProf.
SanjayKumar shouldnot
haveignoredthese.
The section profiling
major political parties
(pages24-28) glossesover
a crucialaspect:it doesnot
spell out the caste-wise
supportbaseof eachof the
majorparties.Thetreat-
mentof the fall of the tra-
ditional Left (the
Communist Partyof India,
theCommunist Partyof
India (Marxist), the So-
cialistUnityCentreof In-
dia,etc.,)andthe“rise”of
the “revolutionary” Left
suchas the Indian People’s
Front-Communist Partyof
India (Marxist-Leninist)
Liberation and the CPI
(Maoist)is alsohighlyin-
adequate. While dealing
withRamVilasPaswan’s
LokJanshakti Party,the
educationalandeconomic
profile of the dominant
castes amongDalits,the
Dusadhsandthe Chamars,
are missingin thisvolume.
Similarly, a profile of
Musahars and Dhobiscouldalsobe quitehelpful.
Prof. Sanjay Kumar
claims to havedeveloped
his researchinterestin Bi-
har elections fromthe 1995
electiononwards.Import-
antly, thatwasthe election
whentheSamataParty in
alliance withthe CPI(ML)
Liberation jumped into
the fray.TheSamataParty
cameintoexistenceafter
LaluPrasad’snomineelost
the Vaishali Lok Sabha
byelection in 1994.This
sawan electoralalliance
betweenthe twocompetit-
ive andrivaluppercastes,
the Bhumihars and the
Rajputs.
Duringthe1970sand
the 1980s, Muzaffarpur re-
mained hostageto gang-
ster-politicians; during
1992 -98,afiercelybloody
war between upper and
lower caste gangster-
politicians continued,
killing Hemant Shahi
(1992), theShukla broth-
ers (1994)andBrijBihari
(1998). Thelattersymbol-
ised an OBC assertion
againstupper castegang-
ster-politiciansin Muzaf-
farpur after1990.
The Vaishali Lok
Sabha byelectionof 1994
alsowitnessed the political
rise of theMallah com-
munity. Captain Jai
Narain Nishad (1930-
2018) secured around
40,000 votesas an inde-
pendent.LaluPrasadtook
note of it, and in 1996
Nishad contestedas the
JanataDalnomineefrom
the Muzaffarpur Lok
Sabha seatandwon.Sub-
sequently,he switchedto
theBJP.Eversince,Muz-
affarpur,otherwise saidto
be a “cultural and eco-
nomic capital”of the Bhu-
mihars, came to be
“politicallydominated”by
the Mallahs.
The 2014 electioninBihar saw the rise of
Mukesh Sahni, the self-
styled “Son of Mallah”,
who eventually aligned
withthe BJP.However,his
leadershipremainedcon-
tested by many leaders
fromwithinthe caste.Prof.
Sanjay Kumar’s account,
otherwise veryrichin data,
doesnotexplain the argu-
ablecaseof thepolitical
riseof the Mallahs.Former
Chief Minister Karpoori
Thakur (1924-88) had,in
hisfinal days,triedto mo-
bilisetheMallahs.
Owingto theselimita-
tions,thevolume,other-
wiserichin data,failsto
enablea prognosisof the
futuretrendsof electoral
politicsin Bihar.Thebook
analyses theelectoralim-
pactof the fodder scambut
leavesoutthedetails per-
tainingto the Srijanscam.
Yet,theauthordoesmen-
tionthelossof credibility
of NitishKumarin no un-
certain terms. He con-
cludesby saying: “Nitish
Kumarmay havebeenable
to savethe ChiefMinister’s
chair[in2017]andmay
evenhaveensuredits con-
tinuation beyondthe 2020
election,butthepremium
he paidfor the insurance...
wasverybig.”
Therearesomeminor
typosandfactualerrors.
Despite theshortcomings,
whichmayalsobe because
of the overall limitationsof
electionstudiesin Indian
academia, particularly as-
pectssuchas wider and
deepereconomic andso-
cialprocesses,thisvolume
is immenselyuseful.One
hopesthattheforthcom-
ingSagebooks on other
Statesaremorecompre-
hensivethanthisone.One
alsohopesthata revised
and enlarged edition of
thisvolumeon Bihar cor-
rectsthe omissions. $