5 august 2019 http://www.openthemagazine.com 19May could not do in three years. Can he revive proposals already
rejected from others, as if they are magically now acceptable
from him?
Boris has not been specific about his strategy, but perhaps that
is all part of it, to keep the Europeans guessing. some suggest that
Johnson will simply shout louder than May, either physically or
metaphorically, in an attempt to be believed about the possibil-
ity of leaving without a deal. this new intensity is supposed to
shock the hitherto stubborn EU into remorseful cooperation,
and somehow the circle of the irish question can be squared.
Because the irish border is such a central issue, perhaps it is
worth unpicking it a little. the basic problem is that, following
any kind of Brexit, the north of ireland will be out of the EU, and
the south will be in it. tariffs and standards will be different on
either side of that border. But any attempt to harden the border,
meaning to give it more legal significance, or to re-install any
kind of physical infrastructure surrounding it, runs counter
to the Belfast agreement of 1998, commonly called the Good
friday agreement.
the version of Brexit contained in theresa May’s Withdraw-
al agreement takes full account of all the sensitivities involved,
and creates a temporary customs union between the United
Kingdom and the EU, to ensure that the political consequences
of separating northern ireland from the mainland UK, how-
ever temporarily, are avoided, while trade is still facilitated. the
downside is that, although temporary, this transition phase—
the backstop—is not time-limited, and the British government
cannot unilaterally withdraw from it without EU consent.
the EU see the Withdrawal agreement as a deal between
institutions, not persons, and they have never said anything
other than that the deal is closed. that agreement was highly
offensive to the hardest Brexiteers within the Conservative
Party, and it failed to pass through Parliament, despite Prime
Minister May’s repeated efforts to persuade opponents (and
some colleagues) of its merits. Boris was unable to stomach it
and resigned from the cabinet. yet, despite this principled stand,
he later voted for this same charter of vassalage on its third andlast appearance on the floor of the Commons last february.
Critics frequently couple this apparent inconsistency with
a long-standing story that, in 2016, before announcing his sup-
port for leave in the referendum, Boris drafted two articles, one
pro-leave and one pro-Remain, and only published the former
after due reflection. the received wisdom about this is that he
wished to triangulate a position, not so much on the issue of
leave or Remain, but on the next tory leadership contest. He
expected Remain to win, but he saw the referendum campaign
as a way to woo the tory members, with a view to mopping up
their support when David Cameron finally stepped down.
these manoeuvrings have lent a certain air of duplicity to
Johnson’s actions regarding Europe. some purists are prepared
to label him as less than a true Brexiteer, and nigel farage, the
high priest of leave, has publicly stated that he does not trust
Boris to deliver. the wider public are not sanguine either. a
recent poll shows that only 26 per cent of the public expect him
to lead Britain out of the EU on 31st october, as promised.
Whatever his personal convictions, Prime Minister Johnson
now has to find a way through some very tricky political
terrain. His government has a working majority of two. this
includes the support of the ten-member Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP), but the ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with
them is currently up for review. Meanwhile, one Conservative
MP has just been charged with a criminal offence and has lost
the party whip, and there is a by-election in august, which the
sitting tory is unlikely to win, having been forced to seek re-
election over an expenses fraud. there are also strong rumours
that perhaps eight Conservative MPs will defect to the liberal
Democrats if Boris continues his hard line.
all this calls into question Johnson’s ability to command a
majority in the House of Commons. so how should he proceed?
take on the recalcitrant MPs and persuade or cow them into
supporting something like theresa May’s deal with the back-
stop removed? But the EU wouldn’t accept any such ‘tweaked’
proposal. alternatively, it has been suggested that he could pro-
rogue Parliament—stand it down temporarily—which is the
sort of thing that cost King Charles i his head. it would be legal,First, there is only one Donald Trump:
crude, confrontational and divisive,
whereas there are at least two Boris
Johnsons. Boris 1 is a socially liberal,
immigration-friendly one-nation Tory
who can reach out to Labour voters in
the south. Boris 2 is a nationalistic,
hard-hitting Europhobe, who writes
chauvinist jibes at religious, sexual and
ethnic minorities, and appeals principally
to the Tory party membershipBoris Johnson with queen elizaBeth ii , london, July 24
ReUteRs