currence which remains of great perti-
nence for the so-called differences of
opinion with the High Court and the
Supreme Court) admonishes us all to
read “judgment... as a whole, and if
there are conflicting parts, they have to
be reconciled harmoniously in order to
yield a result that will accord with an
earlier decision of the same bench
strength”. This means that courts should
wrestle the complexity of judicial dis-
course, and where necessary, recourse to
a creative and harmonic understanding
of binding precedents. In plain words, it
is the judicial duty of all to strive for a
harmonious interpretation of prior judi-
cial discourse, rather than too quickly or
readily read it as deeply conflicted.
Resurfacingis unanimous in holding
that nothing “contained in Section 397
(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the
inherent power by the High Court” in
the “few and far between situations”.
Nor “does it stand to reason to say that
inherent power of the High Court can’t
be exercised for stopping the criminal
proceeding as early as possible, instead
of harassing the accused up to the end”.CONCLUSION
The Bar will, henceforth, prevent any
abuse of the process of the Court in
seeking justice. Nor would the courts,
vested with inherent judicial review
powers, allow any misappropriation of
the rule and role of the law enabling it
to be a programme of personal, group,
or political vendetta.
It is too early to say empirically how
the new SIIO normative regime has
worked India-wide. But it is not prema-
ture to salute the Supreme Court for its
high normative achievement, marking
the emergence of a new organisational
adjudicatory leadership of the nation.—The author is an internationally
renowned law scholar, an acclaimed
teacher and a well-known writerColumn/ Interlocutory Orders/ Prof Upendra Baxi
18 July 22, 2019
speedy trial (India Legal, May 14, 2018
issue). That right is, of course, now a
“legislative mandate”, but it is also a
judicially recognised Article 21 right,
although intentionally excluded (in the
fundamental rights part) by the
Constitution makers.
The most innovative aspect of the
ruling categorically says: “In all pending
matters before the High Courts or other
courts relating to PC Act or all other
civil or criminal cases, where stay of
proceedings in a pending trial is operat-
ing, stay will automatically lapse after
six months from today unless extended
by a speaking order on above parame-
ters.” And this is also true of “civil and
criminal appellate/revisional courts
under the jurisdiction of the High
Courts”. The automatic lapsing of stay is
welcome and its renewal would involve
the exercise of judicial discretion. At the
same time, the speaking orders remain
liable to further litigation.
What is more, the trial courts “may,
on expiry of above period, resume the
proceedings without waiting for any
other intimation unless express order
extending stay is produced”. The High
Courts are required now to also issue
instructions to this effect and it needs to
be emphasised that “the challenge to an
order of charge should be entertained in
a rarest of rare case only to correct a
patent error of jurisdiction and not to
reappreciate the matter. Even where
such challenge is entertained and stay is
granted, the matter must be decided on
day-to-day basis so that stay does not
operate for an unduly long period”.
Though no mandatory time limit may
be fixed, a period of three months is
suggested.
Justice Nariman (in a learned con-Twitter: @indialegalmedia
Website: http://www.indialegallive.com
Contact: [email protected]Justices AK Goel, RF Nariman and
Navin Sinha (clockwise from top) of
the SC had, in the Resurfacing
verdict delivered on March 28,
2018, unanimously said: Nor “does
it stand to reason to say that inher-
ent power of the High Court cannot
be exercised for stopping the
criminal proceeding as early as
possible, instead of harassing the
accused up to the end”.