32 Europe The EconomistJuly 27th 2019
M
ustafa kemal ataturkanchored Turkey in Europe and the
wider West after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. About a
century on Recep Tayyip Erdogan is reversing that process. The
Turkish president’s successive power grabs have edged the coun-
try closer to its eastern neighbours and rendered its application for
eumembership a joke. Two recent incidents have made matters
worse. On July 12th the Turkish air force acquired a Russian s- 400
surface-to-air missile system, prompting its exclusion from
nato’s f-35 stealth-fighter-jet programme. Then on July 15th the eu
imposed sanctions over Turkey’s drilling for gas in waters around
Cyprus, a member of the union whose northern third remains con-
trolled by Turkey.
That the euhas been unable to halt its close neighbour’s drift is
a sorry embarrassment. At times the union has been conciliatory,
particularly during the migration crisis when Turkey agreed to act
as its border guard in return for money and visas. euleaders have
often bitten their tongues rather than criticise the country’s slide
into autocracy. But at other moments the euhas frozen Turkey
out—sneering about “Asia Minor”, dismissing its accession pros-
pects and now imposing penalties for Mr Erdogan’s transgres-
sions. The result has been the worst of all worlds: not enough car-
rot to lure Turkey back into the fold but not enough stick to force it
to comply.
The drilling dispute is a case in point. Turkey’s government
claims that the gas recently discovered under the seabed belongs
partly to Cyprus’s north. The eudoes not recognise Turkish Cyprus
so deems the three Turkish ships that have drilled in nearby waters
since June illegal. Its sanctions are, however, puny: cuts to finan-
cial assistance, the suspension of an aviation agreement and a
pause to high-level talks. Turkey has brushed them off as of “no
importance” and has vowed to send a fourth ship to the area. Once
again the eu looks contradictory and ineffective.
European officials offer two main excuses. The first is that Eu-
rope needs Turkey’s co-operation on migration and terrorism, so
must handle the country delicately. Mr Erdogan might be a diffi-
cult partner but he is better than chaos; a Turkish meltdown would
send economic shockwaves or new surges of migrants onto the
European mainland. Mr Erdogan has encouraged such fears, onJuly 22nd threatening the suspension of the migration deal over
the EU’s sanctions. The second, more frank excuse is that the eu
lacks the culture and tools required to pull Turkey back. Europe, it
is said, is too divided, complacent and weak to wield power deci-
sively. America and the un, not the eu, have led the now-stalled ef-
forts to end Cyprus’s partition: “we still do not have a real and cred-
ible European plan on the table,” despairs Asli Aydintasbas of the
European Council on Foreign Relations.
Neither of the excuses is convincing. Keeping Turkey at arm’s
length while looking forward to the end of the Erdogan era does
not serve Europe’s interests. The country’s economy is once more
on the verge of a currency crisis (not helped by government med-
dling in interest rates); the Cypriot government, fearing hostil-
ities, is pushing for new talks; and the Russian missile deal under-
mines Western security. “Erdogan has been used by Putin against
nato,” says Marc Pierini, a former euambassador to Ankara. A
chaotic, alienated Turkey will hardly make a reliable partner for
Europe—on migration, terrorism or any other matter.
Moreover, the old observation that the euis incapable of con-
certed international action no longer holds. The euhas grown up
in the past decade as economic, migration and security crises have
forced it to contend with major world events. It imposed sanctions
on Russia over its incursions into Ukraine, has taken on the anti-
competitive practices of American technology giants, has main-
tained a disciplined front in the Brexit negotiations and is even
creeping towards military integration. The best example of Eu-
rope’s new taste for realpolitik was the deal on migration with Mr
Erdogan. He agreed to take back migrants who cross into the eunot
out of goodwill but because the union had leverage over him—in
the form of hard currency and visas benefiting his voters.
Mr Erdogan is weaker than he looks. His approval ratings are
dropping and in regional elections in the spring his Justice and De-
velopment Party (akp) lost control of the country’s three largest
cities, including Istanbul. Ali Babacan, his former deputy prime
minister, has quit the akpto form a new party and Ahmet Davuto-
glu, his former prime minister, could follow suit. Soon Turkey may
also require outside economic assistance. At a time of such politi-
cal and economic vulnerability the eu’s economic weight alone—
its gdpis 24 times larger than Turkey’s—gives it huge leverage. It
has not just the motive to do more to reel the country back, but the
means too.Flex them
That might mean threatening greatly increased sanctions, perhaps
modelled on those levied against Russia and targeting Mr Erdo-
gan’s allies, as proof of European seriousness. Sanctions relief
could then be added to a raft of goodies to bring Mr Erdogan to the
table. Economic support, an upgraded customs union, new visa
freedoms for Turks and a power-sharing settlement between the
Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus, including sharing the gas,
could all be touted. In return the eumight demand an end to the il-
legal drilling and the Turkish military presence on the island (the
main block on a deal between the two sides) as well as, in Turkey,
central-bank independence, economic reforms and perhaps even
steps to reverse the concentration of power in the presidency.
Europe aspires to a greater role in the world. But if despite all
the carrots and sticks it has at its disposal it lastingly loses a direct
neighbour and would-be accession state that is controlling territo-
ry claimed by an existing member of the eu, it might as well give
up. Turkey is a natural priority for the eu. It is also a test. 7Charlemagne The muscles from Brussels
The EU’s failing relationship with Turkey is a test of its foreign-policy seriousness