The EconomistJuly 27th 2019 Middle East & Africa 432 First came the Sidama, who number
around 5m and are the biggest group in the
state called the Southern Nations, Nation-
alities and Peoples’ Region (snnpr). They
have longed chafed at their inclusion in the
snnpr, a messy hotch-potch of more than
45 different ethnic groups. Others are also
unhappy with the set-up. Groups that live
far from Hawassa, the state capital, have
less say than those, such as the Sidama,
that dominate the centre. The state govern-
ment is weak and fractious; parliament
failed to pass a budget this year. Since the
Sidama requested a referendum last July at
least ten other groups have demanded their
own states.
Balkanisation along ethnic lines is dan-
gerous. Last year intercommunal fighting
forced almost 3m people from their homes.
Much of the violence occurred in the coun-
try’s densely populated south. A prolifera-
tion of new states equipped with their own
security forces may be a recipe for further
bloodshed if, as seems likely, there are ter-
ritorial disputes. Minority groups fear be-
ing persecuted. States, which can write
their own constitutions, have often failed
to protect them. Some Sidama leaders say
their constitution will be more inclusive
than most and they promise quotas for mi-
norities in government. But other leaders
are less keen on such measures.
Abiy has done little to calm nerves. For
months his government dithered instead
of organising the referendum for the Si-
dama. Then he threatened to use force if
the group declared independence unilater-
ally. Activists say they do not trust the gov-
ernment to keep its new promise of a refer-
endum. “It’s playing tricks,” says Gosaye.
Meanwhile the Welayta, the second-largest
ethnic group in thesnnpr, have taken to
the streets demanding their own vote on
statehood. Ethiopia’s southern problem
may get worse before it gets better. 7SOMALIASOUTH
SUDANETHIOPIA
UGANDA KENYASUDANDJIBOUTIERITREA
Red
SeaAddis Ababa
Hawassa
SNNPR Sidama300 kmC
yril ramaphosa is an avid cattle
breeder. He once bought a herd of An-
kole longhorns from Uganda’s leader, Yow-
eri Museveni. But South Africa’s president
must feel that he has rarely dealt with so
much bull as he has in recent weeks.
On July 19th the public protector, an om-
budsman, accused Mr Ramaphosa of vio-
lating the constitution by deliberately mis-
leading parliament. This is a grave
allegation. If true it would obliterate the
president’s claim to have ushered in a “new
dawn” following the kleptocratic rule of his
predecessor, Jacob Zuma, in 2009-18.
There is both less and more to the case
than first appears. Less in that the public
protector’s arguments are flimsy. More in
that they can be seen as part of a broad as-
sault by Mr Ramaphosa’s enemies.
The case dates back to November. In
parliament Mmusi Maimane, the leader of
the opposition Democratic Alliance, bran-
dished what he said was proof of a payment
of 500,000 rand ($36,000) from the boss of
Africa Global Operations (ago, previouslyknown as Bosasa), a company accused of
graft, to Andile Ramaphosa, the president’s
eldest son. Mr Maimane asked the presi-
dent to “set the record straight”.
The president could have gone away
and checked the facts. But he did not. Mr
Ramaphosa said that he knew about the
matter: he had spoken to his son, who runs
a consultancy, and who had insisted that
the money was for legitimate work. If it
proved otherwise, the president went on,
he would take Andile to the police himself.
Both Mr Maimane’s question and Mr Ra-
maphosa’s answer were based on a flawed
premise. Andile had done work for agobut
this payment was to CR17, the president’s
campaign to replace Mr Zuma as head of
the ruling African National Congress
(anc). According to a sworn affidavit Mr
Ramaphosa did not learn of the donation
until an aide told him after he had left the
chamber; the president had asked to be
kept in the dark about donors, so as to avoid
potential conflicts of interest. Mr Rama-
phosa then wrote to parliament correctingwhat he sees as an honest mistake.
South African campaign-finance laws
are opaque. It reflects badly on the presi-
dent that his team took money from ago.
And it would be naive to think that Andile’s
surname did not help him get jobs.
But the report from Busisiwe Mkhwe-
bane, the public protector (pictured), con-
tains no concrete evidence that the presi-
dent “deliberately” misled parliament, as
she claims. Indeed, Ms Mkhwebane para-
doxically states that the president acted in
“good faith”. Pierre de Vos, a law professor,
calls the report “a legal and factual mess”.
Mr Ramaphosa is seeking a judicial review.
It is not the first display of the public
protector’s incompetence. Courts have tak-
en issue with Ms Mkhwebane since she as-
sumed office in 2016. Most recently, on July
22nd, South Africa’s highest court found
that she had lied under oath and acted in
bad faith in a case involving the central
bank. Ms Mkhwebane also has a record of
(ineptly) going after Mr Ramaphosa’s allies
while being soft on his enemies.
The public protector is not the only
source of woe for Mr Ramaphosa. Mr Zuma
and his henchman, Ace Magashule, the
anc’s secretary-general, who is also ac-
cused of corruption, want to see the back of
a president who is trying to clean up the
government. Mr Zuma, in particular, may
be hoping that having an ally as president
might shield him from prosecution on
charges relating to 783 counts of fraud,
money-laundering and racketeering.
South Africa’s gdpcontracted by 3.2% in
the first quarter of the year. The more the
president is distracted by internal oppo-
nents, the less time he has to try to fix the
country’s pressing problems. His record
continues to be one of overpromising and
underdelivering—which is, of course, ex-
actly what his enemies want. 7JOHANNESBURG
The president’s enemies are undermining his administrationSouth African politicsRamaphosa under siege
Protecting the public?