The Economist UK - 27.07.2019

(C. Jardin) #1

62 Finance & economics The EconomistJuly 27th 2019


2

Buttonwood The auto-technocrats


From rouble to rupee

Source: Bloomberg

Emerging-market currencies against the $
January 1st-July 24th 2019, % change

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Russia
Egypt
Thailand
Mexico
Philippines
Brazil
India
Tu r ke y
Argentina
Pakistan

A


good wayto start an argument that
never ends is to try to define popu-
lism. Dictionaries say it is politics direct-
ed at ordinary people who feel neglected
by elites. That leaves a lot out, not least
economics. In 1990 Sebastian Edwards
and the late Rudiger Dornbusch sketched
what is meant by “economic populism”.
It is an approach, they wrote, that denies
that budget deficits or inflation are con-
straints on economic growth. The Latin
American populists they studied printed
money to pay for public-spending
binges. It ended in tears.
There is no shortage of leaders in
middle-income countries who fit the
dictionary definition of a populist. But
economic populism in its purest form is
now quite rare (though its results are
sadly evident in Venezuela). These days a
lot of would-be champions of the people
prefer their macroeconomic policies on
the orthodox side: inflation targets, fiscal
restraints, free-floating currencies, that
sort of thing. They are happy to let tech-
nocrats get on with it.
This poses a mild dilemma for rich-
world investors—which is soon resolved.
They may be appalled by the social and
foreign policies of such strongmen. Yet
as professionals they are also unthrilled
by inflation, default, devaluation and
adverse shifts in politics, which are
hazardous to a bond portfolio. They tend
to favour autocrats who like technocrats.
You might call it the Putin Principle.
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is
not much loved in the West. Buttressed
by suppression at home and military
adventures abroad, he is the archetypal
strongman. He combines this with an
affinity for well-qualified economists.
His finance ministry frames the budget
by a conservative fiscal rule. Inflation is
under control, helped by fairly high

interest rates. The central bank’s governor,
Elvira Nabiullina, is widely admired.
What pulls investors in or puts them off
is hard to pin down. It is never a single
factor; the world is more complex than
that. But a currency’s value is a clue to
general sentiment, because it is a shadow
price of a country’s assets relative to every-
body else’s. The rouble is one of the best-
performing currencies this year (see
chart). Just as telling is that countries led
by strongmen hostile to orthodox policies
have seen their currencies suffer—the
inverse of the Putin Principle. Recep Tay-
yip Erdogan, president of Turkey, is the
exemplar. For years he has bullied the
central bank. Earlier this month he sacked
its governor for keeping interest rates
high. The lira has suffered badly.
Other countries can be paired on the
Putin-Erdogan scale. Take Egypt and Paki-
stan. The army looms over both. Under the
imf’s auspices, Egypt has followed ortho-
dox policies. The Egyptian pound has
risen. Pakistan lost its policy discipline as
soon as its most recent imfprogramme

ended (though it has just signed up to
another one). The rupee is down.
The populist label also fits both Jair
Bolsonaro of Brazil and Andrés Manuel
López Obrador of Mexico. But when Mr
Bolsonaro was elected, investors sensed
that he might defer to technocratic advis-
ers such as Paulo Guedes, now his econ-
omy minister, who has a doctorate in
economics from the University of Chica-
go. Sure enough, Mr Bolsonaro recently
shepherded through Brazil’s lower house
a pension reform that is vital to the coun-
try’s fiscal stability. The real rallied.
Meanwhile, Mr López Obrador’s finance
minister abruptly resigned. He com-
plained bitterly that technocrats had
been sidelined in favour of unqualified
types. The peso wobbled.
The leader who is hardest to place on
the scale is Narendra Modi of India. He
has all the elements of a strongman:
strident nationalism, personality cult,
enfeebled opposition. He appears to
value technocrats. As prime minister
and, before that, as chief minister of
Gujarat, he has relied on a small band of
trusted civil servants. And though he is
no fiscal hawk, he seems to grasp that the
budget has limits. But there are marks
against him. He lost two well-regarded
central-bank governors in his first term
as prime minister. His madcap idea to
withdraw banknotes from circulation in
2016 was anything but orthodox.
The autocrat-plus-technocrat model
is not rock-solid. A frailty is that stability
is less valuable if it is not married to
policies to promote economic growth.
Such reforms often, or usually, founder
on vested interests on which the autocrat
depends. But if living standards are not
growing, there will be demand from
voters for old-style economic populism.
And that always ends badly.

Why investors favour political strongmen who like orthodox economics

can offer unlimited withdrawals.
The result is compelling for customers.
The savings account offers a juicy interest
rate of 2.69%, around 0.2 percentage points
higher than the best high-yield savings ac-
counts elsewhere. Federal insurance cov-
ers $1m, four times the usual limit. The cur-
rent account, due to launch later this year,
will have no minimum balance or account
or overdraft fees, and will reimburse all
fees for using an atm.
If successful, the shift in strategy could
put to rest worries about profitability that
have dogged both Betterment and the robo-

advisory industry more broadly. New ac-
count customers might be tempted to use
advisory services, too. Mr Stein also hopes
that the firm can encourage account-hold-
ers to save more. More than half of Better-
ment’s customers transfer money auto-
matically into their investment funds. If
the firm manages more current and sav-
ings accounts, it may be able to increase
that share.
The launch comes with risks, however.
The first is that it may irk regulators. De-
posits are supposed to be a reliable source
of funds for banks. If Betterment gets them

to compete for its customers’ funds, not
only would banks’ margins be squeezed
but deposits could become flightier.
The second is that the terms are too gen-
erous to be sustainable. Betterment has
raised $275m to fund its growth so far, but
has not had to raise capital since 2017, when
it added $70m, valuing the firm at $800m.
Mr Stein expects its account products to be
profitable from launch, but admits that
there may be a “learning curve” when it
comes to managing them. To offer custom-
ers compelling investments, Betterment
needs to be a sound investment, too. 7
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