8 Leaders The EconomistJuly 27th 2019
I
t is thelove triangle of global politics. Since the second world
war, China, Russia and the United States have repeatedly
swapped partners. The collapse of the Sino-Soviet pact after the
death of Josef Stalin was followed by Richard Nixon’s visit to Chi-
na in 1972 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s detente with China 30 years
ago. Today’s pairing, between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, was
cemented in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea. In each case the
country that was left on its own has always seemed to pay a price,
by being stretched militarily and diplomatically.
This time is different. Though America is out in the cold, the
price is falling chiefly on Russia. China dominates every aspect
of the two countries’ partnership. Its economy is six times larger
(at purchasing-power parity) and its power is growing, even as
Russia’s fades. What seemed a brilliant way for Mr Putin to turn
his back on the West and magnify Russia’s influence is looking
like a trap that his country will find hard to escape. Far from be-
ing an equal partner, Russia is evolving into a Chinese tributary.
That may seem a harsh judgment. Russia is still a nuclear-
weapons state with a permanent seat on the unSecurity Council.
It has modernised its armed forces and, as in Syria, is not afraid
to use them. This week Russian and Chinese warplanes conduct-
ed what appeared to be a joint air patrol for the first time, causing
alarm when South Korea said a Russian plane had intruded into
its airspace (see Asia section).
But the real news is how rapidly Russia is be-
coming dependent on its giant neighbour (see
Briefing). China is a vital market for Russian raw
materials: Rosneft, Russia’s national oil com-
pany, depends on Chinese financing and is in-
creasingly diverting its oil to China. As Russia
seeks to evade the hegemony of the dollar, the
yuan is becoming a bigger part of its foreign-
currency reserves (the share of dollars fell by half to 23% during
2018, while the yuan’s share grew from 3% to 14%). China sup-
plies vital components for Russia’s advanced weapons systems.
And China is the source of the networking and security gear that
Mr Putin needs to control his people. Last month Russia struck a
deal with Huawei, a Chinese telecoms firm distrusted by Ameri-
ca, to develop 5gequipment—thus rooting Russia firmly in Chi-
na’s half of the splinternet.
This suits China just fine. It wants a lasting friendship with
Russia, if only to secure its northern border, the scene of clashes
in 1969, and a source of worry in the 1990s when Russia looked as
if it might drift into the West’s orbit. Russia also serves as an en-
thusiastic vanguard in China’s campaign to puncture Western
ideas of universal human rights and democracy, which both
countries see as an incitement to “colour revolutions”.
Mr Putin can point to several arguments for his partnership
with China, in addition to their joint hostility to the liberal pro-
ject. One is expediency. Western sanctions, imposed after his an-
nexation of Crimea, the meddling in American elections in 2016
and the lethal use of a nerve agent in Britain two years later, have
left Russia without many alternatives. Mr Xi has also given Rus-
sia cover for its military action in Syria and, to some extent, Cri-
mea. And, in contrast to the end of the 17th century, when Peterthe Great looked to Europe as the wellspring of progress, Mr Pu-
tin can plausibly argue that the future now belongs to China and
its system of state capitalism.
However, Mr Putin is mistaken. For a start, the Russian ver-
sion of state capitalism is a rent-seeking, productivity-sapping
licence for the clique that surrounds him to steal freely from the
national coffers—which is one reason why Chinese investment
in Russia is rather limited. There is also a contradiction between
Mr Putin’s claim to be restoring Russian greatness and the in-
creasingly obvious reality of its subordinate role to China. This
creates tension in Central Asia. Because stability in the region is
important for China’s domestic security—it wants Central Asia
to keep Islamic extremism at bay—the People’s Liberation Army
is stationing troops in Tajikistan and staging exercises there,
without consulting Russia.
And, at some level, the aims of Russia and China diverge.
There is a limit to how much ordinary Russians will forgo West-
ern freedoms (see Europe section). If the regime holds on to pow-
er by means of Chinese technology, it will feed popular anger to-
wards China and its Russian clients.
Who can say when the strains will show? Imagine that Mr Pu-
tin chooses to step down in 2024, when the constitution says he
must, and that his successor tries to mark the change by distanc-
ing Russia from China and turning towards Eu-
rope. Only then will it become clear how deep
China’s influence runs and how much pressure
it is prepared to exert to retain its sway. Russia’s
next president may find that the country has
lost its room for manoeuvre.
Does this mean that the rest of the world—
especially the West—should seek to prise Russia
from China’s embrace, before it is too late? That
idea will tempt those diplomats and analysts who think Russia is
too important to alienate. But it seems unlikely. America does
not suffer from the Xi-Putin alignment today as it would have
done in the cold war. Although Russia and China do indeed un-
dermine the West’s notion of universal values, with President
Donald Trump in the White House that doctrine is, alas, hardly
being applied universally in any case.
What is more, China’s influence over Russia has compensa-
tions. An angry declining power like Russia is dangerous; it may
feel tempted to lash out to show it is still a force to be reckoned
with, by bullying Belarus, say, or by stoking the old fears of Chi-
nese expansion into Siberia. But China has no appetite for inter-
national crises, unless they are of its own devising. As Russia’s
partner, China can serve as a source of reassurance along their
joint border, and temper Russia’s excesses around the world.Sweet patience
Rather than railing against Russia or trying to woo it back, the
West should point out its subordination and wait. Sooner or lat-
er, a President Alexei Navalny or someone like him will look
westwards once again. That is when Russia will most need West-
ern help. And that is when the man or woman in the Oval Office
should emulate Nixon—and go to Moscow. 7Brothers in arms
The partnership between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping is much better for China than it is for RussiaRussia and China