Britain at War – August 2019

THE GREAT WARTHE GREAT WAR||MIDDLE EAST CAMPAIGN MIDDLE EAST CAMPAIGN

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Realising their mistake, the Ali
Muntar was briefly reoccupied the
following day, but it was too little,
too late. Buoyed by the British
withdrawal, a reinforced Turkish
force counter-attacked, sparking
a second hurried withdrawal that
in places resembled a panic-stricken
rout.
With that, the First Battle of Gaza
fizzled out. In what was either a
deliberate cover-up or an act of
self-denial, Murray claimed a partial
victory when, in truth, he had
achieved little beyond inflicting a few
thousand casualties on the enemy
at a cost of 4,000 to his own army.
Yet, despite the bungled nature of
the assault, morale remained high,
particularly among those units such
as the Norfolks, which had not been
fully engaged in the first attack.
With preparations under way for
a second attempt, Captain Eustace
Cubitt, adjutant of the 5th Norfolks,
was one of those convinced that the
Turks were on the brink of collapse.
Eager to avenge the bloody defeats
endured at Gallipoli where he had lost
two of his brothers, Capt Cubitt was
confident that his battalion was ready
to strike the decisive blow. Writing
home on April 2, he declared: “I think
this game has been going on too long
now to be really amusing and it is
time we finished them off.”

Such optimism was common

currency. Another Norfolk officer,

Lt Murray Buxton, who was serving

with the Brigade staff, predicted the

next fight would be “a big show”

and, given all the preparations,

he felt “we should take Gaza with

comparative ease”.

Private Bob Overman of the 5th

Norfolks was of much the same mind.

After all, as he wrote his parents, “we

have a few debts to pay back for the

Peninsula”.

However, not everyone shared their

confidence. Company commander

Major Tom Purdy, who had helped

bring back the wounded from the

first attack, could not help feeling that

“we had... gravely under-estimated

the Turk”.

Far from drawing any positives

from the action on March 27, he saw

only a missed opportunity that was

liable to have grim repercussions.

“The more I hear of the operations...

and the more I see of the country,

the more I think our people at the

top made a colossal blunder in

retiring,” he wrote in his diary on

Easter Sunday, April 8. “Where we

were is the dominating feature of

the country... We were absolutely

safe... and if our reserves... had been

pushed up... we should have occupied

the town and the two mounted

divisions... could have dealt with

all the Turkish reinforcements very

comfortably...”

Three days later and just four days

before a kidney ailment took him out

of the frontline, Maj Purdy looked on

with a deepening sense of foreboding

as enemy troops in front of him

toiled to strengthen their hilltop

positions in the certain expectation

of a second British assault. “It will

not be as easy as it was last time,” he

noted presciently. “The Turks have

had plenty of time to dig in. Why did

we ever leave it?”

Walking Into Disaster

Murray’s plan of attack for Second

Gaza, as it became known, would

have done little to assuage his worst

fears. Whereas the first assault was

in the manner of a ‘cutting’ operation

that relied on speed and stealth,

the new plan was for a thoroughly

conventional Western Front-style

attack, in miniature. Three infantry

divisions were to make a frontal

assault against a firmly entrenched

enemy occupying the high ground

with ample fields of fire across a vast,

featureless no-man’s-land which

was up to a mile-and-a-half wide in

places.

To support them, they had 170

pieces of artillery, representing a

meagre one gun per 100 yards of

front, a limited supply of poison gas

and eight obsolescent Mk.I tanks,

described by one historian as “little

more than slow-moving pill-boxes”,

which were making their debut

outside of the Western Front.

Of these, two were allocated to

the 54th Division to the dismay of

the commanders of the Norfolk

battalions spearheading the

assault, who complained

the noise of the tanks

would shatter what

little hope there was

of achieving any

element of surprise.

However, theirs

were not the only

dissenting voices.

Senior artillery

officers were at

pains to point out

the limitations of the

two-hour barrage that

was planned to precede the

infantry attack.

The commander of

the Eastern Force artillery

units later asserted: “This

bombardment was the most

futile thing possible,

resulting, as

I had

BELOW LEFT

Eustace Cubitt,

adjutant of the

5th Norfolks.

He was the last

of three brothers

to be killed while

serving with the

unit.

BELOW

Lt Murray Buxton,

a Norfolk officer

attached to the

staff of the 163rd

Brigade. Given the

preparations for

the second attack,

he felt Gaza

would be taken

with “comparative

ease”. Awarded

the Military Cross

for his efforts

to rescue the

wounded, he

survived the Great

War only to be

killed during an

air raid on London

during the Blitz.

http://www.britainatwar.com^75

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