Barron\'s - 22.07.2019

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38 BARRON’S July22,2019


CURRENTYIELD n ByJamesGrant


The Big Flaw in Ph.D-conomics


Centralbankersbasetheirratepoliciesontheirforecasts.Whatcouldgowrong?


THE PH.D. STANDARD OF


monetary management


was the topic on the


agenda at the July 15


panel at the American


Enterprise Institute in


Washington. Discretion-


ary central-bank policy conducted by for-


mer tenured economics faculty, or by peo-


ple imbued with the doctrines of those


learnedpeople,isthesysteminplacetoday.


We discussants pulled at our chins: Is the


system any good at all?


It’s a timely, down-to-earth question.


FederalReserveChairmanJeromePowell,


thoughalawyerbytrade,doesbusinessin


abuildinginfusedwiththedoctrinesofthe


hundreds of doctors of economics on the


FederalReserveSystem’sgenerouspayroll.


To a bond buyer, three of these proto-


cols hold special significance.


No. 1, the value of money ought not to


befixed,butfluctuateintheserviceofen-


lightened macroeconomic policy.


No. 2, “price stability” means a rate of


riseofarounda2%perannuminthecon-


sumerpriceindex.Toolittleinflationistan-


tamount to deflation.


No.3,interestratesarenotpricestobe


discovered,butdialstobeset.Youturnthe


knobs to advance the cause of macroeco-


nomic stabilization.


It follows that the value of a bond de-


pends on the skill of the central bankers.


Allan Sproul, longtime president of the


Federal Reserve Bank of New York,


enunciated this doctrine 70 years ago. Fi-


nancial discipline is essential, he said,


“but it should be the discipline of compe-


tent and responsible men, not the auto-


matic discipline of a harsh and perverse


mechanism,” that mechanism being the


gold standard.


Naturally, to turn the policy dials cor-


rectly,onemustforecastaccurately,butwho


candothatconsistently?Ratesofinflation,


employment, and growth go their merry


way,asiffortheexactpurposeofconfound-


ing economists at the control panel.


Still, the central bankers forecast, and


onthoseforecaststheybasetheirpolicy.In


theextremecaseoftheEuropeanCentral


Bank,thepredictiveNorthStaristhefive-


yearforwardinflationrate,i.e.,theimputed


rateofinflationforthefiveyearsstarting


in2024.Aftermentioningthatdistantdate,


apanelistdrylyasked,“Isitgoingtorain


a week from Thursday?”


Ben Bernanke, a Ph.D. in economics


fromtheMassachusettsInstituteofTech-


nology, put in a word for the soothsaying


guildin2010:“Iwouldsaythattherecent


financialcrisiswasmoreofafailureofeco-


nomic engineering and economic manage-


ment than of economic science.”


“Adherents of the Bernanke doctrine


are,infact,disadvantagedincomparisonto


the average Charles Schwab customer,” a


panelist remarked. “Practitioners whom


Mr.Markethastakentoschoolknowbet-


ter than to think they can predict the fu-


ture.RareisthePh.D.withpracticalexpe-


rience in the field of margin calls, client


redemptions,orunsightlydrawdowns.Itis


easiertobelievethatonecanforecastcom-


ingeventswhenonehasn’tbeenpunished


for trying.”


Marriner Eccles, the Fed chairman


(1934-48) whose name graces the central


bank’s Washington headquarters, never


completed the 12th grade. An heir to a


family fortune, but also a successful com-


mercial banker in his own right, Eccles


made his share of mistakes. Still, he had


the courage to stand up to a president—


for him, it was Harry Truman—and to


make his case in plain English. The tenor


of his opposition to post-World War II fi-


nancial policy is conveyed in a headline


over a 1947 Wall Street Journal dispatch:


“Eccles Sees Economic Collapse Unless


Nation Checks Inflation.”


Benjamin Strong, famed president of


theFederalReserveBankofNewYorkin


the1920s,didfinishhighschoolthoughhe


neverattendedcollege.Hewasfunctionally


theCEOofBankersTrustin1913whenhe


passed private judgment on the pending


FederalReserveAct:“Thisisaprovisional


returntotheheresiesofGreenbackismand


fiatmoney,”hesaidbeforeevidentlychang-


ing his mind. Never mind the word “her-


esy”; Strong was right the first time. Be-


fore very long, the old gold dollar became


that very greenback.


William McChesney Martin, the lon-


gest-serving Fed chairman (1951-70),


studied English and classics at Yale be-


fore sampling some postgraduate econom-


ics courses at Columbia University. Per-


haps the latter experience explains his


reluctance to bring professional econo-


mists into monetary councils during his


time at the Fed. Martin, who once had a


thought of entering the Presbyterian


ministry, famously said that the Fed’s job


was to “take away the punch bowl, just as


the party gets going.”


A little less famously, he also said, “in-


terest rates are prices which perform vi-


tal economic functions and they should be


responsive to basic supply and demand.”


In so declaring, Martin might have been


thinking of Sproul’s contention that the


Fed should be active in manipulating in-


terest rates across the length of the yield


curve. No Ph.D. was Sproul, though he


anticipated today’s monetary-policy type.


Martin stood for price discovery and the


financial discipline that seems to have


disappeared into the muggy Washington


air.


Ecles, Strong, and Martin shared one


thing besides a hole in their educational


resumes. They came of age when the dol-


lar was defined in law as a weight of


gold.


This convention today’s economists al-


mostuniversallyderide.Butwhateverthe


meritsordemeritsofyesteryear’sobjective


dollar,today’sisasubjectiveone—itsvalue,


like the level of interest rates and the


shape of the yield curve, is the central


bank’stodetermine,or,ifnottodetermine,


heavily to influence.


With one exception, the AEI panelists


weremoreorlessatpeacewiththeworld


asitis—notwitheverydetail,butwiththe


natureofmodernmoney,andwithmany,if


not all, of the techniques of 21st century


monetary management.


Thedissenter,yourcolumnist,willsub-


mit his ideas to the not-so-tender mercies


ofthemarketplace.Whichwillitbe,fellow


investors,governmentbondspricedtode-


liveranegativerealyield(andintrillionsof


dollars worth of cases, a negative nominal


yield)?Orgold,thelegacymonetarymetal,


yielding nothing but providing a handy


negativebetontheprinciplesandpractice


of busybody central banking?


JAMESGRANT,founderandeditorofGrant’sIn-


terestRateObserver.istheauthorofBagehot:


TheLifeandTimesoftheGreatestVictorian,to


be published this week.


Joel Arbaje (Illustration); Shay Moradi (Source)

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