90 International Relations Theory of War
main players to form alliances and counter alliances. Before the war, the
polar powers were divided into two opposing blocks—Germany, Austro-
Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire against France, Britain, and Russia—
and therefore the conflicts were difficult to prevent because none of the
polar powers was prepared to forfeit its allies.^75 Diplomacy was involved
in instinctive interactions among the five great powers—Britain, France,
Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Germany—and two small powers—Serbia
and Belgium. Significant adverse relations appeared—namely, Germany
against Britain, France, Russia, and Belgium, and Austro-Hungary against
Serbia and Russia^76 —before the war agreements were signed between
the great powers, such as the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austro-
Hungary, and Italy, which was executed in 1882 and renewed in 1902, and
the Entente Cordiale agreement between France and Britain of 1902.^77 Com-
bined-alliance agreements increased the concern that an Austro-Serbian
War might break out with Russia because of its support for Serbia, with
Germany because of its support for Austro-Hungary, and with France
owing to its support for Russia.^78
A few years before the outbreak of the First World War, the bipolar sys-
tem of 1871–1909—headed by the two superpowers that constituted it,
Great Britain and (united) Germany—moved away in deference to a mul-
tipolar system, in which there were several players. Besides Great Britain,
in the system from 1871, Germany, which wanted to compete with it over
its international standing and status, was acting in the system. That aspira-
tion was expressed by the declaration of the kaiser of Germany, Wilhelm
II, in 1898, that “Germany is destined for important tasks outside the nar-
row boundaries of old Europe.” Russia, which was also a rising power in
the early 20th century, expanded and became a threat to Germany. The
decline in the power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany’s sole
ally, increased Germany’s fear of Russia, as expressed by its extreme reac-
tion to the assassination of heir presumptive Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Germany, which feared an undesirable change in the balance of power in
the case of a prolonged war, was convinced that a short, limited-scale war,
which would end in victory, was possible. Therefore, when the advantages
appeared clear, Germany gave Austro-Hungary free rein to crush Serbia.
That step was later found to be a gross misjudgment.
For Germany’s imperial leaders, the risk posted by giving a free hand
made sense from the perspective of preserving the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. The crumbling of the empire would have left Germany isolated
and without allies. Unfortunately for Germany, the guarantee that it gave
Austro-Hungary led to an unexpected response from France and Russia.
These two powers joined forces to protect the Slavs. Britain relinquished
its traditional Splendid Isolation Policy and joined France and Russia in a
tripartite agreement resisting Germany and its allies. The immediate aim
was to defend Belgium’s neutrality. After some time, the war expanded