134 International Relations Theory of War
In that century, Afghanistan was transformed into a key “playing field”
in the Great Game in central Asia. Great Britain started to control India in
the 18th century. In 1779, its sovereignty over the eastern subcontinent
was recognized in the Paris Agreement. In the first quarter of the 19th cen-
tury, while Britain was consolidating its power in India, the Russian tsar
expanded the territory under his control eastward by conquering central
Asian kingdoms and the northern parts of Persia (the Caspian Sea prov-
inces and the cities Darband and Baku). The constant advantages of Russia
caused displeasure in Great Britain concerning the security of its empire in
India. Afghanistan’s strategic location as the “gateway to India” made it
a focus point for British diplomacy and military strategy for decades. The
British invasions of Afghan territory in that century occurred in the First
and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars.^167
The British decision to intervene directly in fights between the Afghan
tribes and politics of the Afghan dynasty, as it developed in India and Brit-
ain, was a response to the way in which the Russo-Persian threat from the
city Herat was perceived by London. This led Lord Auckland, the gov-
ernor general of India, to relinquish unwillingly his previous reliance on
economic penetration into Afghanistan in favor of a plan that was raised
by his military secretary, William Hay MacNaughten, who suggested
replacing the khan bearing the crown in Kabul, Dost Muhammad, with
a claimer of the throne with British support, Shah Shuja, but without any
extensive British action. The sheikhs of Panjab were supposed to provide
the necessary military ability alongside political support from the amir of
Sindh.^168
The same change in approach occurred in London. British Foreign Sec-
retary Palmerston, who feared a confrontation with Russia concerning
Persia, in which Russia’s position was strong and Britain’s weak, rejected
any action to guard Herat. However, in mid-1838, Palmerston decided
in end to part from Persia and adopt Auckland’s plan for intervention in
Afghanistan, where he believed that Britain’s status was strong and Rus-
sia’s weak. The action would not only stop Persia and protect Herat, he
thought, but would also restrain Russia and strengthen Britain in central
Asia, in the Ottoman Empire, in Europe, and even in America. With the
enthusiastic support of the president of the Board of Control of India Hob-
house, Palmerston obtained the consent of the cabinet in early October.
Immediately afterward, he confronted Russian Foreign Minister Nessel-
rode with testimonies of the Russian plots in Persia and Afghanistan. Nes-
selrode expressed his true astonishment, pressured Persia to withdraw
and apologize to Britain, and pleaded to Britain to cooperate with Russia
in Asia for achieving an agreement on borders and on influence regions.
Palmerston refused. Despite the Russian concession and the Persian with-
drawal from Herat, which included an unwilling apology, the British plan
advanced and its goals remained clearly anti-Russian, as before. Because
a Russo-British confrontation or war concerning Asia was supposed to