How the Research Is Empirically Examined 143
the United States to seek how to remove it, both as a punitive action and
for deterring other countries that had sheltered terrorists.^208
The Systemic Pressures for the United States’ Departure
from AfghanistanThe entry of the United States to central Asia complicated the region’s
geostrategic dynamics. If there was ever a “great game” in central Asia in
the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was after the outbreak
of the U.S.-Afghan War (2001).^209
In the 1990s, the United States accepted Moscow’s view of central
Asia being its “backyard.” The region was too far for American strategic
involvement and it was not worth endangering its relations with Russia.
Central Asia held an enormous concentration of highly valuable natural
resources, so Washington was determined to bring the economy of central
Asia, particularly the oil and gas industries, to the international market
in order to reduce global dependence on these resources from the Persian
Gulf. However, these goals were advanced through private businesses
and international organizations with very limited involvement of the U.S.
administration.^210
The September 2001 terrorist attacks challenged the assumption that
central Asia was too far away geographically and therefore posed no
threat to American security. “The international war on terrorism,” com-
bined with its many targets, was recognition that it was no long possible
to consider geography a constant factor in security calculations. Following
the terrorist attacks, the central Asia region was perceived to be a signifi-
cant threat to U.S. national security, owing to which it became a primary
source of great tension with Moscow. Russia did not remain alone in the
attempt to prevent the expansion of U.S. presence in central Asia. China,
Russia’s neighbor and traditional adversary, was also worried by the long-
term presence of American forces near it.^211
The Prolonged American Presence in AfghanistanDespite the pressures applied on the United States to withdraw from
Afghanistan, primarily by the two neighboring key great powers, Rus-
sia and China, the outcome was completely different—American forces
remained in Afghanistan and American involvement in the region deep-
ened. In addition, one cannot ignore the fact that the outcome of the war
was different from the outcome of all the previous four wars in which
polar powers invaded that country—the First, Second, and Third Anglo-
Afghan Wars, and the Soviet-Afghan War—at the end of which the powers
had to withdraw from Afghanistan. According to the current study, the
cause of that outcome was systemic. I now turn to support this argument.