186 Notes
- Miller, When Opponents Cooperate, pp. 11–12.
- Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism
and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999);
Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World”; Ikenberry, America Unrivaled. - Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.”
CHAPTER 3
- Wohlforth presents a similar plea. According to him, the 19th century was
not a “British peace”: in 1815–1853, it was the British and Russian peace; in 1853–
1871, it was not peace of any kind; and in 1871–1914, it was the British and German
peace; similarly, the Cold War was not the American peace but the American and
Soviet peace; he states that today only one power is left, so this period may be
called “the American peace.” Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” p. 39. - Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 163; Waltz, “The Emerging Struc-
ture of International Politics,” p. 44. - Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 357.
- Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War”; Schweller, Deadly
Imbalances. - Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 162; Mearsheimer, “Back to the
Future,” p. 5; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 357. - Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” pp. 5–7.
- Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” p. 36.
- A number of arguments have been made that the United States, Germany,
and Japan are becoming poles, and each of them controls a significant regional
block. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” p. 99; that a world will
be composed of three competing blocks—Europe, East Asia, and the Americans—
with the United States heading the weakest and most problematic block. Walter
R. Mead, “On the Road to Ruin,” in C. W. Kegley and E. R. Wittkopf, eds., The
Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), chapter 26,
pp. 332–339; that the current international system has become economically tripo-
lar and three powers—the United States, Japan, and Germany—are intertwined
in complex relations. L. Silk, “Some Things Are More Vital Than Money When It
Comes to Creating the World Anew,” New York Times, September 22, 1991. - Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”; Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar
World.” - Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in
Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20–33; Hun-
tington, “Why International Primacy Matters”; Huntington, “The Lonely Super-
power”; Ikenberry, America Unrivaled; Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is
the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993),
pp. 52–67; Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics; Krauthammer, “The Unipo-
lar Moment”; Kupchan, “After Pax Americana”; Kurth, “America’s Grand Strategy”;
Manstanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment”; Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Limits of
American Power,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp.
545–559; Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation
of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46;
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”