Notes 191
eds., Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study
of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution (New York: Lexington Books, 2004),
pp. 309–342, at p. 310.
- On the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and
the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157–180;
Glaser L. Charles “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1
(October 1997), pp. 171–201. - Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 3. - Bruce M. Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms
Race, and Arms Control (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983). - Jack S. Levy, “The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World
War I,” in Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 62–117. - Zeev Maoz, Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1990), chapter 4; George, Avoiding War. - Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books,
1962); Miles Kahler, “Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58,
No. 2 (Winter 1979/1980), pp. 374–396. - During the multipolar system of 1849–1870, a limited number of wars were
fought in Europe involving the five great powers that constituted the system. An
explanation for this phenomenon at the individual level has been offered by a
number of historians. They argue that the major limitation, short duration, and
low violence of the wars fought in those years stemmed from the skill and modera-
tion demonstrated by Bismarck and Cavour. The current study denies this argu-
ment because like the Prussian leader Bismarck, the Italian leader Cavour acted
within a framework of limitations and possibilities within the European system.
Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Struc-
ture,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 1–26, at pp. 7–8. - Levy, “Theories of General War,” p. 346.
- Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power
Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chapter 4; David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of
the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War?
A Cautionary Tale (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985); David
Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985). - Clive Ponting, The Crimean War (London: Chatto & Windus, 2004), p. vii.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, p. 1.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, p. 2 fn. 1.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, p. 3.
- Smith M. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in Inter-
national Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Publication, 1966), p. 132. - Gavin B. Henderson, “The Two Interpretations of the Four Points,” The
English Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 205 (January 1937), pp. 48–66. - Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1977), p. 193. - Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chapter 1; Jack, S.
Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical
Problems,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 1983), pp. 76–99.