192 Notes
- Ponting, The Crimean War, pp. 1–3.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, p. viii.
- James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 70. - Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914 (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1992), p. 104; Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 84. - Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 70.
- Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914, p. 107.
- Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 71; Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914,
p. 107. - Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914, pp. 107–108.
- Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 70.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, pp. iv, vii.
- Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914, p. 103; Ann Pottinger Saab, The
Origins of the Crimean Alliance (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977),
p. 156; Gochal and Levy, “Crisis Mismanagement or Conflict of Interests,” p. 332. - Gochal and Levy, “Crisis Mismanagement or Conflict of Interests,” p. 309 fn. 3.
- Ponting, The Crimean War, p. iv.
- On the First World War, see Samuel R. Williamson Jr., “The Origins of
World War I,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp.
795–818; Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41–57; Fritz Fischer, Germany’s
Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); Fritz Fischer, War of
Illusions: German Policies from 1911–1914, translated from Germany by Marian Jack-
son (New York: Norton, 1975); Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline: The Controversy
over Germany’s Aims in the First World War, translated from Germany by Lancelot L.
Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber (New York: Norton, 1974); David E. Kaiser,
“Germany and the Origins of the First World War,” The Journal of Modern History,
Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 442–474; Wolfgang H. Koch, ed., The Origins of
the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims (New York: Taplinger
Publication Co., 1972). - In Paul Kennedy’s opinion, in the years preceding the First World War,
each power had much greater military expenses than in the preceding two to three
decades. This phenomenon included remote countries, such as the United States,
following its war with Spain, and Japan, following its war with Russia. However,
the arms race was definitely centered within Europe. Paul M. Kennedy, “The First
World War and the International Power System,” International Security, Vol. 9,
No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 7–40, at p. 8 Table 1. - During those decades, militarists adopted offensive military doctrines. The
civilian elites and the public assumed that attacking would be advantageous in
battle and that offensive solutions to security problems were the most effective.
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World
War,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58–107; Jack Snyder,
“Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108–146. - The improvement in the relations between Great Britain and Germany
during those years contributed to the outbreak of the war. In Britain, the détente
formed the misbelief that the crisis that broke out in July 1914 could be averted
through Anglo-German cooperation. The leaders did not wish to provoke Germany