Notes 193
and therefore failed in taking early steps to determine the German actions that
led to the war. The détente also contributed to erroneous German hopes that Brit-
ain would remain neutral in a land war, and therefore it encouraged Germany
to adopt a policy that posed a risk of the awakening of such a conflict. Sean M.
Lynn-Jones, “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911–1914,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 121–150, at p. 124.
- Schelling, Arms and Influence; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in Inter-
national Politics, p. 94; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” p. 192. - Jack S. Levy, “Organizational Routines and the Causes of War,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1986), pp. 193–222. - According to Jervis, the First World War is an example of the way in which
wars can break out owing to hostility cycles of this kind. The cyclic model is char-
acterized by action-reaction processes in which each country considers its own
actions to be defensive actions whereas those of its adversaries are considered to be
provocations. Hostility also intensifies even if no country wants war. According to
him, the First World War provided the inspiration for the model. Jervis, Perception
and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58–113. - Tuchman, The Guns of August; Kahler, “Rumors of War”; Richard N. Lebow,
Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987), chapters 2–4; Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 2–3, 65, 222–223. - Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990–1991), pp. 151–186. - Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914.”
- Dickinson, The European Anarchy, pp. 14, 101; Lowes G. Dickinson, The
International Anarchy, 1904–1914 (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1926). - Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914.”
- Harrison R. Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” International Organization, Vol.
47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77–106, at p. 81. - Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” p. 22.
- The Entente Cordiale between Britain and France was signed in London on
April 8, 1904. At its time of signing, Britain and France were two adversaries that
had fought each other for centuries, and even in the early 20th century, they com-
peted over control of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. What they had in common
was their attitude to Germany, which they suspected of planning to take over Eur-
ope. After about two years, German Kaiser Wilhelm II tried to take over Morocco
and hoped that the British would fear a confrontation and abandon the French.
However, in the end, he led France and Britain to “learn the enemy.” France trusted
Britain to help it if the Germans started a war. The agreement successfully relieved
the colonial adversity between the two and led to formation of an alliance against
Germany in both World Wars. - Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151–175; Christensen and Snyder,
“Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” - COW, Interstate Wars.
- Cow, State System Membership List.
- Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” p. 162.
- Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine;
Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.”