194 Notes
- Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” p. 74.
- Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990–1991), pp. 7–57. - Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order,
1648–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 224–225. - Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” p. 81.
- Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” p. 22.
- The Maginot Line was a system of border fornications that the French built
after 1929 in order to defend their borders with Germany. The line was completed
in 1934. The strategic thinking behind the Maginot Line was a result of French
experience in the First World War. - Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes
and Courses of the Second World War, 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1989). - In the Russo-Finnish War (#142) (11/30/1939–3/12/1940), the death toll
was the Soviet Union 126,875 and Finland 24,923. - Mearsheimer presented a lot of support for this argument. Mearsheimer,
“Back to the Future,” pp. 22–24. - Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially chapter 8; Dale C. Cope-
land, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Real-
ist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 29–89;
Hopf, “Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War.” - Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” p. 20.
- A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1954), pp. xix–xx. - Edward V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the
Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1955). - F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States Sys-
tem, 1815–1914 (New York: Longman, 1980). - Josef V. Polisensky, War and Society in Europe, 1618–1648 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978); Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in
Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). - Ragnhild Hatton, George I, Elector and King (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2001); David B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Paul Langford, The Eighteenth Century, 1688–1815
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976); Derek McKay and Hamish M. Scott, The Rise
of the Great Powers, 1648–1815 (New York: Longman, 1983). - The Holy Alliance was an agreement signed on September 26, 1815,
between Russia, Austria, and Prussia as an attempt of conservative leaders to
maintain the social order. - Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System,” pp. 2, 4.
- Benjamin Miller asserts that a concert is an international institution, or a
security regime, for the highest level of diplomatic cooperation of all great powers
at that time. Benjamin Miller, “Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Con-
certs,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 20 (October 1994), pp. 327–348. - Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security
Cooperation,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 58–79. - In times of prosperity, the concert reflected the balance of powers.
States did not tend to behave in a way that weakened their relative power, and