6 International Relations Theory of War
Failing to understand the factors that determine the two international
outcomes may be fatal for small countries and for polar powers alike. For
example, in the First and Second World Wars, Germany—one of the great
powers constituting the multipolar system of 1910–1945—failed to under-
stand that systems in general, including multipolar systems in which these
two wars were fought, did not allow for expansion whose outcome would
position the expanding power as a hegemon in the system. Germany’s two
attempts to ascend to hegemony in the system resulted in it being heavily
penalized. Unlike Germany, Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi under-
stood that unipolar systems could dictate to individual hyperpowers
heading them the removal of any threat or provocation, and he reversed
his policy of provoking the United States. Unlike him, Iraqi president Sad-
dam Hussein failed to understand this and continued his provocative con-
duct toward the United States, resulting in the Iraq War (2003) breaking
out, leading to the occupation of his country and his personal downfall.
Similarly, the leaders of Afghanistan headed by the Taliban regime failed
to understand the forces operating in unipolar systems. The outcome
of their provocative behavior toward the United States, which included
hosting the Al Qaeda organization that carried out the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, on U.S. soil, was fatal to them—the United States
embarked on a war against Afghanistan (2001), occupied it militarily, and
overthrew the Taliban regime.
In these cases, the leaders of countries erred in evaluating the constraints
that international systems imposed on all players in the system and led
their countries to tragic results. Leaders who were aware of the constraints
imposed by international systems, such as Libya’s leader, Gaddafi, in the
early 2000s weathered the international storm while keeping their coun-
tries’ territories intact.^8
According to the international relations theory of war, the system does not
determine all outcomes occurring in it and does not affect them categori-
cally, but influences only the important outcomes, two of which are com-
prehensively assessed in this study. Therefore, the theory does not provide
any explanation, forecast, or prediction of other key phenomena despite
their great importance in the field of theoretical research of international
relations. For example, it does not engage in the manner in which polar
powers act in international crises, as this is not a theory of foreign policy at
the individual or state level. It also does not deal with the factors that lead
to the outbreak of wars or factors that lead to the occurrence of other sig-
nificant events in the international scene, such as the collapse of the Soviet
Union or the end of the Cold War,^9 inasmuch as the theory does not pur-
port to predict the behavior of individuals or countries that cause inter-
national events to occur. To paraphrase Paul Kennedy’s book,^10 it does
not predict the timing of “the rise and fall of international systems” and
does not engage in the reasons behind it,^11 as it is not intended to explain