Notes 197
III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983),
chapters 1–2.
- Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War; John S. Curtiss,
Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979); Rich, Why the
Crimean War? - Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System,” p. 6.
- Additional noteworthy consequences are Austria was neglected and iso-
lated; Italy, German, and the Balkan question remained unresolved; France won
only a prestige victory; the only true victors were those that later exploited the
wars for their own individual goals—Sardinia/Piedmont, Prussia, and others.
Paul W. Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European
System,” The International History Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1984), pp. 1–27. - On the Seven Weeks’ War (1866) between Prussia and Austria, see Gordon
A. Craig, The Battle of Koniggratz: Prussia’s Victory over Austria, 1866 (Philadelphia,
PA: Lippincott, 1964); Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955); Heinrich Friedjung, The Struggle for Supremacy
in Germany, 1859–1866, translated from the German by A. J. P. Taylor and William
McElwee (New York: Russell, 1966—original edition 1897); Montague H. Hozier,
The Seven Weeks’ War: Its Antecedents and Its Incidents (London: Macmillan, 1871);
Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in
1866 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dennis E. Showalter, Rail-
roads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, CT:
Archon Books, 1975). - The Gastein Convention was intended to settle the outstanding questions
on the sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein, which stemmed from Denmark’s defeat
against Austria and Prussia in their war against it in 1864. Alexander Malet, The
Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866 (London: Longmans,
Green, 1870), pp. 106–110. - On the Franco-Prussian War (July 1870–May 1871), see Richard E. Holmes,
The Road to Sedan: The French Army, 1866–1870 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humani-
ties Press, 1984); Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion
of France, 1870–1871 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961); Robert Tombs, The War
Against Paris, 1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). - Mearsheimer argues that great powers tend to prefer the pattern of buck-
passing to balancing. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 160–161. - Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the
Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Sum-
mer 2002), pp. 149–173, at p. 163. - James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 1984).
- Ralph K. White, “Why Aggressors Lose,” Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 2
(1990), pp. 227–242, at pp. 227–228. - White, “Why Aggressors Lose,” pp. 229–230.
- Anton W. DePorte, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance,
2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986). - On the U.S.-Korea War of 1950–1953, see Dean Acheson, The Korean War
(New York: Norton, 1971); Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953
(New York: Times Books, 1987); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy
and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University