Int Rel Theo War

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198 Notes


Press, 1985); Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987);
Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986); Clarence Y. H. Lo, “Civilian Pol-
icy Makers and Military Objectives: A Case Study of the U.S. Offensive to Win the
Korean War,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 7 (Fall 1979), pp. 229–
242; McCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea”; Allan R. Millett, “A Reader’s
Guide to the Korean War,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 3 (July 1997),
pp. 583–597; Michael O’Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defend-
ing South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks,” International Security, Vol.
22, No, 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135–170; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London:
Macmillan, 1964); Michael Schaller, “U.S. Policy in the Korean War,” International
Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986–87), pp. 162–166; James F. Schnable, Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States
Army, 1992); Tucker C. Spencer, ed., Encyclopedia of the Korean War, 3 vols. (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000); Richard G. Stilwell, “The United States, Japan and
the Security of Korea,” International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 93–95;
John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974),
chapter 3, pp. 69–103; John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953 (New York:
Morrow, 1991); Franklin B. Weinstein, “The United States, Japan and the Security
of Korea,” International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 68–89; Franklin
B. Weinstein, “The Korean Debate, Continued,” International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3
(Winter 1978), pp. 160–167; I. D. White, “Commentary: The United States, Japan
and the Security of Korea,” International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 1977),
pp. 90–92.



  1. Raymond G. O’Connor, “Victory in Modern War,” Journal of Peace Research,
    Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1969), pp. 367–384, at p. 372.

  2. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms; James F. Dunnigan and William C. Mar-
    tel, How to Stop a War: The Lessons on Two Hundred Years of War and Peace (New York:
    Doubleday Religious Publishing Group, 1987).

  3. Shannon McCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” World Politics,
    Vol. 1, No. 2 (January 1949), pp. 223–232.

  4. On the U.S.-Vietnam War of 1968–1975, see Jeffrey J. Clarhe, Advice and
    Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973, The United States Army in Vietnam (Washing-
    ton, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988); Phillip B. Davidson, Viet-
    nam at War: The History, 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988); Michael
    Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States
    Decisionmaking on Vietnam, 5 vols. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971); George C.
    Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 3rd ed.
    (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996); George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of
    the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: Univer-
    sity of Texas Press, 1983); Stanley Hoffmann et al., “Vietnam Reappraised,” Inter-
    national Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 3–26; David E. Kaiser, “Vietnam:
    Was the System the Solution?” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980),
    pp. 199–218; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983);
    Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in
    Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); James Nathan, “The New
    Strategy: Force and Diplomacy in American Foreign Policy,” Defense Analysis, Vol.
    11, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 121–145; James S. Olson, Where the Domino Fell: America

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