Notes 199
in Vietnam, 1945–1990 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991); Stephen P. Rosen, “Viet-
nam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security, Vol. 7, No.
2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83–113; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and
Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.,
1999); Ronald H. Spector, “U.S. Army Strategy in the Vietnam War,” International
Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 130–134.
- Kurth, “America’s Grand Strategy.”
- Yehoshafat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1997)
[Hebrew], p. 595. - Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 1–7. - Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984); Ashley L. Roger, A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War (London: Weidenfeld,
1967). - Summers, On Strategy, pp. 4–5.
- On the Gulf War of 1991 between the U.S. and the coalition against Iraq,
see Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 1993); Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf
War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall
1996), pp. 139–179; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Gulf War
(The Lessons of Modern War), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Lawrence Freed-
man and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New
World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Norman Friedman,
Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991);
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the
Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1995); Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of
Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992); Thomas G.
Mahnken and Barry D. Watts, “What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about
the Future of Warfare,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 151–162. - Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, “Persian Gulf Myths,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 76, No. 3 (May–June 1997), pp. 42–52. - George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” pp. 43–44.
- Sarah O’Hara and Michael Heffernan, “From Geo-Strategy to Geo-
Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After MacKinder,”
Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 54–73, at p. 54; Michael G. Partem, “The
Buffer System in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27,
No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 3–26; Trygve Mathison, The Function of Small States in the
Strategies of Great Powers (Oslo: Scandinavian University Books, 1971). - Edward Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828–1834 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 74–117; David Gillard, The Struggle for
Asia, 1828–1914: A Study in British and Russian Imperialism (London: Methuen,
1977), pp. 26–31, 34–35, 46–53; James A. Norris, The First Afghan War, 1838–1842
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 22–47; G. J. Alder, “The Key
to India? Britain and the Herat Problem, 1830–1863—Part I,” Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (1974), pp. 186–209, at pp. 186–190. - Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848, p. 757.
- M. E. Yapp, Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, 1798–
1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 129–150; Norris, The First Afghan