International Relations Theory of War 59
The international relations theory of war, in contrast, belongs to the cat-
egory of materialistic-holistic theories because it makes the following
arguments. Firstly, the argument that the structure of the system, more
than the internal properties of countries, is what influences the way in
which countries behave. According to the theory, the same country will
act differently under different polarity models. Here one may mention
the clear difference in the way in which the United States behaved in
the bipolar system of 1946–1991 and the unipolar system of 1992–2016.
Secondly, the argument that the international system will dictate inter-
national outcomes of a certain type even when the behavior pattern is
ostensibly to the contrary. According to the theory, balancing actions
against a hyperpower in a unipolar world will be unsuccessful. Here the
failed attempts of France, Germany, and Russia to balance the United
States before the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) can be mentioned. Thirdly,
the argument that the international system structures identities. Accord-
ing to the theory, each hyperpower in a unipolar world will be moti-
vated by the system to expand. Here one may mention the change in
the behavior pattern of the United States in the unipolar system: from a
reserved power in the 1990s to an aggressive one after the 9/11 attacks
in 2001.
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY OF WAR AND
OTHER KEY REALIST THEORIES
The international relations theory of war developed based on the argu-
ment by Thomas Kuhn that cumulative acquisition of innovations and
gradual developments is preferable to destroying a previous paradigm
when developing a new one.^101 The theory is based on the three key realist
theories in the theoretical research of international relations: traditional
realism,^102 neorealism, and offensive realism. Table 2.3 compares the four
theories.
Comparing the international relations theory of war to the two main con-
temporary systemic realist theories in international relations theory, neo-
realism and offensive realism, emphasizes the difference between them.
Firstly, both other theories argue that a unipolar system cannot exist,^103
unlike the international relations theory of war, which claims that a unipolar
system is possible and occurred in 1992–2016. Therefore, one may argue
against them that they neglect a third of the possible international systems.
Secondly, both these theories are based on an analysis unit at the state
level—balancing and bandwagoning according to neorealism; balancing
and buck-passing according to offensive realism—to explain outcomes at
the system level. Therefore, it may be determined that they indicated a
bottom-up (inductive) direction of influence. Conversely, the international
relations theory of war presents a systemic plea in which the direction of