82 International Relations Theory of War
Second World Wars, both of which were central wars that were fought in
the multipolar system of the 20th century.
STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS IN A
MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM
Multipolar systems are the ones most inclined to war. The presence of
three or more polar powers constituting the system increases the number
of possible bipartite relations and the potential for development of con-
flicts that may deteriorate into the three types of wars that the polar pow-
ers would be involved in: central wars, major wars, or minor wars. In the
current subchapter, the argument is that multipolar systems will dictate to
the great powers constituting them to wage more central, major, or minor
wars than the other two polarity models.
Wars as an Unintended Consequence or Systemic Dictate
of the PlayersIt is sometimes argued that many wars stem from misconceptions, mis-
calculations, and silly mistakes. According to this view, wars are uninten-
tional and a result of failure in crisis management.^31 This view focuses
only on the interests of countries whereas a full explanation of the actions,
including counteractions of countries, must relate both to the interests of
countries and to the structure of the environment. Political leaders who
prefer peace to war may end up in a war because the situation is struc-
tured in a manner that incentivizes rational players to act in a manner
that leads them to undesirable outcomes. This dynamic is reflected well in
the prisoners’ dilemma model, in which the structure of the situation results
in individual rational players waiving the advantages of cooperation and
becoming trapped in crisis behavior.^32
In the prisoners’ dilemma game with two players in which each has the
possibility to cooperate with his adversary or not (defecting), each of the
players prefers the outcome of mutual cooperation (an output that is a
result of the decision or strategies of the players) over mutual noncoopera-
tion. The best possible outcome for each of the players is defecting while
his adversary is a sucker and continues to cooperate. The worst possible
outcome is being a sucker by oneself. Therefore, irrespective of the player’s
view of the actions of the counterparty, for both of them, defecting would
be better than cooperation. Following this, individual rational behavior of
defecting leads to an outcome of mutual noncooperation, which is an irra-
tional behavior because this is not the optimal outcome for either player,
for whom mutual cooperation is better. That is the dilemma. Technically,
in the prisoners’ dilemma game, the crisis outcome is undesirable, but it is
not unexpected and hence not inadvertent. Sensible leaders may be able