90 Chapter Three
force but by suasion, using “friendly” measures to attract pilgrims to the in-
tended routes with promises, and delivery, of superior services and security.
The timing could be synchronized, with hajj passports issued a few months
before the Feast of the Sacrifice (the Muslim holiday that marked the end of the
hajj rituals in Mecca). Levitskii proposed that the government make an agree-
ment with one of Russia’s steamship companies to provide direct, round-trip
hajj service to Jeddah. Finally, he argued that the government should appoint
guides and companions to the hajj crowds “from among trusted Muslims who
do not work for the government.”^14
Levitskii pointed out that other European powers had undertaken similar
measures with success, including the provision of special hajj steamships to
their Muslim subjects. And he cited the economic and administrative benefits
that would come from such measures. By providing steamships that gave Mus-
lims a “safer, cheaper way” to make the hajj and perform their religious duties,
the Russian government could both capture some of the hajj revenues of which
Russia had been deprived, and also help with Russia’s efforts to “supervise” the
hajj traffic. At the same time, he added, these measures would help reassure the
local population (in Arabia) of Russia’s good intentions.^15
To organize Russia’s hajj traffic within Arabia itself, Levitskii suggested that
the Foreign Ministry expand Russia’s consular apparatus there, appointing
agents in Mecca, Medina, and Yanbu, with Ottoman approval and “from
among the Russian Muslims living in the Hejaz.” It should also cover the costs
of travel for Muslims stranded in the Hejaz, by charging a fee upon issuing
passports or by organizing charitable donations from among departing Mus-
lims (there were a lot of stranded Muslims from Russia, and not all of them
were poor or illiterate). Finally, it should petition the Ottoman government to
restrain the Bedouin population of the Hejaz.^16
Levitskii’s proposal, which effectively called for Russia to facilitate and capi-
talize on Muslim mobility, was not unusual. The plan took shape during the era
of Sergei Witte, Russia’s minister of finance from 1892 to 1904, who famously
sought to industrialize Russia rapidly as a matter of imperial strength and sur-
vival. Witte focused in particular on the modernization and expansion of Rus-
sian railroads and steamship networks, as a means of building industry and
developing capitalism in Russia, and also knitting together the different regions
of the empire to foster economic growth and imperial unity.^17
Levitskii’s plan fit with Witte’s broader efforts to encourage and profit from
passenger traffic along the empire’s new rail network. During Witte’s tenure as
finance minister, the government invested heavily in railroad construction and