The Hajj and Socialist Revolution 181officials opposed Sovtorgflot’s recruitment and hiring of foreign mullahs and
imams to work as hajj brokers. It was one thing to work with merchants;
another to work directly with religious leaders. The NKID asked Sovtorgflot to
stop the practice, but the fleet was loath to do this—religious elites offered
invaluable connections to foreign Muslim communities, and they often served
as excellent brokers for the fleet.^81
Sovtorgflot’s advertising of its hajj transport service also created conflict with
the NKID. In 1928 the NKID refused to help Sovtorgflot get permission to print
posters because of the religious imagery the fleet used. Officials were uncom-
fortable with the image depicting religious rituals at the Kaaba, and wanted it
changed. The NKID wanted the fleet to avoid religious depictions in general. It
acknowledged that the USSR was trying to attract pilgrims to Soviet routes, but
nevertheless should avoid “agitating” for the expansion of the pilgrimage, espe-
cially agitation of a religious nature. It also noted that the Persian government
in no way wanted to see an expansion of the pilgrimage and might object to
advertisements with a religious character.^82 It encouraged the fleet to change its
advertisements to appeal to Muslims traveling to many destinations, including
Constantinople, Egypt, and Arabia. “It should appear that we seek all kinds of
passengers, not just pilgrims.”^83 By 1929 resistance to Sovtorgflot’s advertise-
ments was widespread. For the first time, Glavlit (the central Soviet censorship
office, which had authority over all printed materials) refused to print Sovtorg-
flot’s posters. Fleet officials were upset. They rightly pointed out that this oppo-
sition frustrated preparations for that year’s hajj campaign. And the sudden
opposition confused them. The previous year Glavlit had printed 5,000 copies
of their brochures to distribute to “all the foreign Eastern countries.”^84
These tensions reveal the dilemma the Soviets faced with regard to hajj trans-
port. Encouraging tourism to the USSR was one thing, but support for the hajj
was different. By facilitating and supporting a central Islamic ritual, the Soviets
were effectively helping Muslims practice their faith. As the hajj traffic through
Soviet lands grew, this support became more visible to Soviet populations.
Soviet officials worried about the domestic repercussions, especially for its
Muslim citizens. In 1928 OGPU officials noted with dismay a rise in domestic
demand for access to Mecca. That year it received applications for hajj passports
from Muslims across the USSR, in Central Asia, the Volga region, Altai, and
the Far East. It issued passports to sixty people, and Sovtorgflot sold them tick-
ets. At the same time, the fleet quietly raised its rates for “internal” hajj pil-
grims, hoping to discourage them and ensure “minimal” pilgrimages by Soviet
citizens in the future.^85